Du Bois v. Gibbons, 33052

• Decision Date: 17 March 1954
• Docket Number: No. 33052,33052
• Citation: 118 N.E.2d 295,2 Ill.2d 392
• Parties: DU BOIS v. GIBBONS. CARLSON v. CITY OF CHICAGO et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 295

118 N.E.2d 295

2 Ill.2d 392

DU BOIS v. GIBBONS.

CARLSON v. CITY OF CHICAGO et al.

No. 33052.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 17, 1954.

John J. Mortimer, Corporation Counsel, Chicago (Charles F. Rathbun, Harry D. Lavery and John A. Cook, Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.

John P. Coghlan, John E. Toomey, John J. Moran and William M. Gibbons, Chicago, for appellees.

Ben W. Heineman, Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Harold A. Smith, Henry F. Tenney and Austin L. Wyman, Chicago, amici curiae.

FULTON, Justice.

This is a direct appeal from a judgment and a decree entered in the superior court of Cook County in separate actions begun in that court but consolidated by order of the trial court at the time of the entry of final judgment and decree in each case. Both actions involve the activities of the emergency committee on crime of the city council of the city of Chicago. The appeal is brought directly to this court because the constitutionality of a statute and an ordinance are in question. The questioned statute is section 23-111 of the Revised Cities and Villages Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 24, par. 23-111. The challenged ordinance created the emergency committee on crime of the city council of the city of Chicago. It was passed on February 14, 1952. The issues in both cases arise upon the pleadings. Final judgment and decree were entered in the superior court after motions to dismiss were sustained in one case and overruled in the other.

On February 13, 1953, Reginald Du Bois, as a member of the city council of the city of Chicago and chairman of the emergency committee on crime of that body, filed his complaint in the court below seeking to compel the defendant, Redmond P. Gibbons, to answer certain questions put to him by the committee concerning his income and property. The complaint alleges in substance that the ordinance was passed pursuant to the authority of section 23-111 of the Revised Cities and Villages Act; that the membership of the committee was established by council resolution, and that Du Bois, a duly elected and qualified member of the council, is the duly appointed chairman; that the committee had begun certain investigations and had heard oral testimony at hearings in connection therewith; that the investigation then being conducted was an investigation of the Chicago police department partment and particularly of its Thirty-sixth police district, commanded by the defendant as captain from September, 1949, to May 13, 1952; that the hearings had developed that there were certain criminal activities in the district during the incumbency of the defendant, including gambling, prostitution and tavern violations which were open and notorious; that the testimony had indicated that the captain of the district was controlled by persons who in turn controlled these illegal activities; that persons engaged in these activities were friendly with the police and that the activities apparently were permitted except when supervisory officers of the police department visited the district. The complaint further alleges that the defendant had been examined under oath at a public hearing before the committee; that after denying that he knew certain persons previously connected with illegal activities in the district, defendant further denied that he had received money from these persons or certain of them; that he denied having 'received anything of any kind from anybody;' that he was then asked the question: 'Starting with the year 1948 and running through to the end of 1952, did you have any income in excess of your salary from any source?'; that defendant refused to answer, stating: 'Mr. Rathbun, any questions concerning my privacy I will discuss with you in private. I will gladly discuss it with you in private and if there is anything that is the least bit wrong, I want you to call it to the attention of the commissioner of police but I want my rights to my privacy respected and I don't think I have to discuss my private affairs here in an open meeting.' The complaint further alleges that the defendant then refused to answer in a private or executive session of the committee; that the testimony developed constitutes probable cause for inquiry into defendant's financial affairs while captain; that the questions were relevant and necessary and that the committee had authorized the commencement of the suit.

Defendant Gibbons filed a motion to dismiss. It asserts that the statute is unconstitutional because it is special legislation in violation of section 22 of article IV of the Illinois constitution, S.H.A.; that in providing for unlimited hearings it subjects citizens' rights to unlimited discretion; that in delegating judicial powers it violates article VI of the State constitution and that the General Assembly cannot delegate the powers enumerated to a single municipal corporation. The motion challenges the validity of the ordinance because it is not within the power delegated by the General Assembly, either expressly or impliedly; because it subjects citizens' rights to unlimited discretion and because it is vague and indefinite, purports to authorize the exercise of power inherent in the State, purports to delegate judicial powers, authorizes impertinent and irrelevant inquiries and authorizes the exercise of powers not possessed by the State or Nation. The trial court sustained the motion to dismiss whereupon plaintiff elected to stand upon the complaint and final judgment was entered against him.

In the other case, plaintiff, C. Arthur Carlson, filed a complaint as a taxpayer against the city of Chicago and the officers and officials named, asserting the unconstitutionality of the statute and ordinance in question and seeking to restrain them from incurring any further expense in connection with the investigations; to enjoin the comptroller from approving the committee's bills; to enjoin him from signing checks on the city treasury and to enjoin the treasurer from honoring checks for committee expense. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, asserting the constitutionality of the statute and ordinance and that the facts alleged show that the authorities were engaged in an investigation authorized by the enactments of the General Assembly and the city council. The court overruled the motion to dismiss and the defendants then elected to stand upon their motion. The court signed a decree enjoining the further expenditure of money by the emergency committee on crime. Recognizing that the issues in both cases were the same, the trial court ordered the cases consolidated at the time of entry of the final judgment and decree in each case. The propriety of the order of consolidation is not questioned.

The section of the Revised Cities and Villages Act involved in this appeal was enacted by the Sixty-seventh General Assembly and was approved July 2, 1951. It provides in substance that the corporate authorities in municipalities of more than 500,000 population shall have the power to investigate the enforcement of the municipal ordinances, rules and regulations, and the action, conduct and efficiency of all officers, agents and employees of the municipality. In conducting investigations, the authorities are empowered to hold public hearings, to administer oaths and to issue subpoenas to secure the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of books and papers relevant to such investigations or to any hearing before such authorities. The act further gives the circuit court or the superior court, upon application of the corporate authorities, power to compel the attendance of witnesses, the production of books and papers and the giving of testimony by attachment for contempt. Appellees successfully contended in the superior court that this statute is unconstitutional and void because it is a special or local law granting a special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise, applying only to the city of Chicago, in violation of section 22 of article IV of the constitution of the State of Illinois. That is the principal argument advanced against the constitutionality of the statute here.

Both sides to this appeal have cited extensively decisions of this court in which legislative classification by population has been sustained and denied, but the only conclusion to be drawn in that this court will uphold the classification when it is reasonable and will refuse to give it effect where clearly unreasonable or arbitrary. Each case and each statute must be separately considered and the problem must be resolved by the application of certain timetested principles to the particular situation. These rules have been stated so often by this court that their reiteration here would appear to be unnecessary. Beginning with the premise that classification is primarily a legislative function with which there should be no judicial interference except to determine whether the legislative action is clearly unreasonable, the rule is finally deduced that a legislative classification based upon population will be sustained where founded on a rational difference of situation or condition existing in the persons or objects upon which it rests and there is a reasonable basis for the classification in view of the objects and purposes to be accomplished. Gaca v. City of Chicago, 411 Ill. 146, 103 N.E.2d 617; Hansen v. Raleigh, 391 Ill. 536, 63 N.E.2d 851, 163 A.L.R. 1425; People ex rel. Johnson v. Dekalb & Great Western Railroad Co., 256 Ill. 290. 100 N.E. 242; Chicago Terminal Transfer Railroad Co. v. Greer, 223 Ill. 104, 79 N.E. 46; People ex rel. Hatfield v. Grover, 258 Ill. 124, 101 N.E. 216; Douglas v. People ex rel. Ruddy, 225 Ill. 536, 80 N.E. 341, 8 L.R.A.,N.S., 1116. Legislation is not special or local merely because it may operate only in a single place where the condition necessary to its operation exists or because, at the time of its enactment, it can be applied only to one city in ...