Duart v. Dep't of Corr.
Decision Date | 24 January 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 18476.,18476. |
Citation | 114 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 363,303 Conn. 479,34 A.3d 343 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | Bonnie DUART v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Leon M. Rosenblatt, West Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Gregory T. D'Auria, solicitor general, with whom were Antoria D. Howard, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, George Jepsen, attorney general, Richard Blumenthal, former attorney general, Margaret Q. Chapple, assistant attorney general, and Jane B. Emons, former assistant attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).
Kathleen Eldergill, Manchester, filed a brief for the Connecticut Employment Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.Charles Krich filed a brief for the commission on human rights and opportunities as amicus curiae.ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH, VERTEFEUILLE and BEAR, Js.*McLACHLAN, J.
The issue before us in this certified appeal is whether a party seeking a new trial on the basis of alleged knowing and deliberate discovery misconduct must show that the result at a new trial would likely be different.1 The plaintiff, Bonnie Duart, appeals, upon our grant of her petition for certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's motion for a new trial. She claims that the rule that we set forth in Varley v. Varley, 180 Conn. 1, 428 A.2d 317 (1980), to determine whether a new trial should be granted on the basis of allegations that the judgment was obtained through fraud—which requires, inter alia, that the movant demonstrate a substantial likelihood that the result of a new trial will be different—does not apply to a motion for a new trial on the basis of alleged discovery misconduct by the nonmoving party. 2 She claims, therefore, that the Appellate Court improperly applied the standard set forth in Varley in affirming the judgment of the trial court. We conclude that the Varley rule as reframed in this decision applies to motions for a new trial based on the discovery misconduct of the nonmoving party. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The Appellate Court set forth the following relevant facts and procedural history. “This case arises out of an employment dispute between the plaintiff, a lieutenant with the department of correction, and the defendant, [the department of correction]. On May 28, 2002, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint against the defendant. In count one, she alleged that the defendant discriminated against her on the basis of her gender and sexual orientation. In count two, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant retaliated against her after she filed a complaint of discrimination with the commission on human rights and opportunities (commission).3
4
Duart v. Dept. of Correction, 116 Conn.App. 758, 760–62, 977 A.2d 670 (2009).5
A jury trial commenced on July 14, 2004. On July 27, 2004, the jury issued a verdict denying the plaintiff's claims of discrimination on the basis of gender, race and sexual orientation. On August 6, 2004, the plaintiff filed a motion in arrest of judgment for extrinsic causes, to set aside the verdict and for a new trial. In support of her motion, the plaintiff relied on the defendant's failure to disclose an anonymous note accusing the plaintiff of being in a relationship with Bruner, developments in the defendant's investigation of a complaint by Lieutenant Catherine Osten that Kelley and Valade had retaliated against her, and a 2002 discrimination complaint filed by Lieutenant Lisa Jackson against Osten and Kelley.6 Assuming, without deciding, that the defendant had engaged in discovery misconduct, the trial court concluded that the evidence at issue was “merely cumulative” of evidence presented at trial and, as such, “would not have produced a different result.” The court applied the “result altering” standard as set forth in Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local No. 59 v. Superline Transportation Co., 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir.1992) ( Teamsters ), which requires the movant to show that it “possesses a potentially meritorious claim or defense which, if proven, will bring success in its wake,” and denied the plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, claiming that the defendant's discovery misconduct had “so perverted the process” that it had deprived her of the opportunity to fully and fairly discover evidence, and that consequently she was entitled to a new trial. She argued that the trial court improperly applied the “result altering” standard set forth in Teamsters, and should have applied the “substantial interference” test set forth in Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 926 (1st Cir.1988), which requires the movant to show that “the misconduct substantially interfered with its ability fully and fairly to prepare for, and proceed at, trial.”
The Appellate Court upheld the trial court's decision by applying the “result altering” standard as articulated in Varley for a motion for a new trial grounded upon evidence of fraud, rather than by applying First Circuit case law. The Appellate Court held that, although the trial court's memorandum of decision did not expressly set out the standard established in Varley, it had “effectively applied the correct standard” in determining that, even if the defendant had disclosed the evidence at issue, the evidence was unlikely to produce a different result. Duart v. Dept. of Correction, supra, 116 Conn.App. at 772–73, 977 A.2d 670. This certified appeal followed.
The plaintiff argues that the Varley rule is inapposite because discovery misconduct is distinct from misconduct at trial, and she should not be required to prove that the result of a new trial will be different. Instead, she suggests that the court should adopt the standard articulated by the First Circuit in Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., supra, 862 F.2d at 926, or by this court in Ramin v. Ramin, 281 Conn. 324, 915 A.2d 790 (2007). In response, the defendant contends that the Appellate Court properly concluded that the “result altering” standard in Varley applies to both claims of fraud and discovery misconduct. We agree with the defendant.
Practice Book § 16–35 authorizes motions for a new trial.7 Historically, this court has recognized the difficulty of articulating a “precise rule” applicable to all motions for new trials for verdicts against the evidence. Laflin v. Pomeroy, 11 Conn. 440, 445 (1836). In Laflin, we stated that while the court must not interfere with the “appropriate province of the jury,” it was clear that it may exercise its authority to grant a new trial when necessary to serve the “great end of all trials, a fair and impartial administration of justice.” Id. We further concluded that the “substantial ends of justice” would not require a new trial when it did not clearly appear that “the result would or ought to be different....” Id.; see also Wooster v. Glover, 37 Conn. 315, 316 (1870) ( ).
Over time and in a variety of contexts, this court consistently has required parties to demonstrate the likelihood of a different result to show that justice requires a new trial. For example, we have stated that the discovery of new evidence warrants a new trial if “upon all the evidence an injustice had been done,” but that a new trial will not be granted upon newly discovered evidence “unless ... a new trial would probably produce a different result.” Turner v. Scanlon, ...
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