Dubai Petroleum Co., v. Kazi, 97-1068

• Court: Supreme Court of Texas
• Citation: 43 Tex. Sup.Ct.J. 412,12 S.W.3d 71
• Docket Number: No. 97-1068,97-1068
• Parties: (Tex. 2000) Dubai Petroleum Company, Conoco, Inc., Dresser Industries, Inc. d/b/a Dresser-Rand Company, Aeroquip Corporation, Solar Turbines Incorporated and Energy Service International, Ltd. a/k/a ESI, Inc., Petitioners v. Sabiha Alimuddin Kazi, individually and as representative of the estate of Alimuddin Sirajuddin Kazi, deceased, and as guardian for Mumtaz Alimuddin Kazi and Shehnaz Alimuddin Kazi, children, Sirajuddin Najmuddin Kazi, father, Farida Sirajuddin Kazi, mother, Respondents
• Decision Date: 10 February 2000

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12 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. 2000) Dubai Petroleum Company, Conoco, Inc., Dresser Industries,
Inc. d/b/a Dresser-Rand Company, Aeroquip Corporation, Solar Turbines
Incorporated and Energy Service International, Ltd. a/k/a ESI, Inc., Petitioners
v.
Sabiha Alimuddin Kazi, individually and as representative of the
estate of Alimuddin Sirajuddin Kazi, deceased, and as guardian
for Mumtaz Alimuddin Kazi and Shehnaz Alimuddin Kazi, children,
Sirajuddin Najmuddin Kazi, father, Farida Sirajuddin Kazi, mother, Respondents No. 97-1068 SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS Argued Sept. 10, 1998
Decided Feb. 10, 2000.

On Petition for Review from the

Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas

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Copyrighted Material Omitted

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Chief Justice Phillips delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Hecht, Justice Owen, Justice Baker, Justice Abbott, Justice Hankinson, Justice O'Neill and Justice Gonzales joined.

We withdraw our January 6 opinion and substitute the following.

Section 71.031 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits suit for the personal injury or wrongful death of a citizen of a foreign country, if the decedent or injured party's country of citizenship has "equal treaty rights" with the United States. In this wrongful death case, we hold that the "equal treaty rights" requirement is not jurisdictional and that the plaintiffs have satisfied their initial burden to show that the decedent's country of citizenship offers "equal treaty rights" to United States citizens. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, which reversed the trial court's order dismissing the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 961 S.W.2d 313.

I

Alimuddin Sirajuddin Kazi, a citizen of India, was killed while working on an oil rig off the coast of the United Arab Emirates. Kazi's survivors, all citizens of India, brought this wrongful death suit in Harris County district court, basing their claim on Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 71.031. When the Kazis filed this suit in 1993, section 71.031 provided:

(a) An action for damages for the death or personal injury of a citizen of this state, of the United States, or of a foreign country may be enforced in the courts of this state, although the wrongful

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act, neglect, or default causing the death or injury takes place in a foreign state or country, if:

(1) a law of the foreign state or country or of this state gives a right to maintain an action for damages for the death or injury;

(2) the action is begun in this state within the time provided by the laws of this state for beginning the action; and

(3) in the case of a citizen of a foreign country, the country has equal treaty rights with the United States on behalf of its citizens.

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 71.031(a) (1997).¹

Defendants, Dubai Petroleum Company, Inc., Conoco, Inc., Dresser Industries, Inc. d/b/a Dresser-Rand Co., Aeroquip Corporation, Solar Turbines Incorporated, and Energy Service International, LTD a/k/a ESI., Inc., responded that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because India does not have "equal treaty rights" with the United States as section 71.031(a)(3)required. The court agreed and dismissed the case.²

The court of appeals reversed, holding that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 ("Covenant"), confers "equal treaty rights" between India and the United States. 961 S.W.2d at 318. The court of appeals sought guidance from a footnote in our opinion in Dow Chemical Co. v. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 675 n.2 (Tex. 1990), which requires the existence of treaty provisions "similar" to those in the Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation ("FCN") Treaty between Costa Rica and the United States³ to satisfy subsection (a)(3) of section 71.031. Determining that the Covenant's provisions were sufficiently "similar" to the rights extended in the FCN Treaty, which include (1) protection to persons and property, (2) free and open access to the courts, (3) the ability to employ counsel, and (4) the same rights and privileges as native citizens, the court of appeals held that Texas courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over the Kazis' wrongful death action. 961 S.W.2d at 318. For different reasons than the court of appeals gave, we affirm that judgment.

II

It is well-settled that "[a] judgment may properly be rendered against a

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party only if the court has authority to adjudicate the type of controversy involved in the action." Restatement (Second) of Judgments 11 (1982). For federal district courts or state trial courts of limited jurisdiction, the authority to adjudicate must be established at the outset of each case, as jurisdiction is never presumed. See 13 Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure 3522, at 62 (1984). A Texas district court, however, is a court of general jurisdiction. Our Constitution provides that the jurisdiction of a district court "consists of exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution or other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body." Tex. Const. art. V, 8. By statute, district courts have "the jurisdiction provided by Article V, Section 8, of the Texas Constitution," Tex. Gov't Code 24.007, and "may hear and determine any cause that is cognizable by courts of law or equity and may grant any relief that could be granted by either courts of law or equity." Tex. Gov't Code 24.008.⁴ For "courts of general jurisdiction, . . . the presumption is that they have subject matter jurisdiction unless a showing can be made to the contrary." 13 Wright et al., supra, at 3522, at 60; see also 16 Casad et al., Moore's Federal Practice 108.04[2], at 108-19 (3d ed. 1999); Dean v. State ex rel. Bailey, 30 S.W. 1047, 1048 (Tex. 1895) ("No other court having jurisdiction over the cause, the district court has the power to determine the right of the case, and to apply the remedy."); Bowles v. Angelo, 188 S.W.2d 691, 693 (Tex. Civ. App.--Galveston 1945, no writ) ("[I]f the jurisdiction necessary to relieve against a wrong is not to be found in the specific grants of jurisdiction to the justice or the county court, then it has either been specifically granted to the district court, or conferred upon that court in the grant to it of all residuary jurisdiction."); 2 Braden, et al., The Constitution of the State of Texas, An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 411 (1977). Thus, all claims are presumed to fall within the jurisdiction of the district court unless the Legislature or Congress has provided that they must be heard elsewhere.

However, this Court has held that this presumption does not apply to actions grounded in statute rather than the common law. For example, this Court held in Mingus v. Wadley, 285 S.W. 1084 (Tex. 1926):

The general rule is where the cause of action and remedy for its enforcement are derived not from the common law but from the statute, the statutory provisions are mandatory and exclusive, and must be complied with in all respects or the action is not maintainable.

Id. at 1087. Further, the Court stated:

". . . there is no presumption of jurisdiction where a court, although it is one of general jurisdiction, exercises special statutory powers in a special statutory manner or otherwise than according to the courts of the common law, since under such circumstances the court

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stands with reference to the special power exercised on the same footing with courts of limited and inferior jurisdiction."

Id. at 1089 (quoting 15 Corpus Juris Courts, 148(c), at 831-32). We have repeatedly reaffirmed this dichotomy between common-law and statutory actions. See, e.g., Grounds v. Tolar Indep. Sch. Dist., 707 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. 1986); Texas Catastrophe Property Ins. Ass'n v. Council of Co-Owners of Saida II Towers Condominium Ass'n, 706 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. 1986); Alpha Petroleum Co. v. Terrell, 59 S.W.2d 364, 367-68 (Tex. 1933); see also Cunningham v. Robison, 136 S.W. 441, 442 (Tex. 1911). Likewise, the court of appeals below concluded that a claim must satisfy all the requisites of section 71.031 in order for the district court to assert subject-matter jurisdiction. 961 S.W.2d at 314. This approach is consistent with the language of other appellate decisions. See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Baker, 838 S.W.2d 838, 841 n.2 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1992, no writ); Alfaro v. Dow Chem., 751 S.W.2d 208, 208-09 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1988), aff'd, 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990).

But while conceptualizing subject-matter jurisdiction in this way has an initial appeal, the resulting practical difficulties suggest underlying logical flaws. Because of the longstanding principle that subject-matter jurisdiction is a power that "exists by operation of law only, and cannot be conferred upon any court by consent or waiver," Federal Underwriters Exch. v. Pugh, 174 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1943), a judgment will never be considered final if the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. "The classification of a matter as one of [subject-matter] jurisdiction . . . opens the way to making judgments vulnerable to delayed attack for a variety of irregularities that perhaps better ought to be sealed in a judgment." Restatement (Second) of Judgments 12 cmt. b, at 118 (1982). When, as here, it is difficult to tell whether or not the parties have satisfied the requisites of a particular statute, it seems perverse to treat a judgment as perpetually void merely because the court or the parties made a good-faith mistake in interpreting the law. Thus, the rationale of Mingus has been criticized as "more suited to a eulogy for the common law than to a businesslike administration of justice." Dobbs, Trial Court Error as an Excess of...