Dubee v. Feinstein

Citation200 A. 528
Decision Date08 July 1938
Docket NumberNo. 7985.,7985.
PartiesDUBEE v. FEINSTEIN.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Charles A. Walsh, Judge.

Action upon a book account by J. Raymond Dubee, receiver, against B. E. Feinstein. By stipulation of the parties decision was entered in district court for plaintiff and defendant appealed to the superior court, which gave a decision for the plaintiff in the sum of $154.14, and defendant brings exceptions.

Exceptions overruled and case remitted for entry of judgment on decision.

Aram A. Arabian, of Providence, for plaintiff. Frank H. Wildes, of Providence, for defendant.

CONDON, Justice.

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This action of the case on book account was originally brought in the district court for the sixth judicial district. By stipulation of the parties, decision was entered in that court for the plaintiff. Defendant appealed to the superior court, where the case was tried by a justice of that court, without the intervention of a jury and resulted in a decision for the plaintiff in the sum of $154.14.

Defendant properly excepted to this decision, and brought his bill of exceptions to this court. In his bill of exceptions he has stated, as separate exceptions, the several grounds of error, which he alleges in support of his exception to the decision.

The bill of exceptions is as follows: "This cause came on to be heard before Mr. Justice Walsh on the 1st day of November, 1937, and decision was rendered therein for the plaintiff receiver in the sum of $154.14; and within seven days after the rendition of said decision, the defendant filed his notice and claim of exceptions, and now within the time fixed by the Court, the defendant comes and files this, his Bill of Exceptions, and for grounds of exception states: 1st. That the decision rendered was against the law. 2nd. That said decision was against the evidence and the weight thereof. 3rd. That said decision was against the law and the evidence. 4th. That the trial justice erred both upon the law and the evidence in the rendition of said decision, and to which the defendant duly excepted."

The plaintiff, in his brief in this court, objected to this manner of stating exceptions, but he did not move to dismiss the defendant's bill. Nevertheless, he contended that it did not state exceptions as required by general laws 1923, chapter 348, sec. 17. This section provides that any person or party who has taken exceptions in the superior court, "shall file in the office of the clerk of the superior court his bill of exceptions, in which he shall state separately and clearly the exceptions relied upon * * *."

Before we consider the defendant's exceptions, we shall dispose of this objection, notwithstanding the failure of the plaintiff to move to dismiss defendant's bill.

Exceptions must be stated separately and clearly. However, it is the exceptions themselves and not the reasons upon which the claim or claims of error in the decision are based that are to be so stated. Blake v. Atlantic National Bank, 33 R.I. 109, 80 A. 181. In that case this court very definitely set out the requirements to be followed in order to conform with the mandate of the statute. This procedure is now well established and seldom is there any departure from it.

In the instant case we are of the opinion that the defendant has in effect complied with these requirements. Bannon v. Bannon, 44 R.I. 468, 119 A. 56. He has gone further than necessary and has set out the grounds of his exception as exceptions. But it is clear that his exception is to the decision of the trial justice. Actually that is the one exception brought here by this bill. It is not necessary, nor is it desirable, for the party objecting to the decision of a case by a trial justice, sitting without a jury, to take separate exceptions to that decision, based on various grounds. See Dunn Worsted Mills v. Allendale Worsted Mills, 33 R.I. 115, 80 A. 591. A single exception to such decision will enable the party prosecuting a bill of exceptions to advance here any reason in support of his claim or claims of error in that decision. The method adopted by the defendant in the instant case tends to confuse the practice in stating motions for new trials addressed to the trial justice, with an entirely different procedure prescribed for bringing to this court for review, by bill of exceptions, the decisions and rulings of the superior court.

Defendant's exceptions are deemed to be properly before us and we shall now consider them as but one exception to the decision of the case by the trial justice. The defendant contends that such decision is erroneous on the grounds that it is against the law, against the evidence and against the law and the evidence, and the weight thereof.

It appears from the evidence that the defendant was a member of the Progressive Assistance Association; that such association was incorporated under the laws of the state of Rhode Island but never formally organized by adopting by-laws; that it was a mutual benefit association not unlike, in its nature, a building loan association, except that it loaned money to its members on promissory notes and not on mortgages; that the defendant became a member, received a passbook, paid dues to the association and borrowed money from it; that as such member he was credited on the books of the association with certain amounts which he had paid periodically as dues or shares, and with certain other amounts, which he had paid in reduction of an outstanding loan that he owed to the association on a promissory note, dated January 4, 1930, in the sum of $150.

It further appears from the evidence that, while the association did not formally adopt by-laws, it did receive from the office of the secretary of state a duplicate of its articles of association filed in that office, which duplicate was duly certified by the secretary of state under the seal of the state; that the association thereupon did business under such articles for...

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3 cases
  • Memorial Hospital v. Woolf, 9795
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island
    • August 16, 1957
    ...it any error that may inhere in the decision. General Motors Truck Co. v. Shepard Co., 47 R.I. 153, 155, 130 A. 593; Dubee v. Feinstein, 61 R.I. 214, 216, 200 A. 528. Such an error, however, must be prejudicial to warrant The defendant Eunice F. Kalver's name on the writ and her name in the......
  • Lehner v. Adam Hat Stores, Inc., 9837
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island
    • July 9, 1958
    ...necessary nor desirable to prosecute separate exceptions to the decision of a trial justice sitting without a jury. Dubee v. Feinstein, 61 R.I. 214, 200 A. 528. We shall treat them as though there was but a single exception to the decision based on the grounds that such decision is against ......
  • White v. Alexion, 9246
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island
    • April 10, 1952
    ...decision on all grounds presented in the motion and argued to him. See Kenyon v. Parzych, 69 R.I. 139, 31 A.2d 476, and Dubee v. Feinstein, 61 R.I. 214, 200 A. 528. We shall treat each of those points in the above order after first summarizing briefly the main facts of the accident out of w......

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