Dubie v. Cass-Warner Corp., CASS-WARNER

• Decision Date: 05 April 1966
• Docket Number: CASS-WARNER,No. 342,342
• Citation: 125 Vt. 476,218 A.2d 694
• Parties: Francis T. DUBIE v.CORPORATION and Robert Bugbee.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Page 694

218 A.2d 694

125 Vt. 476

Francis T. DUBIE v. CASS-WARNER CORPORATION and Robert Bugbee.

No. 342.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

April 5, 1966.

Rosenberg & Rosenberg, Burlington, Loveland & Hackel, Rutland, for plaintiff.

McNamara & Larrow, Burlington, for defendant corporation.

Philip A. Kolvoord, Essex Junction, for defendant Bugbee.

Before HOLDEN, C. J., and SHANGRAW, BARNEY, SMITH and KEYSER, JJ.

HOLDEN, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff was injured while working on a construction project in Winooski, Vermont, on April 21, 1961. He was in the employ of Sewall and Smith Construction Company at the time of the accident. His employer has expended $6,908.80 for the plaintiff's benefit under the Workmen's Compensation Law.

The present action is to establish liability in the defendant, Cass-Warner Corporation, and its employee, Bugbee, as third party participants in the accident which gave rise to the plaintiff's injuries. The defendant, Bugbee, was the operator of heavy mechanized equipment at a construction site in which Sewall and Smith Construction Company was the main contractor.

The final award of workmen's compensation was made on May 31, 1963. The present action was commenced the following June. Notice, by registered mail, was not sent by the plaintiff to his employer, the compensation carrier, not to the commissioner of industrial relations, as provided in 21 V.S.A. § 624. However, the parties have stipulated to the fact that counsel for the employer and insurance carrier have participated in the preparation of the pleadings and have shared in certain expenses of the present action.

The original complaint alleged the amount of payment under the Workmen's Compensation Law and further stated 'This action is being brought for the benefit of Sewall and Smith Construction Company up to this amount ($6,908.80) and for the benefit of the plaintiff for the balance herein claimed as damages.'

The plaintiff was later allowed to amend the complaint which, among other things, deleted the allegation concerning the payment of workmen's compensation under the statute. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint as amended. The motion was denied by the trial court. The defendants bring the question for review before final judgment under the provisions of 12 V.S.A. § 2386.

'1. In a third-party suit under Title 21, V.S.A. § 624, where compensation has been paid the injured employee, is it necessary to plead the fact that compensation has been paid, the amount thereof, and the name of the compensation carrier who has made the payment?'

The statute which authorizes this suit furnishes no direct answer.

Prior to 1959, the Workmen's Compensation Law made acceptance of benefits a bar to any other suit for recovery for the injury by the injured employee. V.S. '41 §§ 8076 and 8078; P.L. §§ 6509 and 6511. Where the employee elected compensation under the law, the statute preserved only a right in the employer, by way of subrogation, to recover against the tort-feasor. Towne v. Rizzico, 113 Vt. 205, 211, 32 A.2d 129, held that the pleadings in the case should show this in order that the record demonstrate, in support of the judgment, that the action was not barred because the employe had had compensation. In that case, amendment of the pleadings was allowed in this Court to support the judgment.

With the amendment of 21 V.S.A. § 624 (V.S. '47 § 8078) by No. 232 of the Acts of 1959, specifically reversing the election provision and removing the bar formerly imposed by acceptance of compensation, the necessity for the rule of Towne v. Rizzico, supra, 113 Vt. 205, 211, 32 A.2d 129, no longer applies. Receipt of statutory compensation has no relevance with respect to the employee's right to sue the tort-feasor. The wrongdoer is not entitled to credit for compensation payments, from outside sources, against the damages he brought about. D'Archangelo v. Loyer, 125 Vt. --, --, 215 A.2d 520, 523.

The answer to the questions certified must be given in the context of this case at the time the issue was raised, not in the abstract. Powers v. State Highway Board, 123 Vt. 1, 5, 178 A.2d 390. In this third party suit, at the time of challenge, the complaint was not fatally deficient for failing to plead the facts relative to compensation or name the carrier involved.

Our answer cannot be given in the broad language of the question certified. We recognize that actions might arise where the issues presented by the pleadings might require the joinder or intervention of an employer or his compensation carrier. Under such circumstances our rules of procedure are sufficiently fiexible to entrust such participation to the control and direction of the trial court, as in Harris v. General Coach Works, 37 F.R.D. 343 (U.S.Dist.Ct., Mich.1964).

The second question, as certified by the court, is:

'2. Do the facts as set forth in a stipulation filed by counsel in this case relieve the plaintiff of a literal compliance with the provisions of 21 V.S.A. 624, as regards notice and does such a failure of literal compliance become a bar to a third-party action?'

The related provisions of 21 V.S.A. § 624 specify:

If the injured employee or his personal representative does not commence the action within one year after the occurrence of the personal injury, then the employer or its compensation insurance carrier may, within the period of time for the commencement of actions prescribed by statute, enforce the liability of the third party in the name of the injured employee or his personal representative. Not less than thirty days before the commencement of suit by any party under this section, the party shall notify, by registered mail at their last known address, the commissioner of industrial relations, the injured employee, or in the event of his death, his known...