Dubin v. Cnty. of Nassau

Decision Date27 September 2017
Docket NumberNo 16–CV–4209 (JFB) (AKT),16–CV–4209 (JFB) (AKT)
Citation277 F.Supp.3d 366
Parties Benjamin DUBIN and Byron Alston, on behalf of themselves and all others so similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. The COUNTY OF NASSAU, the Nassau County Legislature, and the Nassau County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

Plaintiffs are represented by Kevin Page, Kiel Martin Doran, and Steven M. O'Connor of O'Connor Reed, LLP, 242 King Street Port Chester, New York 10573.

Defendants are represented by Andrew Reginald Scott of the Nassau County Attorney's Office, 1 West Street, Mineola, New York 11501.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Joseph F. Bianco, District Judge:

Plaintiffs Benjamin Dubin ("Dubin") and Byron Alston ("Alston," and with Dubin, "plaintiffs") bring this putative class action against defendants the County of Nassau (the "County"), the Nassau County Legislature (the "Legislature"), and the Nassau County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency (the "TPVA")1 (collectively, "defendants") alleging (1) a cause of action for violations of various federal constitutional rights2 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983(" Section 1983"); (2) a claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 ; and (3) eighteen claims under New York State law for myriad constitutional and statutory infractions.3 The gravamen of plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") is that defendants have unlawfully enacted and enforced a local ordinance known as the Drivers' Responsibility Fee (the "DRF"), Nassau Cty. Ordinance 190–2012.4 The DRF allegedly imposes a mandatory payment of $45 on all motorists who have been issued tickets or citations and received a final disposition other than "not guilty."

Defendants now move to dismiss the SAC pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)5 on the following grounds: (1) the Rooker Feldman doctrine bars plaintiffs' claims; (2) the Court should abstain from adjudicating the Section 1983 claim due to ongoing New York State court proceedings; (3) the Court should decline jurisdiction over plaintiffs' second cause of action for a declaratory judgment; (4) all of plaintiffs' federal claims under Section 1983 fail to state a cause of action; and (5) in the absence of a viable federal claim, the Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' New York State law claims.

As an initial matter, the Court concludes that (1) the Rooker Feldman does not bar any claims in this case, and (2) abstention is unwarranted on the federal claims. On the merits, the Court finds that plaintiffs have not pled a plausible cause of action based on their bill of attainder, procedural due process, substantive due process, unjust takings, equal protection, and double jeopardy allegations. However, the Court denies the motion to dismiss the excessive fines claim under Section 1983 on the ground raised by defendants—namely, that the DRF cannot be punitive because it is not imposed following a criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding and is assessed to defray administrative costs. Because it was not raised by defendants, the Court does not reach the second issue with respect to the excessive fines claim—that is, whether a $45 fine can be unconstitutionally excessive.

Accordingly, because a federal claim has survived defendants' motion, the Court retains supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims and will not dismiss them at this stage. Thus, for the reasons set forth below, the Court grants defendants' motion in part and denies it in part.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background

The Court takes the following facts from the SAC. (ECF No. 23.) The Court assumes these facts to be true for purposes of deciding this motion and construes them in the light most favorable to plaintiffs as the non-moving party.

1. The Parties

Plaintiffs Dubin and Alston are both New York State residents and were respectively assessed a DRF on September 4, 2015 and July 7, 2016. (SAC at ¶¶ 7–8.) The County is a local New York government governed by the Legislature, which established the TPVA and enacted ordinances related to the DRF. (Id. at ¶¶ 9–10.)

2. Nature of the Action

This case arises out of "defendants' unlawful assessment of [the DRF] against motorists who have had tickets and/or citations dismissed by the" TPVA court. (Id. at ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs allege that the DRF mandates a $45 payment by all motorists who receive citations or tickets and a "final disposition other than not guilty," and although "characterized as a ‘fee,’ this charge is in fact a non-discretionary penalty imposed merely for having been issued a ticket, and the TPVA Court must charge the penalty even when the tickets against the individuals have been dismissed ...." (Id. at ¶ 2; see also id. at ¶ 28 ("This is a legislative penalty, and is not based on an actual adjudication by any Court after a hearing or other opportunity to be heard.").)

The SAC further states that the "TPVA has created a chilling-effect to [sic] individual citizens who come before that Court, as the[ ] only way that the[y] can dispute the penalty is to go to trial, which requires time, effort, and costs just to dispute the DRF." (Id. at ¶ 4.) As a result, "only approximately 1% of individuals who are issued tickets elect to proceed to trial," notwithstanding that "for those individuals whom [sic] make an appearance before the TPVA Court, over 40% of all tickets are dismissed." (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 30.) In sum, plaintiffs assert that the DRF "has nothing to do with ‘administrative costs’ relating to issuing tickets/citations" but is rather a punishment imposed "against individuals for simply being issued a ticket without any findings of fact, nor proof of any actual violations," and "irrespective of whether or not they are actually guilty of any offense or violation ...." (Id. at ¶¶ 32–34.) Moreover, the SAC alleges that the DRF's underlying aim is to generate revenue for the County to help defray budget deficits. (Id. at ¶¶ 34–40.)

3. Plaintiffs' Alleged Injuries

On or about July 31, 2015, Dubin was issued a ticket with an appearance date of September 11, 2015 for a defective brake light on his vehicle. (Id. at ¶¶ 16–17, Exh. A.) After Dubin repaired the brake light and had his vehicle inspected by a County police officer, the TPVA dismissed the ticket but nevertheless assessed a DRF.6 (Id. at ¶¶ 18–20, Exhs. B–C.)

Alston appeared before the TPVA on or about July 7, 2016 regarding seven outstanding tickets or citations. (Id. at ¶ 23, Exh. F.) He pled guilty to four offenses, and the TPVA dismissed the remaining three tickets/citations. (Id. ) The TPVA assessed Alston a DRF for each dismissed ticket, as well as a "deferred payment fee" of $15 per ticket, for an approximate total cost of $180. (Id. at ¶ 24.)

Among other relief, plaintiffs seek, on behalf of themselves and a class of other similarly situated individuals, a declaration that the "DRF violates the Constitutional protections of the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and as well as [sic] other [federal] Constitutional Protections"; an injunction enjoining defendants from imposing the DRF; and reimbursement of all DRF charges and associated expenses. (Id. at ¶ 6.)

B. Procedural Background

Dubin commenced this action on July 29, 2016 (ECF No. 3), and plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 20, 2016 (ECF No. 12) and the SAC on November 30, 2016 (ECF No. 23). Defendants moved to dismiss the SAC on January 13, 2017 (ECF No. 25) and provided supplemental legal authority in support of their motion on February 3, 2017 (ECF No. 28). Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion and defendants' supplemental letter on February 27, 2017 and March 2, 2017, respectively (ECF Nos. 30–31); and defendants replied on March 20, 2017 (ECF No. 33).

The Court heard oral argument on March 23, 2017 (ECF No. 34), and plaintiffs subsequently filed their own letter providing supplemental legal authority in support of their opposition on May 27, 2017 (ECF No. 38). The Court has fully considered all of the parties' submissions and arguments.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Relevant here are Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), which respectively govern motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The following standards of review are applicable to motions brought under those provisions.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

To defeat a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(1), "[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence." Aurecchione v. Schoolman Transp. Sys., Inc. , 426 F.3d 635, 638 (2d Cir. 2005). In resolving this issue, the court "must accept as true all material factual allegations in the complaint, but [it is] not to draw inferences from the complaint favorable to plaintiffs." J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Schs. , 386 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2004). Additionally, the court "may refer to evidence outside the pleadings" to resolve the jurisdictional issue. Makarova v. United States , 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Kamen v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. , 791 F.2d 1006, 1011 (2d Cir. 1986) ).

B. Failure to State a Claim

In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters. , 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 2006) ; Nechis v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc. , 421 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2005). "In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege a plausible set of facts sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’ " Operating Local 649 Annuity Trust Fund v. Smith Barney Fund Mgmt. LLC , 595 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). This standard...

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