Dubois v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Mayes Cnty.
| Decision Date | 29 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 12-CV-677-JED-PJC |
| Parties | GREGORY DUBOIS, Plaintiff, v. THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF MAYES COUNTY, OKLAHOMA; FRANK CANTEY; CHUCK WARD; JEFFERY BARTLETT; CHRIS BUCK; S. BROWN; MITCH GOODMAN; and EMILY GARCIA; Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Oklahoma |
Plaintiff alleges that he was denied necessary medical care for over three months while he was a pretrial detainee in the Mayes County Jail. During that time, he exhibited clear and objective indications of serious physical illness or injury, and his immediate medical needs were reported and obviously apparent, but the defendants were deliberately indifferent in denying him an evaluation by a competent medical professional. Plaintiff alleges that, after 100 days of being held without medical care, he was found in his cell, suffering from abdominal pain, and in visible distress, anxious, hyperventilating, with a distended abdomen. He was finally taken to a nearby medical center, where he was diagnosed with upper gastrointestinal bleeding, a likely perforated ulcer, and hemorrhagic shock.
He was then transferred by Life Flight to Saint Francis Hospital in Tulsa, where he was diagnosed with gastrointestinal bleeding, acute blood loss anemia, free air, free fluid, acute abdominal pain and vascular changes to his right leg, which was discolored, with arterial occlusion. The leg was ultimately amputated as a result of the defendants' deliberateindifference. Plaintiff alleges that his rights were violated under the federal and State Constitutions.
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion, a court must determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Rules require "a short and plain statement of the claim to show that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The standard does "not require a heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," and the factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555-56, 570 (citations omitted). Id. at 556. "Once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Id. at 563.
Twombly articulated the pleading standard for all civil actions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009). For the purpose of making the dismissal determination, a court must accept all the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true, even if doubtful, and must construe the allegations in the light most favorable to the claimant. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
Defendants Brown, Buck, and Ward argue that the plaintiff's pleading does not include sufficiently specific allegations of facts against each of them. Specifically, these defendants contend that plaintiff "makes no allegation of wrong doing [sic] committed by [any of these defendants]," and instead "makes generic, vague, and broad assertions that 'defendants' were deliberately indifferent." (Doc. 22 at 1-2). Defendant Bartlett adopted those defendants' motion and thus argues for dismissal on the same grounds. (Doc. 25).
Plaintiff responds that he has plainly alleged constitutional violations for the deliberate indifference of the defendants in refusing him medical care while he was held in the jail. Plaintiff also points out that his pleading was filed in state court, and the Oklahoma state courts have not yet adopted the more exacting Twombly and Iqbal pleading standards. After Twombly and Iqbal were decided, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has continued to hold that a pleading "must not be dismissed for failure to state a legally cognizable claim unless the allegations indicate beyond any doubt that the litigant can prove no set of facts that would entitle [plaintiff to] relief." Simonson v. Schaefer, 301 P.3d 413, 414 (Okla. 2013). Because plaintiff's pleading was filed in state court under the less stringent state pleading standard, plaintiff requests that the Court grant leave to amend if plaintiff's allegations are found insufficient.
It is well-established in this Circuit that, "[b]ecause in [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 actions, named defendants often include a governmental entity and numerous state actors, 'it is particularly important in such circumstances that the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claimsagainst him or her, as distinguished from collective allegations against the state." Gray v. University of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 672 F.3d 909, 921-22, n.9 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008)) (emphasis in original). "To provide adequate notice as to the nature of multiple claims against multiple defendants, a complaint must isolate the allegedly unlawful acts of 'each defendant.'" Id.
Here, plaintiff's pleading generally provides sufficient facts to support a plausible claim that his constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution were violated by one or more sheriff's deputies, who allegedly denied him medical care while he was in the county jail.1 However, he has not alleged any specific actions by the individual defendants in participating in the constitutional violations. Rather, the only specific allegations against the individual defendants are found in the jurisdictional section of his Amended Petition, where plaintiff notes that defendant Ward was the jail administrator and was acting as "the agent, servant, and employee of the Mayes County Sheriff's Office." (Doc. 2-10 at ¶¶ 6-7). Bartlett, Buck, and Brown are alleged to have been deputy sheriffs and detention officers who were also employed by the Mayes County Sheriff's Office. (Id. at ¶¶ 8-10; see alsoid., ¶ 13). These allegations are insufficient to provide notice to each individual defendant of the plaintiff's allegations against him. See Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1250. For example, it is unclear whether plaintiff's claim against Ward is premised solely upon Ward's position as jail administrator or if plaintiff asserts that Ward was directly aware of, and involved in denying medical care for, plaintiff's serious medical needs. Similarly, plaintiff does not specifically allege that Bartlett, Buck, or Brown had direct involvement in dealing with plaintiff and thus knew of and deliberately disregarded his serious medical needs while at the jail or whether plaintiff has merely included all of them as defendants because they were detention officers at the jail during the time of his incarceration. Those are critical distinctions that will impact the determination of whether plaintiff has § 1983 claims against any or all of them.
Accordingly, dismissal is appropriate as to the claims against defendants Ward, Buck, Brown, and Bartlett in their individual capacities. See id. at 1250-54. However, the Court agrees with plaintiff that he should be granted leave to amend.
Defendant Cantey was the sheriff of Mayes County at the time plaintiff was in jail, and plaintiff sued him in his official and individual capacities. In addition to identifying him as the then-sheriff, plaintiff's pleading also alleges that, as sheriff, Cantey was charged with operational supervision of the jail and county jail inmates, and was responsible for establishing polices, practices, and customs of treating county jail inmates with deliberate indifference to their mental and physical needs and failing to provide training and supervision regarding proper medical and mental evaluations of inmates in the county jail. (See Doc. 10-2 at ¶ 30). It is also alleged that jail detention officers acted pursuant to those policies in violating plaintiff's civil rights, and that "[s]uch policies were the moving force behind the constitutional violations." (Id.).
Plaintiff's claims against Cantey, in his individual capacity, are premised upon a theory of supervisory liability under § 1983. A supervisor may not be held liable individually under a theory of respondeat superior or be held liable solely based upon the misdeeds of his or her employees; instead, a supervisor "is only liable for his or her own misconduct." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (emphasis added); see also Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 435 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dept., 717 F.3d 760, 767 (10th Cir. 2013)). "[M]ere negligence is insufficient to establish supervisory liability." Johnson v. Martin, 195 F.3d 1208, 1219 (10th Cir. 1999). Three elements are required to establish supervisory liability: (1) personal involvement; (2) causation; and (3) state of mind. Schneider, 717 F.3d at 767. As with the others sued in their individual capacities, plaintiff has not provided sufficient allegations necessary to state a claim against Cantey in his individual capacity.
Specifically, the Amended Petition does not sufficiently allege that Cantey was personally involved in denying medical care...
To continue reading
Request your trial