Dubose v. Charles
| Decision Date | 22 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:12-cv-971 |
| Parties | Bobby-Ray DuBose, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Thomas P. Charles, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs,1 pro se, sued the Director of the Ohio Department of Public Safety, Thomas P. Charles, Franklin County Sheriff Zach Scott, Deputy Sheriff William Fitzpatrick, the Honorable William H. Politt, Jr., Police Chief Walter L. Distelzweig, the Honorable David S. Jump, Officer Martin Holley, and the Honorable Andrea C. Peeples under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for various state law violations. In a previous Opinion and Order, the Court granted the motions to dismiss of the Honorable Andrea C. Peeples, the Honorable William H. Pollitt, Jr., the Honorable David S. Jump, Chief Distelzweig, Officer Holley, and Director Charles. Defendants Scott and Fitzpatrick now move for summary judgment. Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 40. For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion with respect to the federal claims and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.
The facts as they relate to Defendants Scott and Fitzpatrick are as follows. Bobby-Ray DuBose ("Plaintiff") is an Ohio resident. Defendant Zach Scott is the Franklin County Sheriff ("Sheriff Scott"). Defendant William Fitzpatrick is a deputy with the Franklin County Sheriff's Office ("Deputy Fitzpatrick").
On October 3, 2012, at 6:45 in the morning, Plaintiff was riding a bicycle in Columbus, Ohio when he was stopped by Deputy Fitzpatrick. Deputy Fitzpatrick said he stopped Plaintiff because Plaintiff did not have lights on his bike, as required by the Ohio Revised Code. Plaintiff informed Deputy Fitzpatrick there was no law requiring him to have lights on his bicycle, but he says Deputy Fitzpatrick cited a Columbus City Code provision in response.
Plaintiff avers Deputy Fitzpatrick "kidnapped" him and took him to the Franklin County Corrections Center. He states that upon his release from the corrections center, he was informed of two charges against "BOBBY R DUBOSE." According to Plaintiff, because the letters were capitalized, this means there were charges against a fictional corporate entity that was illegally using his name for which he has a commercial lien and a trademark or copyright.
The standard governing summary judgment is set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), which provides: "The court shall grant summary judgmentif the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The Court must grant summary judgment if the opposing party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also Van Gorder v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., Inc., 509 F.3d 265, 268 (6th Cir. 2007).
When reviewing a summary judgment motion, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, who must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial, and the Court must refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence. Matsushita Bee. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dept. of Children and Family Servs., 640 F.3d 716, 723 (6th Cir. 2011). The Court disregards all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury would not be required to believe. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000). Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is genuine, "that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 511 (6th Cir. 2009).
In its prior Opinion and Order, the Court construed the claims against Deputy Fitzpatrick as follows: (1) unlawful seizure; (2) false imprisonment; (3) breach of contract; and (4) violation of the oath of office. Plaintiff alleges Sheriff Scott is vicariously liable for those claims.
Plaintiff ostensibly brings his unlawful seizure and false imprisonment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 states in relevant part:
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, regulation, custom or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proceedings for redress[.]
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To prevail on a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that a person acting under color of law deprived him of his rights secured by the United States Constitution or its laws. Berger v. City of Mayfield Heights, 265 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2001).
Deputy Fitzpatrick argues he is entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff's § 1983 claims, which is an affirmative defense to a § 1983 suit. '"[Gjovernment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Binay v. Bettendorf, 601 F.3d 640, 646-47 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). "The central purpose ofaffording public officials qualified immunity from suit is to protect them from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability." Id. (quoting Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 514 (1994) (internal quotations omitted)). Qualified immunity involves an objective legal reasonableness standard that analyzes "claims of immunity on a fact-specific, case-by-case basis to determine whether a reasonable official in the defendant's position could have believed that his conduct was lawful, judged from the perspective of the reasonable official on the scene." Kowolonek v. Moore, 463 F. App'x 531, 534 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation omitted).
"In reviewing claims for qualified immunity, [courts] conduct a two-step analysis." Id. (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007)). In step one, [courts] consider whether "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Scott, 550 U.S. at 377 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled on other grounds by Person v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)). If the answer is no because the facts alleged fail to establish a constitutional violation, then the inquiry ends and the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If the answer is yes, the second step is to determine "whether the right was clearly established . . . in light of the specific context of the case." Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201).
"For a right to be clearly established, the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doingviolates that right." Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). Although the sequence of this two-step inquiry is often appropriate, it is no longer mandatory. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). The Court considers Plaintiff's § 1983 claims pursuant to this framework.
Construing Plaintiff's Complaint liberally, Plaintiff contends his detention2 amounted to an unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Here, Deputy Fitzpatrick detained Plaintiff, issued him a citation, and then arrested Plaintiff and transported him to the Franklin County Corrections Center. Neither the stop nor the arrest were unlawful.
Deputy Fitzpatrick's traffic stop was lawful. "A police officer may effect a traffic stop of any motorist for any traffic infraction, even if the officer's true motive is to detect more extensive criminal conduct." United States v. Townsend, 305F.3d 537, 541 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted). "A traffic stop is justified and does not violate the Fourth Amendment when a police officer has reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime or a completed felony or when he has probable cause to believe that a civil traffic violation has been committed." United States v. Parker, 530 F. App'x 449, 452 (6th Cir. 2013). "Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed." Brooks, 577 F.3d at 706 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Deputy Fitzpatrick states in his affidavit that while on patrol duty on October 3, 2012, he personally observed Plaintiff riding his bicycle without a lamp mounted on the front of the bike or on the rider and without a red lamp mounted on the rear of the bike. Fitzpatrick Aff. ¶ 6, ECF No. 40-1. Ohio Revised Code §§ 4511.56(A)(1) and (3) require a bicycle, when used during certain times,3 to be equipped with a lamp mounted on either the front of the bicycle or the rider and a red lamp on the back of the bicycle. Plaintiff offers no evidence to show that Deputy...
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