Dubose v. City of St. Louis

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Kathianne Knaup Crane
• Citation: Dubose v. City of St. Louis, 210 S.W.3d 391 (Mo. App. 2006)
• Decision Date: 14 November 2006
• Docket Number: No. ED 87865.,ED 87865.
• Parties: Leslie DUBOSE, Claimant/Respondent, v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Employer/Appellant, and Treasurer of the State of Missouri, as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, Additional Party.

210 S.W.3d 391

Leslie DUBOSE, Claimant/Respondent, v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Employer/Appellant, and Treasurer of the State of Missouri, as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, Additional Party.

No. ED 87865.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Four.

November 14, 2006.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied December 14, 2006.

Application for Transfer Denied January 30, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Dean L. Christianson, St. Louis, MO, for respondent.

R. Kent Schultz Holtkamp, Liese, Childress & Schultz, P.C., St. Louis, MO, for appellant.

Da-Niel Cunningham, Office of the Attorney General, St. Louis, MO, for additional party.

KATHIANNE KNAUP CRANE, Judge.

In this workers' compensation case, employer, the City of St. Louis, appeals from the final award of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) allowing compensation and reversing the award and decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The Commission found that claimant, Leslie Dubose, had sustained permanent total disability as a result of injuries sustained in an automobile accident precipitated by a seizure while driving a vehicle for employer. On appeal, employer challenges the causal connection between the work and claimant's injuries and whether claimant's injuries were medically caused by the accident. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 7, 2000, claimant, who was employed by the City of St. Louis as an airport police officer, had a seizure while driving his city-owned vehicle on Natural Bridge Road in the course of his patrol duties. As a result of the seizure, he lost control of his vehicle, which hit the car in front of it, left the road, and collided with a utility pole, a building, and a parked vehicle. Claimant was seriously injured as a result of these impacts.

Claimant's employment required him to patrol the areas in and around Lambert International Airport by foot four days a week and by car one eight-hour day a week. Patrol officers were to "devote the maximum possible time to the performance of [their] basic dut[ies] of patrol, remaining in the station only when necessary." His patrol route took him on the highways and roads that accessed the airport. In particular, he traveled on Natural Bridge Road in order to access the airport from the east.

Claimant filed a claim for compensation with the Division of Workers' Compensation against the City of St. Louis and the Second Injury Fund for the injuries resulting from the March 7, 2000 motor vehicle accident. After a hearing, the ALJ entered an award denying compensation, concluding that claimant's injuries did not arise out of his employment because the seizure was idiopathic and wholly unrelated to work. On review, the Commission entered a Final Award Allowing Compensation, reversing the ALJ's award and decision. The Commission concluded that claimant sustained an injury due to an accident arising in the course of his employment and that a causal connection was established between the conditions of employment and the accident. The Commission awarded claimant permanent total disability benefits, temporary total disability benefits, temporary partial disability benefits, past due medical expenses, and future medical care and treatment. It did not find Second Injury Fund liability. Employer appeals.

DISCUSSION

When a worker's compensation claim is appealed, we review only questions of law. Section 287.495.1 RSMo (2000). We may modify, reverse, remand for hearing, or set aside awards based on factual determinations only on the grounds prescribed by statute: (1) that the Commission acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) that the award was procured by fraud; (3) that the facts found by the Commission do not support the award; or (4) that there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award. Id. We review the Commission's award to determine whether the award is "supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record." Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 222-23 (Mo. banc 2003).

We defer to the Commission on issues of fact, but review questions of law de novo. Endicott v. Display Technologies, Inc., 77 S.W.3d 612, 615 (Mo. banc 2002). We review Commission decisions which are clearly interpretations or applications of law for correctness without deference to the Commission's judgment. West v. Posten Const. Co., 804 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Mo. banc 1991) overruled on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 222-23 (Mo. banc 2003); Harrison v. Harrison Turf Co., 908 S.W.2d 159, 161 (Mo.App.1995). Findings of ultimate fact reached through the application of law, rather than by natural reasoning based on facts alone, are conclusions of law. Merriman v. Ben Gutman Truck Service, Inc., 392 S.W.2d 292, 297 (Mo.1965). We defer to the Commission when it resolves issues concerning the credibility and weight to be given to conflicting evidence. Moriarty v. Treasurer of State of Missouri, 141 S.W.3d 69, 72 (Mo.App.2004). We do not review arguments and issues raised in the argument under a point that are not fairly encompassed by that point. See Rule 84.04(e); 66, Inc. v. Crestwood Commons Redev. Corp, 130 S.W.3d 573, 584 (Mo.App. E.D. 2003).

Point I — Work Related Causation

For its first point, employer contends that the Commission's finding that employment conditions caused claimant's injuries is not based upon sufficient, competent evidence on the record.¹ In the argument portion under this point, employer contends that a causal connection did not exist between the condition of the "workplace" and claimant's injury because claimant's injury was idiopathic in nature and employee was not engaged in an activity "unique to the workplace" at the time of the accident, as required under the Missouri workers' compensation statute.

The Commission found a causal connection was established because the conditions of the employment caused or contributed to the accident. It found that claimant's employment "had placed him in a position where the consequences of his blacking out precipitated by an idiopathic occurrence were markedly more dangerous than if he had not been so employed." It further found that employee would not have suffered the significant injuries he did if he had not been driving a motor vehicle on behalf of his employer.

Section 287.020.2 RSMo (2000) defines accident:

The word "accident" as used in this chapter, shall, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, be construed to mean an unexpected or unforeseen identifiable event or series of events happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury. An injury is compensable if it is clearly work related. An injury is clearly work related if work was a substantial factor in the cause of the resulting medical condition or disability. An injury is not compensable merely because work was a triggering or precipitating factor.

(Emphasis denotes language new in 1993). This definition focuses on whether there is a compensable injury. Willeford v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctr., 3 S.W.3d 872, 874 (Mo. App. S.D.1999). Section 287.020.3(1) defines "injury" to be one that "has arisen out of and in the course of employment." Section 287.020.3(1) adds that "[t]he injury must be incidental to and not independent of the relation of employer and employee." Section 287.020.3(2) declares:

(2) An injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of the employment only if:

(a) It is reasonably apparent, upon consideration of all the circumstances, that the employment is a substantial factor in causing the injury; and

(b) It can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work; and

(c) It can be fairly traced to the employment as a proximate cause; and

(d) It does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal nonemployment life [.]

The worker's compensation statute does not cover an injury wholly caused by an idiopathic condition. Kasl v. Bristol Care Inc., 984 S.W.2d 852, 854 (Mo. banc 1999); Alexander v. D.L. Sitton Motor Lines, 851 S.W.2d 525, 528-29 (Mo. banc 1993). However, a causal connection is established if the conditions of the employment contribute to the injury, even if the cause of the accident was idiopathic. Alexander, 851 S.W.2d at 528-29; McCormack v. Stewart Enterprises, Inc., 916 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Mo.App.1995); Clancy v. Armor Elevator Co., 899 S.W.2d 123, 126 (Mo.App.1995). See also Knipp v. Nordyne, Inc., 969 S.W.2d 236, 239-40 (Mo. App.1998).

In Alexander, the employee suffered a dizzy spell and fell. His injuries were caused by falling four and a half feet from a narrow platform on which he was required to work. Although the dizzy spell was idiopathic, the court held that his injuries were compensable because the condition of employment, being on the platform, contributed to the injuries. 851 S.W.2d at 529. In McCormack, the parties disputed whether heat or an idiopathic condition caused the employee to black out and fall four feet from the seat of an asphalt compactor he was operating. The court held that the cause of the employee's unconsciousness and fall "is not determinative of the legal issue." 916 S.W.2d at 223. Rather, it was the fact that the four-foot fall from the compactor contributed to the employee's spinal injury that made the injury compensable. Id. at 224. In Clancy, the employee experienced chest pain while repairing an elevator. He slipped and fell while descending a narrow set of steps to get assistance. Although employer claimed that walking down an ordinary set of steps was not a condition of employment, we held that the "conditions of the employment — his negotiation of the metal steps — caused or contributed to cause his...