DuBose v. Quinlan
| Decision Date | 22 November 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 22 EAP 2016,No. 21 EAP 2016,21 EAP 2016,22 EAP 2016 |
| Citation | 173 A.3d 634 |
| Parties | Robert DUBOSE, Administrator of the Estate of Elise Dubose, Deceased v. Mark QUINLAN, Donna Brown, RNC, BSN, Albert Einstein Medical Center d/b/a Willowcrest, Willowcrest and Jefferson Health System Appeal of: Willowcrest Nursing Home, Albert Einstein Healthcare Network, Albert Einstein Medical Center d/b/a Willowcrest and Willowcrest Robert Dubose, Administrator of the Estate of Elise Dubose, Deceased, Appellee v. Willowcrest Nursing Home, and Albert Einstein Healthcare Network, Appellants |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
James Michael Doyle, Esq., Sheila Ann Haren, Esq., Karyn Dobroskey Rienzi, Esq., Post & Schell, P.C., for Appellant.
Rhonda Hill Wilson, Esq., Law Office of Rhonda Hill Wilson, P.C., for Appellee.
Rosalind T. Kaplan, Esq., Jarve Kaplan Granato Starr, LLC, for Appellee Amicus Curiae.
OPINION
In this appeal by allowance, we consider whether the Superior Court applied the correct statute of limitations for a survival action in a medical professional liability case. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude the statute of limitations for medical professional liability cases in the form of wrongful death or survival actions is two years from the time of the decedent's death. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
The facts and procedural history of this medical professional liability action, asserting negligent care at a nursing home, are as follows. On July 25, 2005, Elise Dubose was admitted to Albert Einstein Medical Center (Einstein) after she fell in her home and sustained severe head injuries, including anoxia and a brain injury. On August 9, 2005, Mrs. Dubose was transferred and admitted to Willowcrest Nursing Home (Willowcrest), a division of Einstein, where she was diagnosed with Type II diabetes, respiratory failure necessitating a ventilator, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and several pressure ulcers (bedsores ). On September 6, 2005, to treat the ulcers, a physician ordered a flexor bed and frequent repositioning of Mrs. Dubose. Willowcrest's staff negligently failed to follow the physician's order, resulting in a deterioration of Mrs. Dubose's existing pressure ulcers and proliferation of new ones to other parts of her body. During a hospitalization at Einstein from January 30 to February 14, 2007, Mrs. Dubose developed additional bedsores on her right heel and shin, on her right scapula (upper back), and on her lower back. In addition, while at Willowcrest from 2005 to 2007, Mrs. Dubose suffered malnourishment, dehydration, conscious pain from the bedsores, bone infection, and a sepsis systemic infection.
One of the ulcers, located at the sacral region of the spine, which Mrs. Dubose developed during her initial July 25, 2005 hospitalization, gradually increased in size from August 9, 2005 to July 2007. In July 2007, the sacral ulcer became infected with bacteria from contact with feces. This infection caused sepsis in Mrs. Dubose in September 2007, and she was admitted to Einstein with sepsis on September 12, 2007. On October 18, 2007, Mrs. Dubose died from sepsis and multiple pressure sores.
On August 13, 2009, Robert Dubose, as administrator for the Estate of Elise Dubose, filed a complaint against Willowcrest and Albert Einstein Healthcare Network (collectively Appellants). This complaint contained counts for negligence on behalf of Mrs. Dubose (survival action1 ), and a wrongful death action2 to compensate Mrs. Dubose's survivors. Additionally, on September 14, 2009, Robert Dubose commenced a second case by filing a praecipe to issue a writ of summons. On October 7, 2009, Mr. Dubose filed a complaint in the second case, asserting similar survival and wrongful death actions based on negligence, requesting punitive damages, and naming as defendants Mark Quinlan, Willowcrest's administrator; Donna Brown, Willowcrest's director of nursing; Einstein; Willowcrest; and Jefferson Health System. On October 18, 2010, the trial court issued an order consolidating the two cases pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 213(a).
In October 2012, the case proceeded to a jury trial, which resulted in a mistrial. A second jury trial was held from February 13, 2013 to March 13, 2013. On March 13, 2013, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Mr. Dubose and against Appellants in the amount of $125,000.00 on the wrongful death action and $1,000,000.00 on the survival action. The jury apportioned liability as 60% to Willowcrest, 25% to Einstein Healthcare Network, and 15% to Donna Brown. Further, on March 21, 2013, following a bifurcated punitive damages trial, the same jury awarded $875,000.00 in punitive damages against Appellants. The trial court granted the defendants' post-trial motions in part in the form of judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), dismissing the action as against Donna Brown because she was an employee of Willowcrest, but the trial court did not reduce the amount of the verdict. The trial court denied the remaining post-trial motions for a new trial, for JNOV, and for remittitur, and entered judgment on the verdict. Regarding the subject of this appeal, the trial court explained that Mr. Dubose's survival action was timely filed pursuant to Section 513(d) of the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act (MCARE), 40 P.S. §§ 1303.501 – 1303.516, which permits plaintiffs to bring survival actions within two years of death.
Trial Ct. Op., 6/27/14, at 11. As alternative support, the trial court applied the "discovery rule" and concluded that Mrs. Dubose's comatose condition prevented her from knowing or reasonably discovering her injuries before her death. Id. at 12. Appellants appealed to the Superior Court.
Relevant to this appeal, Appellants argued Mr. Dubose's survival claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which began to run at the time of Mrs. Dubose's injury in 2005.3 Appellants asserted that a survival action is distinct from a wrongful death action. A survival action is merely a continuation of a cause of action that accrued to the plaintiff's decedent while the decedent was alive, and the statute of limitations begins to run when the decedent is injured. On the other hand, a wrongful death action accrues to the decedent's heirs when the decedent dies of such an injury, and its statute of limitations begins to run at the decedent's death. Appellants asserted that once the statute of limitations expires on the decedent's cause of action, it cannot form the basis for a survival action following the decedent's death. Appellants' Super. Ct. Brief at 12–14 (citing Baumgart v. Keene Bldg. Prods. Corp. , 430 Pa.Super. 162, 633 A.2d 1189 (1993) (en banc)).
Applying these principles, Appellants argued that the statute of limitations for Mrs. Dubose's medical professional liability claim began when she sustained the pressure ulcer in 2005. The two-year statute of limitations on the survival actions expired in 2007, and therefore the survival actions Mr. Dubose filed in 2009 were time-barred.
Further, Appellants disputed the trial court's holding that the survival action was rendered timely by Section 513 of MCARE, which provides:
Appellants contended the trial court misapprehended MCARE to revive causes of action that the statute of limitations barred. The trial court relied on Matharu v. Muir , 86 A.3d 250, 263 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), in which then-Judge, now-Justice, Donohue authored a unanimous, en banc opinion holding "subsection 1303.513(d) does not set forth a statute of repose at all, but rather is a statute of limitation[,] ... and survival claims under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8302 must be commenced within two years after the death, unless there is fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment as to the cause of death." Matharu , 86 A.3d at 263. Appellants attempted to distinguish Matharu because that case involved a timely survival action, and this case is based on an untimely survival action. According to Appellants, the statute of limitations on Mrs. Dubose's medical professional liability action expired before her death, so a survival claim was already barred before her death. MCARE does not permit an already-barred claim to become timely through the survival statute.
In the alternative, Appellants argued that even if the statute of limitations ran from the date of Mrs. Dubose's October 17, 2007 death, certain claims added in amended complaints after October 17, 2009 were time-barred. Appellants narrowly construed the Estate's survival action as solely based on Appellants' negligent wound care, resulting in a pressure ulcer. Appellants contended that after the statute of limitations expired, the trial court permitted the Estate to amend its complaints to add new facts to support additional...
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