Ducharme v. Champagne, 1614-A
| Decision Date | 27 June 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 1614-A,1614-A |
| Citation | 110 R.I. 270,292 A.2d 224 |
| Parties | Gerard U. DUCHARME v. David CHAMPAGNE et al. ppeal. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This is a civil action instituted by a judgment creditor, seeking to set aside as fraudulent a conveyance of real estate pursuant to the provisions of G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 6-16-1. The conveyance, it is not disputed, was made by the defendants, David Champagne and his wife Jean Champagne, as joint tenants to the defendant, John T. McMann, Sr., by warranty deed dated October 21, 1968, and recorded October 30, 1968. The case was heard by a justice of the Superior Court sitting without a jury, who found that the conveyance of the defendants Champagne to the defendant McMann did not constitute a fraudulent conveyance within the contemplation of said § 6-16-1 and dismissed the complaint and entered judgment for the defendants for costs. From this judgment the plaintiff has appealed to this court.
The plaintiff brought an action against defendant Champagne to recover damages allegedly sustained as the result of a motor vehicle collision in April of 1968. The complaint went unanswered, and thereafter, on October 29, 1968, default entered. On November 15, 1968, after proof of claim, plaintiff was awarded a judgment in the amount of $3,000 plus interest and costs. It further appears that on October 21, 1968, a week prior to the date of the default, defendant Champagne and his wife Jean, as joint tenants of certain real estate in East Providence, conveyed that estate to the wife's father, defendant John T. McMann, Sr., it appearing on the face of the deed that no consideration passed.
Subsequently, in proceeding to levy on said real estate, plaintiff learned of the conveyance of October 21, 1968, and commenced the instant action to set aside the conveyance as fraudulent under said § 6-16-1. The plaintiff was then informed that McMann had contracted to sell the real estate to a third party and that the closing of such sale was imminent. It was agreed between the parties after negotiation that the sum of $3,000 would be held in escrow pending the outcome of the present suit.
The trial justice found from the evidence, substantially uncontradicted, that defendant McMann had in 1966 advanced his daughter and son-in-law the sum of $8,190.32 with the understanding that it would be repaid when the parties became able to do so but without any specific date for repayment being set. He found that the understanding was that repayment would be made when the Champagnes were of sufficient ability to do so. He stated: 'There is no question in the Court's mind at all the sum of money was advanced and it was used for the purpose of purchasing this house.' The court went on to say: 'As a consequence, the Court finds as a fact and holds as a matter of law that the conveyance of (sic) Mr. McMann was for a valid antecedent debt owed to him and acknowledged by both of the parties; in the light of this conveyance, that this indebtedness has been proven by overwhelming evidence; and that therefore, the conveyance to Mr. McMann did not constitute a fraudulent conveyance.'
Here the parties to the litigation have submitted the controversy, both on the law and the evidence, to a justice of the trial court sitting without a jury. We have long held that where the parties so act, the findings of fact of the trial court will be given great weight and will not be disturbed by this court on appeal unless clearly wrong. F. D. McKendall Lumber Co. v. Buratti, 107 R.I. 158, 265 A.2d 732 (1970); Chace v. Anarumo, 104 R.I. 48, 241 A.2d 628 (1968). Here the trial justice expressly stated that the testimony of defendant McMann was uncontradicted and was entirely credible. On that basis he found that there was a valid antecedent debt owed to McMann and that such indebtedness had been proven by the great weight of the evidence and that the conveyance to...
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...by an insolvent debtor without consideration [does not] give rise to a presumption that it was fraudulent." Ducharme v. Champagne, 110 R.I. 270, 274-75, 292 A.2d 224, 226 (1972). However, the absence of proof of actual fraud is not fatal to plaintiff's claim. Id. "As has often been said, a ......
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...v. State, 481 S.W.2d 10, 15(Mo. 1972) (burden is always upon the new trial movant to prove his allegations); Ducharme v. Champagne, 110 R.I. 270, 292 A.2d 224, 226 (R.I. 1972) ("[T]he long-standing rule in this state [is] that the burden of proof is on [the party] who asserts a claim, wheth......
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...to a trial justice sitting without a jury, the findings of fact of the trial justice will be given great weight, Ducharme v. Champagne, 110 R.I. 270, 292 A.2d 224 (1972); F. D. McKendall Lumber Co. v. Buratti, 107 R.I. 158, 265 A.2d 732 (1970), and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it ......