Duchesne v. Sugarman, 72 Civ. 3447 (CMM).

Citation459 F. Supp. 313
Decision Date24 October 1978
Docket NumberNo. 72 Civ. 3447 (CMM).,72 Civ. 3447 (CMM).
PartiesJosephine DUCHESNE, Administratrix of Paulina Perez, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Jule M. SUGARMAN, Individually and as Commissioner of New York City's Human Resources Administration, and The New York Foundling Hospital and St. Joseph's Home of Peekskill, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Lisa H. Blitman, Thomas H. Baer, New York City, for plaintiffs.

Allen G. Schwartz, Corp. Counsel, New York City, for defendant Jule M. Sugarman; Bruce Evan Stahl, Asst. Corp. Counsel, New York City, of counsel.

Bodell & Magovern, New York City, for defendants The New York Foundling Hospital and St. Joseph's Home of Peekskill; Frederick J. Magovern, New York City, of counsel.

METZNER, District Judge:

This is a civil rights action (42 U.S.C. § 1983) seeking damages against four individual defendants and two child-caring institutions. Plaintiff Josephine Duchesne, suing as the personal representative of her deceased daughter, Paulina Perez, moves pursuant to Rules 19, 20 and 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for an order directing that the complaint be amended to include the City of New York and the New York City Bureau of Child Welfare as defendants.

The events which gave rise to decedent's claims occurred between 1969 and 1972. Those claims are seemingly time barred for the purposes of joining new parties under the three-year New York statute of limitations (NYCPLR § 214(2) (McKinney 1972)) applicable to this action. Cates v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 561 F.2d 1064, 1067, n. 4 (2d Cir. 1977).

Plaintiff argues that she should not be barred from joining these new defendants because she was unable to sue them until June of this year when the Supreme Court in Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), overruled Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). She cites United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet Impala Sedan, 457 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1972), for the proposition that a cause of action does not accrue if a plaintiff "had no reasonable probability of successfully prosecuting his claim against the government prior to the enunciation of the new . . . rule." 457 F.2d at 1358.

That case involved an attempt in 1972 to recover items seized by the government in 1963 by forfeiture. In 1971 the Supreme Court had ruled such forfeitures illegal. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 91 S.Ct. 1041, 28 L.Ed.2d 434. The Circuit Court overruled the government's argument that, nine years having passed, the six-year statute of limitations had run.

This court is not persuaded by the logic of the Red Chevrolet case. The plaintiff here would have us toll the statute of limitations from 1961, when Monroe was decided, until June 6, 1978, when the Supreme Court reversed Monroe in Monell. It is inconceivable that a byproduct of Monell would be to open the courts to claims for damages based on actions taken by municipalities in the intervening years.

The answer to plaintiff's contention is found in Versluis v. Town of Haskell, Okl., 154 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1946). In that case the court said at 943:

"The application of the statute of limitations cannot be made to depend upon the constantly shifting state of the law, and a suitor cannot toll or suspend the running of the statutes by relying upon the uncertainties of controlling law. It is incumbent upon him to test his right and remedy in the available forums. These suits were not commenced until through the labor of others the way was made clear."

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4 cases
  • Communications Vending Corp. of Arizona, Inc. v. Citizens Communications Co.
    • United States
    • Federal Communications Commission Decisions
    • 19 novembre 2002
    ... ... the argument raised by Complainants. [ 72 ] Upon a thorough review of ... the ... 1982) ... (" Fiesel "); Duchesne v. Sugarman , ... 459 F.Supp. 313 (S.D.N.Y ... ...
  • McConnell v. Critchlow
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 9 novembre 1981
    ...a cause of action after the period has run does not retroactively interrupt the running of the limitations period. Duchesne v. Sugarman, 459 F.Supp. 313 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (rejecting delayed accrual arising from Monell). See generally, Versluis v. Town of Haskell, Okl., 154 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. ......
  • Fiesel v. Board of Educ. of City of New York, 749
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • 9 avril 1982
    ...on alleged wrongs occurring in 1970, did not accrue until Monell was decided in 1978. As Judge Metzner stated in Duchesne v. Sugarman, 459 F.Supp. 313, 314 (S.D.N.Y.1978), "(i)t is inconceivable that a byproduct of Monell would be to open the courts to claims for damages based on actions ta......
  • Barrett v. United States, 76 Civ. 1061 (CBM).
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • 9 septembre 1986
    ...United States, 689 F.2d 324, 331 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1131, 103 S.Ct. 3111, 77 L.Ed.2d 1366 (1983); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 459 F.Supp. 313 (S.D. N.Y.1978). The statutory provision which provides for the survival of a plaintiff's claim after his or her death, section 11-3.2(b......

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