Duchess Music Corporation v. Stern
Decision Date | 26 April 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 71-1854.,71-1854. |
Citation | 458 F.2d 1305 |
Parties | DUCHESS MUSIC CORPORATION et al., Petitioners-Appellants, v. Martin STERN et al., Respondents-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Robert C. Osterberg (argued), John S. Clark, of Abeles & Clark, New York City, Pasquale R. Cheche, of Meadow, Cheche, Thrasher & Zalut, Phoenix, Ariz., for petitioners-appellants.
B. Allen Millstone (argued), Hollywood, Cal., William C. Loftus, Phoenix, Ariz., for respondents-appellees.
Before KILKENNY and CHOY, Circuit Judges, and BYRNE,* Senior District Judge.
This interlocutory appeal requires construction of the remedial and compulsory license provisions of the Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(e) and 101(c), (d) and (e). Appellants are a group of music companies which own the copyrights to musical compositions by such diverse and well-known musicians as Elvis Presley, Johnny Cash, Burt Bacharach, Mick Jagger, Joni Mitchell, and Buck Owens. They allege that appellee Pearl Rosner and others are music pirates who make cassette tape recordings of phonograph records legitimately issued by appellants from copyrighted compositions. After a nationwide search, appellants discovered a major pirate haven in Phoenix, Arizona. With the aid of private investigators and the local police, they obtained sufficient information to secure from the District Court an ex parte order to show cause, a temporary restraining order and a writ of seizure, all directed against the alleged pirates.
The marshal seized and impounded 25,000 complete tape recordings and master recordings, which serve to reproduce mechanically appellants' copyrighted musical compositions; blank tapes and cartridges designed for use in the manufacture of tape recordings; printed labels; machinery used to transfer the sounds onto blank tapes; packaging and promotional materials; and other equipment and machinery utilized in the manufacturing process. Appellants filed the requisite bond.
Only appellee Rosner, who does business as National Manufacturing Company, appeared and contested the seizure order. She objected to the order's scope on the ground that the statutory authority for seizure and the Supreme Court rules implementing that authority contemplate the seizure and impoundment only of items of ". . . such nature that they would be the last item of identifiable character used to make an infringing copy." She also contended that since she had filed a statutory Notice of Intention to Use under 17 U.S.C. § 101(e), after the writ of seizure was issued and executed but before the hearing on the preliminary injunction, injunctive relief prohibiting her from using appellants' copyrighted works was unavailable.
The District Court agreed with Rosner on each count. It ordered the return of all The District Court also held that Rosner could avail herself of the compulsory license scheme although she had previously illegally infringed appellants' copyrights and although she intended to continue duplicating the copyrighted material.
The District Court later amended its order, nunc pro tunc, to allow an appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The court also stayed its order pending the outcome of this appeal. The seized materials have not been returned to Rosner. We reverse the District Court on both counts and remand.
The scope of the seizure order
The Copyright Act of 1909 provides for injunctive and monetary relief for infringement, and also for impoundment and destruction of infringing articles.
The language used throughout the Supreme Court rules which implement these provisions is not uniform,2 and there is some verbal confusion about what is to be seized and destroyed. But the statutory mandate is clear. "All articles alleged to infringe the copyright" are to be impounded, and "all infringing copies . . ." are to be destroyed. Neither the statute nor the Supreme Court rules give the District Court any discretion to determine what to impound or what to destroy. The process Congress granted the aggrieved copyright proprietor is a summary one. Universal Film Manufacturing Co. v. Copperman, 206 F. 69, 70 (S.D.N.Y.1913). It is to impound everything the plaintiff alleges infringes his copyright. Rules 9 and 10 then provide that the defendant may apply to the court for return of the seized articles if he shows that "the articles seized are not infringing copies, records, plates, molds, matrices, or other means for making the copies alleged to infringe the copyright." Rule 9. The court, in its discretion, may order a return, but only if the defendant has met his burden of proof. Rule 10. If the articles seized are infringing copies or infringing means, the District Court has no discretion to return them. A similar interpretation is applicable to the destruction provision.
There is no reason here to apply the statutory construction rule of ejusdem generis3 to narrow the items to be impounded and destroyed to the general class of plates, molds, and matrices, that is, to items embodying an identifiable impression of the copyrighted work. The statute and Supreme Court rules provide for the impoundment and destruction of three classes of items: (1) infringing copies; (2) plates, molds, matrices, etc.; and (3) other means for making the allegedly infringing copies. If ejusdem generis is applicable here, it is applicable to construe the word "etc.," not the words "other means for making such infringing copies." Machines, blank cassettes and cartridges, blank and printed labels, and other devices are "other means" for making infringing copies to appellants' copyrights. They fall within the scope of both the statute and the rules and were properly impounded.
In dealing with copyright infringers, Congress did not halt at injunctive and monetary relief. It prescribed impoundment and destruction. While the Joint Committee reporting the proposed Act did not elaborate on these remedies,4 they were often discussed in extensive hearings before the Joint Senate and House Committee, held in June and December, 1906, and March, 1908. Congressmen, supporters, and opponents of the copyright bill agreed that the impoundment and destruction provisions were sweeping in their scope, and encompassed machines and items which could be used for other, allegedly innocent purposes. During the June, 1906 hearings, opponents of the bill foresaw the spectre of the destruction of equipment, machines, and entire plants. Hearings on S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 before the Senate and House Committees on Patents, conjointly, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., 124, 177-178, 200 (June, 1906). Proponents of the bill envisioned the same.5 Congress intended to impound and destroy "the whole of the paraphernalia," including those items which may be used for other purposes.6
We, therefore, reverse the District Court's order on this point, and direct that all material and machinery seized continue to be impounded pending a hearing on the merits.
The compulsory license provision
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