Duckett v. Riley

Decision Date29 August 2012
Docket NumberSept. Term, 2007.,No. 61,61
Citation52 A.3d 84,428 Md. 471
PartiesLuat D. DUCKETT, M.D., et al. v. Raenora RILEY.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Robert W. Goodson (Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, Washington, D.C.), on brief, for Petitioner.

C. William Michaels, Baltimore, MD, on brief, for Respondent.

La'Vern D. Wiley (Allen T. Eaton of Eaton Law Firm, PLLC, Washington, D.C.), on brief, for Respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER*, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ALAN M. WILNER, (Retired, Specially Assigned), DALE R. CATHELL, (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

BELL, C.J.

The respondent, Raenora Riley, filed, in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, a medical negligence action against the petitioner, Luat D. Duckett, M.D. The issue we must resolve is essentially a procedural one: whether a completedcase information report, on which an election of a jury trial is noted and which is filed with the complaint, but not served on the opposing party, is a proper vehicle for demanding a jury trial. The Court of Special Appeals held that it was and, therefore, reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court, which had reached the opposite result. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that a case information report form, being neither a “paper” nor a “pleading” and, in any event, having not been served on the opposing party, is neither a proper nor timely means of demanding a civil jury trial pursuant to Maryland Rule 2–325(a) and (b).1 Accordingly, we shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

I. FACTS

The respondent filed her complaint on November 12, 2003. The complaint did not contain a prayer for jury trial—there was no separately titled demand in the conclusion of the complaint immediately preceding the required certificate of service. Contemporaneously with the complaint, she filed a civil non-domestic case information sheet, a pre-printed form, which she completed. On that form was a section for jury demand and boxes, indicating “yes” and “no”, in which trial preference, jury or non-jury, could be noted. The respondent placed an x mark in the “yes” box indicating she was electing a jury trial. A photocopy of the respondent's completed case information sheet was not included with the summons, which the Clerk of the Circuit Court delivered to the respondent, to be served, with her complaint, on the petitioner. As a result, the respondent served the petitioner with the summons and complaint only; the petitioner was unaware of the choice of trial mode that the respondent made on the information report.

Nearly four months after the respondent filed her complaint, the Clerk sent a scheduling order to the parties. That order indicated that the trial was to be a jury trial. Unaware, because it had not been served on him, that the jury-trial box on the case information sheet had been checked when it was filed with the court, the petitioner moved to amend the scheduling order to reflect that the trial would be a bench trial. The respondent filed a written opposition to the motion, in which she pointed out that she had opted for a jury trial by checking the “yes” box in the jury demand section of the case information report. After a hearing, the judge denied the petitioner's motion to amend the scheduling order, concluding that the respondent had properly demanded a jury trial, notwithstanding that the case information report on which the election was made had not been served on the petitioner. He reasoned:

“In this case the Defendants urge because the ‘separate paper’ requesting Trial by Jury was not served upon them, the Jury Demand is waived. The Court does not agree. Plaintiff's counsel complied with the Rules by signing the Information Report and making a Demand for Jury Trial on a separate paper. The Clerk failed to comply with the mandatory duty to include a copy of that paper with the process the Clerk issued. This does not, standing alone, constitute a waiver of the Plaintiff's constitutional right to a Trial by Jury.”

The case was called for trial before a different judge. The petitioner renewed his objection to the case being tried by a jury and to the respondent's jury demand, to which the respondent again objected. The trial judge agreed with the petitioner. Overruling the hearing judge, he explained:

Rule 2–325(a) states that any party may elect a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury by filing a demand therefor in writing either as a separate paper or separately titled at the conclusion of a pleading and immediately preceding any required certificate of service.

Defendant focuses on the second alternative. Plaintiff focuses on the first alternative.

“Clearly, the civil information report is not a pleading as defined by the rules. The question is whether it qualifies as a writing as a separate paper.

“The purpose of the civil non-domestic case information report is contained in Rule 16–202(b). And that purpose is for the Court to monitor its case management plan.

“Consequently, I find based on my review of the Rules that the request for trial by jury in a civil non-domestic case information report is insufficient to place the defendant on notice that trial by jury is requested. And this will be a Court trial.”

At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial judge entered judgment on the merits in favor of the petitioner.

The respondent timely noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. That court, in an unreported opinion, reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court, concluding that the dual purpose of Rule 2–325—to place the opposing party on strategic notice that a jury trial has been demanded and to notify the court system so that it may facilitate the appropriate case-assignment procedure—had been met.2 Regarding the former purpose, the court pointed out that the petitioner was “fully apprised” of the respondent's jury demand well before trial: he received the Clerk's scheduling order, which indicated that a jury trial had been demanded and scheduled and, having failed in his attempt to amend that order from a jury trial to a bench trial, had over two years to prepare for the jury trial. Significantly, the court believed, the petitioner did not complain about the mode of trial until the case was called for trial. The latter purpose of the Rule was satisfied, the intermediate appellate court opined, when the respondent notified the Circuit Court management system of her jury demand, causing the Clerk to schedule a jury trial early in the course of the proceedings.3 Therefore, the intermediate appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion by striking the respondent's jury-trial demand and proceeding with a bench trial.

The petitioner timely filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted. 401 Md. 172, 931 A.2d 1095 (2007). We now consider whether a civil case information report constitutes a “paper” pursuant to Rule 2–325(a), and whether, by checking the “yes” box in the jury-demand section of that report, and filing it with the complaint, a proper election of a jury trial was made, even though the case information report was not served on the defendant.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case requires, first, that we construe, and interpret, “paper” as used in Maryland Rule 2–325(a). We are mindful that

“the principles applied to statutory interpretation are also used to interpret the Maryland Rules. Like construing a statute, to ascertain the meaning of a ... rule of procedure we first look to the normal, plain meaning of the language. If that language is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the provision's terms to inform our analysis; however, the goal of our examination is always to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular ... part of the Rules. To that end, we must consider the context in which the ... rule appears, including related statutes or rules, and relevant legislative history. Also, where the language of the rule is ambiguous, external evidence may be referred to for discerning the purpose of the legislature, including the bill's title or function paragraphs, relevant case law, and secondary sources.”

Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604–05, 861 A.2d 78, 81 (2004) (internal citations omitted). This is a purely legal inquiry; therefore, we construe Rule 2–325(a) without giving deference to the intermediate appellate court's interpretation. Id., 383 Md. at 604, 861 A.2d at 81 (citing J.L. Matthews, Inc. v. Md.–Nat'l. Capital Park & Planning, 368 Md. 71, 93–94, 792 A.2d 288, 301 (2002) (discussing whether, after a successful jury demand, amending the amount in controversy below the jurisdictional threshold of the circuit court eliminates the right to a civil jury trial)).

Maryland Rule 1–201(a) provides that [t]hese rules shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.” Moreover, “When construing ... rules, we must bear in mind that they are ‘precise rubrics,’ established to promote the orderly and efficient administration of justice, and thus are to be strictly followed.” In re Kaela, 394 Md. 432, 471, 906 A.2d 915, 938 (2006) (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Seay, 388 Md. 341, 356, 879 A.2d 1049, 1057 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Articles 5 4 and 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights enshrine the right to a civil jury trial. Goldstein & Baron Chartered v. Chesley, 375 Md. 244, 255, 825 A.2d 985, 991 (2003). Article 23 provides specifically, [t]he right of trial by Jury of all issues of fact in civil proceedings in the several Courts of Law in this State, where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $15,000, shall be inviolably preserved.” Md. Dec. Rts., art. 23. Although “inviolably preserved,” the right to have a civil jury trial may be regulated reasonably: [I]ndeed, it is generally acknowledged that ...

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