Duckett v. State, 94-00077
| Decision Date | 11 December 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-00077,94-00077 |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
| Parties | 21 Fla. L. Weekly D2656 Thomas Pearson DUCKETT, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Jennifer Y. Fogle, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and John M. Klawikofsky, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
Thomas Pearson Duckett, Jr., appeals his convictions and sentences for five counts of second-degree murder and his sentences for driving while under influence (DUI) with serious bodily injury, personal injury, and property damage. We conclude that the five convictions for second-degree murder must be reduced to convictions for manslaughter and Duckett must be resentenced for these five crimes. Otherwise, we affirm.
The offenses for which Duckett was convicted arose from an accident which Duckett caused. On the night of the accident Duckett was highly intoxicated. He had been speeding and weaving in and out of traffic for several miles and almost caused two other accidents. At one point Duckett had stopped on the side of the road and leaned against his vehicle. He then got back in his vehicle and continued his reckless driving. He eventually ran off the interstate into the grass and hit a tow truck and then a disabled church bus, both of which were clearly visible to other drivers. Duckett killed five people who were standing near the bus and injured several others. The state charged Duckett with five counts of second degree murder, five counts of manslaughter, five counts of DUI manslaughter, two counts of DUI with serious bodily injury, eight counts of DUI with property damage or injury, driving with a suspended driver's license, unauthorized possession of a driver's license, and possession of marijuana.
The elements for second-degree murder set out in the Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, are as follows:
1. (Victim) is dead.
2. The death was caused by the criminal act or agency of (defendant).
3. There was an unlawful killing of (victim) by an act imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life.
Fla.Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 66. The standard jury instructions define the term "imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life" as follows:
An act is one "imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life" if it is an act or series of acts that:
1. a person of ordinary judgment would know is reasonably certain to kill or do serious bodily injury to another, and
2. is done from ill will, hatred, spite or an evil intent, and
3. is of such a nature that the act itself indicates an indifference to human life.
Fla.Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 66.
The facts in this case do not constitute second-degree murder because there was no evidence offered at trial to support the fact that Duckett's act was done from ill will, hatred, spite, or an evil intent toward the victims. We recognize this court's decision in Manis v. State, 528 So.2d 1342 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 534 So.2d 400 (Fla.1988), holding that a driver impaired by alcohol causing death to another may be convicted of second-degree murder. The Manis court did not address the facts it found sufficient to prove the act which killed the victim was imminently dangerous to another evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life. Instead, this court focused on the facts it found supported a departure sentence. We agree with Manis that, under some circumstances, a person may be convicted of second-degree murder for vehicular homicide. In the instant case, however, the state failed to prove all of the elements of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Michelson v. State, 4D99-4280.
...spite or an evil intent, and 3. is of such a nature that the act itself indicates an indifference to human life. Duckett v. State, 686 So.2d 662, 663 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Accordingly, in order to prove that an act demonstrates a depraved mind, the State must prove that it was done from "ill ......
-
Kenner v. State
...spite or an evil intent, and (3) is of such a nature that the act itself indicates an indifference to human life." Duckett v. State , 686 So.2d 662, 663 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). The intent required for second-degree murder may be "inferred from the circumstances." Perez v. State , 187 So.3d 1279......
-
Light v. State
...a nature that the act itself indicates an indifference to human life." Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 98; see also Duckett v. State, 686 So.2d 662, 663 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). The context of these events admittedly makes it difficult to evaluate the first and third prongs necessary to a jury's d......
-
Allen v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.
...was caused by an act "imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life." Duckett v. State, 686 So. 2d 662, 663 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Florida courts describe such conduct evincing a depraved mind as characterized byan act or series of acts that (1) a person......
-
Judicial Exploitation of Mens Rea Confusion, at Common Law and Under the Model Penal Code
...heart" murder. [213]. See id. at 274-75. [214]. 207 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2000). [215]. See id. at 1234. [216]. See Duckett v. State, 686 So. 2d 662 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Williams v. State, 674 So. 2d 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). [217]. See State v. Brady, 745 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1999)......