Ducosin v. Mott
Decision Date | 06 April 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 77-4-184,77-4-184 |
Citation | 292 Or. 764,642 P.2d 1168 |
Parties | Kathryn Colleen DUCOSIN, Petitioner on Review, v. Richard MOTT, Respondent on Review. ; CA 16290; SC 27657. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Robert J. Morgan, Milwaukie, argued the cause for petitioner on review. With him on the brief was Emil Berg, Portland.
John C. Anicker, Jr., Oregon City, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.
Before DENECKE, C. J., and TONGUE, * LENT, LINDE, PETERSON, TANZER and CAMPBELL, JJ.
The principal issue is whether a defamatory communication made to a county medical examiner suggesting a possible homicide is absolutely privileged. The trial court held that it was not, found the defendant acted maliciously, and awarded the plaintiff damages. The Court of Appeals held the communication was absolutely privileged and reversed. 49 Or.App. 369, 619 P.2d 678 (1980), 50 Or.App. 207, 622 P.2d 763 (1981). We affirm the Court of Appeals.
There was animosity and litigation between the parties caused by the defendant's father bequeathing property to plaintiff's mother. The mother died in a nursing home where the plaintiff worked. The defendant called the county medical examiner and according to the testimony of the examiner suggested to the examiner that the plaintiff "possibly administered inappropriate amounts of medication to Mrs. Mangold (plaintiff's mother), leading to her death." As a result of the call the examiner postponed the cremation of the mother, notified the district attorney, and had an autopsy performed. As a result of the autopsy the examiner certified the cause of death as natural.
If there is an absolute privilege, it is because the communication was made in a "judicial proceeding." "Judicial proceeding" has been defined more broadly than the phrase itself may imply. Ramstead v. Morgan, 219 Or. 383, 388-394, 347 P.2d 594, 77 ALR2d 481 (1959). The Restatement of Torts § 587, which we have cited with approval in several cases including Ramstead v. Morgan, supra, at 394, 347 P.2d 594, states that communications are absolutely privileged when made "preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of * * * a judicial proceeding."
The defendant contends that this case is governed by Ramstead v. Morgan, supra. In Ramstead we held that a letter defamatory of the plaintiff, a member of the bar, written by the defendant to the bar grievance committee, was absolutely privileged. We reasoned that the communication was to institute a quasi-judicial proceeding, that is, to cause the bar to investigate the charges made in the letter. We used the same reasoning in Moore v. West Lawn Mem'l Park, 266 Or. 244, 512 P.2d 1344 (1973), in which the defendant wrote a defamatory letter to the State Board of Funeral Directors to which the plaintiff was applying for a license as a funeral director. The defendant argues that the instant case is similar because the communication by the defendant to the medical examiner would cause an investigation to be made of the cause of death of the decedent with a possible criminal charge being instituted as a result of the investigation. ORS 146.090 and following.
Plaintiff contends the present case falls within the principle stated in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 598, which states:
A portion of Comment e. to § 598, however, states:
The plaintiff counters the assertion that this case falls within § 587 with a reference to Comment e. of § 587, as added in the Restatement (Second):
It must be remembered that the Restatement is not a statute which we are bound to accept in its entirety. We can accept or reject all or any part of the black letter portion or all or any part of the explanatory comment.
We are of the opinion that our analysis in Ramstead v. Morgan, supra, 219 Or. 383, 347 P.2d 594, is a better criterion than whether a judicial proceeding is a "bare possibility" or "under serious consideration" as suggested in Comment e. to § 587. In Ramstead we stated:
"The absolute privilege to publish defamatory matter under the circumstances to which the privilege applies is based upon the ground that 'there are certain relations of life in which it is so important that the persons engaged in them should be able to speak freely that the law takes the risk of their abusing the occasion and speaking maliciously as well as untruly, and in order that their duties may be carried on freely and without fear of any action being brought against them, it says: ' "We will treat as absolutely privileged any statement made in the performance of these duties. " ' * * *." Ramstead v. Morgan, supra, 219 Or. at 387.
We relied upon the same principle in Moore v. Westlawn Mem'l Park, supra, 266 Or. at 249, 512 P.2d 1344. In essence, in Ramstead we concluded that it is so important that lawyers guilty of misdeeds be disciplined that complaints of misdeeds made to appropriate bar groups be cloaked with an absolute privilege. Similarly, in Moore we concluded that it is so important that only qualified persons be licensed as funeral directors that communications to the licensing board concerning an applicant be cloaked with an absolute privilege.
Applying this analysis to the instant case, it is apparent that...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Kraemer v. Harding
...statements that are made as part of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged. See e.g., Ducosin v. Mott, 292 Or. 764, 768, 770, 642 P.2d 1168 (1982) (communications to a medical examiner suggesting a possible homicide should be 'cloaked with an absolute privilege,' ......
-
Fenelon v. Superior Court
...than a qualified immunity." (Prosser and Keeton on Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 114, pp. 819-820, fns. omitted; see also Ducosin v. Mott (1982) 292 Or. 764, 642 P.2d 1168, 1169: report to medical examiner about potential homicide absolutely privileged; Cushman v. Edgar (1980) 44 Or.App. 297, 605 ......
-
Wallulis v. Dymowski
...statements that are made as part of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged. See, e.g., Ducosin v. Mott, 292 Or. 764, 768, 770, 642 P.2d 1168 (1982) (communications to a medical examiner suggesting a possible homicide should be "cloaked with an absolute privilege,"......
-
Fridovich v. Fridovich
...566, 568-69, 539 N.E.2d 1372, 1374-75, appeal denied, 127 Ill.2d 642, 136 Ill.Dec. 607, 545 N.E.2d 131 (1989); Ducosin v. Mott, 292 Or. 764, 642 P.2d 1168, 1169-70 (1982); Hott v. Yarborough, 112 Tex. 179, 245 S.W. 676, 678-79 (1922).We further note that two California courts of appeal are ......