Dudek v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.
| Decision Date | 24 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:17-cv-11045 |
| Parties | DANIELLE MARIE DUDEK, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
II. REPORT
Plaintiff, Danielle Marie Dudek, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and/or 1383(c)(3) for review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her applications for disability income (DI) and supplemental security income (SSI) benefits. This matter is before the United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (DE 16), the Commissioner's cross-motion for summary judgment (DE 17), Plaintiff's reply (DE 18), and the administrative record (DE 12).
This case has lengthy and convoluted procedural history. Plaintiff applied for DI and SSI benefits in 2008 and 2009. (R. at 450-464.) She alleged that her disability began on February 1, 2006 and August 1, 2006, at the age of 24. (R. at 450, 452, 458.) She listed several conditions (anxiety, depression, acid reflux, tendonitis, sublaxation of the cervicals, whip lash, allergies, atrophy from cortizone in wrist, pain in shoulders and neck, and headaches) that limit her ability to work. (R. at 530.) Her application(s) was(were) denied on May 27, 2009. (R. at 174.)
Plaintiff requested a hearing by an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (R. at 256-257.) ALJ Theodore W. Grippo held a hearing on March 24, 2010, at which Plaintiff and a vocational expert (VE), James Fuller, testified. (R. at 149-173.) ALJ Grippo issued an opinion on August 18, 2010, which determined that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (R. at 175-190.)On June 25, 2012, the Appeals Council vacated the hearing decision and remanded the case to an ALJ for resolution of certain issues. (R. at 191-195.)
Plaintiff requested an in person hearing. (R. at 313.) Judge Grippo denied Plaintiff's "request for transfer for an in-person hearing . . ." as "being untimely and without showing good reason for the untimeliness." (R. at 314.) Plaintiff reiterated her request for an in-person hearing. (R. at 318-319; see also R. at 320-321, 345-349.)
ALJ Grippo held another hearing on February 7, 2013, at which Plaintiff's counsel, but not Plaintiff herself, was present, and at which Judy Panek, M.D. and VE Devin Lessne testified. (R. at 100-148.) ALJ Grippo issued an opinion on September 12, 2013, which determined that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (R. at 196-238.) Plaintiff requested review of this decision. (R. at 363.) On January 8, 2015, the Appeals Council vacated the hearing decision, because she had been denied the right to an in-person hearing after filing a timely objection to a notice of video hearing, and remanded the case for further proceedings. (R. at 239-242.)
ALJ Melody Paige held a hearing on February 2, 2016, at which two medical experts (Drs. Pollack and Wargel), and Plaintiff testified. (R. at 33-99.)ALJ Paige issued a "partially favorable" opinion on March 17, 2016, ultimately concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled prior to February 9, 2015, but became disabled on that date and has continued to be disabled through the date of the ALJ's decision. (R. at 9-32.) Plaintiff submitted a brief dated June 19, 2016, which will be mentioned in further detail below. (R. at 4-5, 655-657.) On March 3, 2017, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (R. at 1-5, 8.) Thus, ALJ Paige's decision became the Commissioner's final decision.
Plaintiff timely commenced the instant action on April 3, 2017. (DE 1.)
The administrative record contains approximately 335 pages of medical records, all of which was available to ALJ Paige at the time of her decision. (R. at 32, 658-992 [Exhibits 1F - 33F].) They will be discussed in detail, as necessary, below.
Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4), at Step 1 of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. (R. at 17.) At Step 2, the ALJ found that, since the alleged onset date of disability, February 1, 2006, the claimant has had the following severe impairments: fibromyalgia; chronic myofascial pain syndrome; periodic wrist tendinitis; generalized anxiety disorder;dependent personality traits; obsessive-compulsive disorder; and affective disorder. (Id. at 17-18.) At Step 3, the ALJ found that, prior to February 9, 2015, the date the claimant became disabled, she did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments. (Id. at 18-19.) Between Steps 3 and 4 of the sequential process, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC")1 and found that, prior to February 9, 2015, the date Plaintiff became disabled, Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work, with additional exertional, postural manipulative, environmental, and mental health limitations. (Id. at 19-21.) At Step 4, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has no past relevant work. (R. at 21.) At Step 5, the ALJ concluded that, prior to February 9, 2015, considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could have performed. (R. at 21-22.)
However, the ALJ also found that, beginning on February 9, 2015, the severity of the claimant's mental impairments had medically equaled the criteria of section 12.04, 12.06, and 12.08 of 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. at 22-23.) Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled prior toFebruary 9, 2015, but became disabled on that date and had continued to be disabled through the date of the decision. (R. at 24.)
The District Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). When reviewing a case under the Social Security Act, the Court "must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it 'is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.'" Rabbers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. at 2009) (quoting Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. at 2007)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (). Under this standard, "substantial evidence is defined as 'more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241 (quoting Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). In deciding whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, the court does "not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence or decide questions of credibility." Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007); Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247 ().
Although the substantial evidence standard is deferential, it is not trivial. The Court must "'take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from [the] weight'" of the Commissioner's decision. TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 395 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951)). Nevertheless, "if substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, this Court defers to that finding 'even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.'" Blakley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)). Finally, even if the ALJ's decision meets the substantial evidence standard, "'a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.'" Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 651 (quoting Bowen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007)).
Plaintiff sets forth two arguments:
The Commissioner argues that the Court does not have jurisdiction to review ALJ Paige's compliance with the Appeals Council's January 8, 2015 remand order, although this argument misses the mark within the larger picture, for reasons explained below. (DE 17 at 3, 9-21.) The Commissioner does not cross-appeal from the ALJ's decision to partially award benefits from February 9, 2015 forward, based upon Plaintiff having established medical equivalency with various Listings, and so that finding will remain undisturbed here or...
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