Dudley v. Hull

• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: WHEELER, C.J. (after stating the facts as above).
• Citation: Dudley v. Hull, 105 Conn. 710, 136 A. 575 (Conn. 1927)
• Decision Date: 05 March 1927
• Parties: DUDLEY ET AL. v. HULL.

136 A. 575

105 Conn. 710

DUDLEY ET AL. v. HULL.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 5, 1927

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven county; George E. Hinman and Edwin C. Dickenson, Judges.

Action by Edward H. Dudley and others against Minnie D. Hull to set aside a deed tried to the court. From a judgment for defendant, and a judgment denying plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, plaintiffs appeal. No error.

On January 26, 1914, just before he died, William Davis and his wife, Annie Davis, owned jointly the farm in controversy, and on this day Mr. Davis conveyed by quitclaim deed his interest in these premises to Mrs. Davis, expressing a wish and expectation that the property upon Mrs. Davis' death should go to their only surviving daughter, the defendant. The plaintiff Isabella Conklin is a granddaughter of Mr. and Mrs. Davis. The plaintiff Edward H. Dudley is the husband of Mrs. Davis, they having been married in November, 1914 following the decease of Mr. Davis, and they lived on the farm. He neglected Mrs. Dudley's interest, and was of intemperate habits. This condition caused much dissatisfaction on the part of Mrs. Dudley up to the time of her death, and by reason thereof their relations became antagonistic and much estranged.

The defendant Minnie Davis Hull in 1919, and prior to that, lived with her husband on the farm of Mrs. Dudley, and assisted in the care of the farm, crops, and stock. The relations of Hull and Dudley became increasingly unfriendly, and late in 1919 or early in 1920, Mr. Dudley left home, and remained away about six months. Mrs. Dudley requested her husband to return, but he refused until Hull left the farm. While Dudley was absent, defendant was informed and believed he was endeavoring to obtain a conveyance from Mrs. Dudley of her farm or an interest therein. In consequence, on June 23 1920, the defendant brought an action against Mrs. Dudley to set aside the deed given by her father to her mother. Mrs Dudley employed Mr. Klein to defend the action, and thereafter he and Mr. Carmody, who represented Mrs. Hull, endeavored to settle the differences between the mother and daughter. After this action was brought, the Hulls left the farm, and Dudley returned and resumed living with his wife on the farm. In June, 1921, Mrs. Dudley discharged Mr. Klein and retained James A. Peasley as her attorney. The action was never brought to trial. Long before Mrs. Dudley's death a complete reconciliation occurred between the mother and daughter, and intimate and affectionate relations between them were re-established and continued until Mrs. Dudley's death. Mrs. Dudley suffered a stroke on October 20, 1921. The physician advised that Mrs. Dudley be taken to a hospital, but he took no steps to secure her removal, but engaged a woman to assist in her care. The day following Mrs. Dudley's stroke Mr. and Mrs. Hull came to the farm, and, the doctor consenting, Mrs. Dudley was removed to her daughter's home in Milford, where she remained and received competent care, a physician and a nurse, until her death. After Mrs. Dudley had been in Milford for some time, she of her own motion caused James A. Peasley, her attorney, to be sent for, and he prepared the quitclaim deed conveying the farm to her daughter, the defendant. Mrs. Dudley was at this time of sound mind, and had full opportunity to confer with her counsel as to the effect of her act. She was then, and had been since April, 1922, in the exclusive possession and control of this farm. The claims presented to the administrator of the estate of Mrs. Dudley aggregate $1,307.36, of which $550 is for the funeral expenses and $200 for nursing in her last illness. The court reached the conclusion that Mrs. Dudley was of sound mind at the execution of the deed, and that it was not procured by coercion, importunity, or undue influence exerted by the defendant, or any one else.

William E. Thoms, of Waterbury, for appellants.

Charles S. Hamilton, of New Haven, for appellee.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and CURTIS, MALTBIE, HAINES, and ELLS, JJ.

WHEELER, C.J. (after stating the facts as above).

The appeal contains assignments of error based upon rulings on evidence and exceptions to the failure to find, and in the finding of, certain facts. The additional reason of appeal contains a single assignment of error, the denial of the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial.

We consider, first, the denial of the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. In our practice such a motion is sometimes denominated a motion, and sometimes a petition. The facts upon which plaintiffs based their motion for a new trial were that the official stenographer who had taken down the testimony offered upon the trial had deceased prior to the filing of the finding by the trial judge; that the notes of the stenographer cannot be transcribed; that the trial judge is unable fully and fairly to set forth the testimony; and, in consequence, the plaintiffs have been unable to comply with the rule that requires a transcript of the stenographer's notes to accompany exceptions to the refusal of the trial court to correct the finding. The trial court reached the conclusion that, the plaintiffs, having prosecuted their appeal, and made the refusal of the trial court to correct the finding a ground of appeal, the motion should be denied, and that the claim of law that the plaintiffs were entitled to a new trial should be overruled, and rendered judgment in favor of defendant. The judgment was right, though the method of reaching it would be difficult to justify.

A motion or petition for a new trial, while not an independent action, but a proceeding ancillary to the original action in which the judgment sought to be relieved against was rendered, is to be determined upon its own issues, and regardless of those raised by the appeal from the judgment on the merits. When both are taken at the same time we see no legal or practical reason why one appeal should not include the claimed errors made by the trial court, and the claimed error made by the trial court in the denial of the motion or petition for a new trial. Our statute authorizing the granting of new trials was enacted in 1762; the statute was continued in substantially the early form as late as in section 199 at page 41 of the Revision of 1866, viz.:

" The superior court shall and may, from time to time as occasion may require, and as by it shall be judged reasonable and proper, grant new trials of causes that shall come before it for mispleading, or discovery of new evidence, or for other reasonable cause, according to the common and usual rules and methods in such cases."

Our statutes also included from an early time the provision found in the Revision of 1866, at page 390:

" Sec. 9. Courts of equity may grant new trials for newly discovered evidence, or any other reasonable cause, according to the course of proceedings in equity."

We announced the rule of equity in Day v. Welles, 31 Conn. 344, 349, to be:

" But the rule is clear, that equity will not interfere to grant a new trial in an action at law, however unjust the judgment or great the hardship, unless the judgment was obtained through fraud, accident or mistake, unconnected with any negligence or inattention on the part of the judgment debtor, and the rule is founded on the necessity of the case; for if it was otherwise, petitions to set aside or enjoin judgments at law would become too common, and a court of equity be compelled generally to revise decisions at law which on legal principles should be final."

In the next Revision of the statutes, that of 1875, section 1 at page 447, the revisers, evidently in the interest of brevity, and because they were of the opinion that the right of a court of equity to grant new trials was inherent in the court, and every power of that court to grant new trials not expressly found in the statutes was included in the clause, " or other reasonable cause, according to the usual rules in such cases," shortened the provision in use prior to this time, and omitted the statute authorizing courts of equity to grant new trials. There was added in the Revision of 1875 to the two specified causes, " mispleading; the discovery of new evidence," another cause,--" want of actual * * * opportunity to appear and defend, when a just defense in whole or part existed." In Smith v. Hall, 71 Conn. 427, 42 A. 86, an action was brought in New Haven county to foreclose a judgment lien on land in that county, based on a judgment rendered in Litchfield county. The defendant filed a cross-complaint in the original action on the ground of newly discovered evidence, and prayed for an injunction against the prosecution of the foreclosure action. We held that only the court in Litchfield county could take jurisdiction of defendant's cross-complaint, and that the facts averred in the cross-complaint might properly be considered as grounds for a new trial had the complaint been made to the court having jurisdiction. In the course of the opinion, Mr. Justice Baldwin said:

" New trials may be granted for legal cause. They may also be granted for equitable cause, when no legal ground for such relief is shown. Such a power is inherent in courts of equity, and is confirmed by General statutes, § 1125."

This reference is to the Revision of 1887, and the section is identical with the corresponding section of the Revision of 1875. Mr. Justice Baldwin was a member of the committee which prepared the Revision of 1875; his statement of the construction of the clause " other reasonable cause" as including equitable causes may be taken as expressing the view of that committee, and their intention in omitting from their Revision the statute granting authority to courts of equity...