Dudley v. Snyder

• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Before BARNEY; LARROW
• Citation: Dudley v. Snyder, 140 Vt. 129, 436 A.2d 763 (Vt. 1981)
• Decision Date: 01 September 1981
• Docket Number: No. 244-80,244-80
• Parties: Bernard F. DUDLEY and Anne W. Dudley v. Sheridan C. SNYDER and Dartmouth Savings Bank.

Page 763

436 A.2d 763

140 Vt. 129

Bernard F. DUDLEY and Anne W. Dudley v. Sheridan C. SNYDER and Dartmouth Savings Bank.

No. 244-80.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

Sept. 1, 1981.

Thomas P. Wright and Jacqueline Fitzpatrick, Law Clerk, Woodstock, on the brief, for plaintiffs.

Laurence F. Gardner, Hanover, N. H., for defendants.

Before BARNEY, C. J., and LARROW, BILLINGS, HILL and UNDERWOOD, JJ.

LARROW, Justice.

Plaintiffs Dudley, husband and wife, brought a complaint for foreclosure on property in Sharon, Vermont, against defendant Snyder. The complaint also named Dartmouth Savings Bank as a defendant, it being the holder of another mortgage on the property. Synder counterclaimed for breach of warranties, contract and fiduciary duty. The Bank filed a cross-complaint against Snyder for foreclosure of its mortgage, which contained a power of sale. On March 7, 1979, a judgment order issued for foreclosure of the Bank's second mortgage. A settlement between Snyder and the plaintiffs had been reached but not filed at that time. The order anticipated future dismissal of the outstanding claims and counterclaims between plaintiffs and Snyder. In brief, payment of the mortgage debt from sale proceeds was contemplated, less $10,000 in settlement of Snyder's counterclaim. This $10,000 was to be reduced by some $6,000 outstanding taxes to be paid by the Dudleys, and enhanced by 1979 insurance paid by Snyder. Deeds, releases and the like were to be executed upon payment, and dismissals with prejudice filed.

The judgment order also included a provision for payment by the Bank to the Dudleys, from the proceeds of the mortgage sale, of the approximate $6,000 in taxes paid by them. The net result, mathematically, if carried out, would be double recovery by the Dudleys of the $6,000, once as credit on their settlement of the Snyder counterclaim, and once as payment from the Bank. Plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the judgment order, and defendant Snyder filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment Order, purportedly under V.R.C.P. 60. The amount in controversy was escrowed by the parties with the court, pending disposition of the motions.

Following hearing, the court denied plaintiffs' motion to enforce and granted Snyder's motion for relief, striking that part of the March 7, 1979, order which directed payment over by the Bank to the plaintiffs of the $6,000. This, of course, enhanced the residual payment to Snyder as mortgagor from the proceeds of the sale, and the court's order directed payment to him of the escrowed sum. Given as grounds for the action by the court was a "mistake" by the court under V.R.C.P. 60(b)(1). Plaintiffs appeal this order by permission.

The equities of the actions of the trial court in revising the judgment order in question seem quite apparent from the foregoing recitation. A review of the exhibits and the evidence taken convinces us that the ruling, as made, was justified as a matter of substance. Even were we not in full agreement, the ruling is certainly within the trial court's discretion, not to be disturbed unless that discretion is abused or withheld. See Bardill Land & Lumber, Inc., v. Davis, 135 Vt. 81, 370 A.2d 212 (1977)....