Dudukovich v. Lorain Metropolitan Housing Authority
Citation | 12 O.O.3d 198,58 Ohio St.2d 202,389 N.E.2d 1113 |
Decision Date | 23 May 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 78-1071,78-1071 |
Parties | , 12 O.O.3d 198 DUDUKOVICH, Appellee, v. LORAIN METROPOLITAN HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellant. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Ohio |
Appellee, Marie Dudukovich, was employed by appellant, Lorain Metropolitan Housing Authority (LMHA), as an inspector of housing. On April 29, 1977, the board of directors of appellant, at a regular meeting, resolved to terminate the employment of appellee. Appellant listed five reasons for its dismissal of Dudukovich, which can be summarized as follows:
(1) Unsatisfactory performance of inspection;
(2) non-cooperation on eviction case bordering on insubordination;
(3) failure to show up for an inspection appointment with a tenant;
(4) miscalculation of rent owed by tenant; and
(5) errors in work performance.
Appellee appealed her dismissal to the board of directors of LMHA, and a hearing was held before that body on May 23, 1977, during which appellant was represented by counsel. The evidence presented at this hearing to support the charges against Dudukovich consisted of the unsworn testimony of the executive director of LMHA and a number of exhibits, all of which was offered without objection from appellee's counsel. At the conclusion of this hearing, appellant affirmed its dismissal of Dudukovich. 1
Appellee subsequently appealed the May 23 decision of the board to the Court of Common Pleas of Lorain County by filing a notice of appeal with that court on May 31, 1977, and by sending a copy of said notice to appellant by certified mail on May 28, 1977.
After reviewing the record compiled at the hearing, the Court of Common Pleas reversed the board's decision and ordered that appellee be reinstated in her position of inspector. The Court of Appeals thereafter affirmed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas.
This cause is now before this court upon a motion to certify the record.
Smith & Smith and Kenneth P. Frankel, Avon Lake, for appellee.
Warhola, O'Toole & Lumley and Dennis M. O'Toole, Lorain, for appellant.
Initially we are confronted with a challenge by appellant to the assumption of jurisdiction by the Court of Common Pleas in this cause. Specifically, appellant contends that Marie Dudukovich did not comply with the requirements of R.C. Chapter 2505, pertaining to the filing of a notice of appeal from an agency decision. 2 R.C. 2505.04 provides, as follows:
R.C. 2505.07(B) requires that such an appeal be perfected within ten days of the entry of a final order by the agency. Here, the final decision by LMHA was reached at the conclusion of the May 23, 1977, hearing. Appellee filed a notice of appeal with the Court of Common Pleas on May 31, 1977, and sent a copy of the notice to appellant by certified mail on May 28, 1977.
Although R.C. 2505.04 is, admittedly, not explicit on this point, it appears to require that written notice be filed, within the time limit prescribed by R.C. 2505.07(B), with the agency or board from which the appeal is being taken, in order for the appeal to be perfected. As a practical matter, such notice must also be filed, within the same time limit, with the Court of Common Pleas, in order for it to assume jurisdiction. This filing statute was similarly interpreted by the Court of Appeals for Franklin County in Bartlett v. Snouffer (1945), 64 N.E.2d 848, 44 Ohio Law Abs. 612. In construing the predecessor to R.C. 2505.04, that court, at page 613, 64 N.E.2d at page 849 stated:
The issue thus becomes whether Dudukovich sufficiently complied with R.C. 2505.04 by mailing a copy of the notice of appeal to LMHA. It is established that the act of depositing the notice in the mail, in itself, does not constitute a "filing," at least where the notice is not received until after the expiration of the prescribed time limit. Fulton, Supt. of Banks v. State, ex rel. General Motors Corp. (1936), 130 Ohio St. 494, 200 N.E. 636. Rather, "(t)he term 'filed' * * * requires actual delivery * * *." Id., at paragraph one of the syllabus. However, no particular method of delivery is prescribed by the statute. Instead, as was aptly stated in Columbus v. Upper Arlington (1964), 201 N.E.2d 305, 308, 94 Ohio Law Abs. 392, 397 "any method productive of certainty of accomplishment is countenanced." Having considered appellee's method of service, we find that simply "(b)ecause the manner of delivery is unusual does not make it illegal." Id.
Since there is evidence in the record that appellant did eventually receive the mailed copy of the notice, 3 the question remains whether it received the notice within the ten-day time limit prescribed by R.C. 2505.07(B). In a situation such as this, a presumption of timely delivery, as first was expressed in Young v. Bd. of Review (1967), 9 Ohio App.2d 25, 222 N.E.2d 789, should control. There, the appellate court took judicial notice of the ordinary course of the mails and concluded that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the notice of appeal was timely filed. Such a presumption is applicable in the instant cause. Here, a copy of the notice of appeal was sent by certified mail, to a destination within the same city, five days prior to the expiration of the statutory time limit. Appellant having presented no evidence of late delivery, a presumption of timely delivery controls; thus, the Court of Common Pleas correctly assumed jurisdiction in this cause.
The other major issue presented by the appeal is whether the Court of Common Pleas acted within its scope of review in reversing the decision of LMHA to dismiss appellee. Pursuant to its authority under R.C. 2506.04, 4 that court held that "(u)pon review of the transcript and exhibits filed," the decision of appellant was "arbitrary, unreasonable and unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable and probative evidence on the whole record." The Court of Common Pleas made no findings of fact in this regard.
As a basis for affirming the judgment of that court, the Court of Appeals cited our decision in Arcaro Bros. Builders, Inc., v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals (1966), 7 Ohio St.2d 32, 218 N.E.2d 179. In that case we held that, since the board had refused permission to have any of the witnesses, sworn, the record contained no evidence. Thus, R.C. 2506.04 sanctioned a reversal of the board's decision. However, that case was subsequently distinguished in the syllabus of Stores Realty Co. v. Cleveland (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 41, 322 N.E.2d 629, wherein we held: "The omission of administration of the oath to a witness in a trial or administrative hearing is waivable error. * * * "
In the hearing before the board of directors of appellant there was no objection raised to the unsworn character of the executive director's testimony, nor to the admission of any of the exhibits. Thus, contrary to the view of the Court of Appeals, we must assume that the Court of Common Pleas weighed all the evidence presented to the board in reaching its conclusion that the decision of the board was "arbitrary, unreasonable and unsupported by a preponderance of the substantial, reliable and probative evidence on the whole record."
The issue is thus narrowed to a question of whether the Court of Common Pleas properly conceived of its scope of review under R.C. 2506.04 as including a weighing of the evidence. In one of the few instances this court has had to consider the scope of review provided for by R.C. Chapter 2506, we stated that, Cincinnati Bell v. Glendale (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 368, 370, 328 N.E.2d 808, 809. Similarly, in interpreting the scope of review of decisions of specific state agencies under analogous R.C. 119.12, we have held...
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