Duenas v. Nagle

• Decision Date: 06 May 1991
• Docket Number: No. 91-C-0024-C.,91-C-0024-C.
• Citation: Duenas v. Nagle, 765 F.Supp. 1393 (W.D. Wis. 1991)
• Parties: Jose Ramon DUENAS, Plaintiff, v. James J. NAGLE, James P. Murphy, Marvin Prieve, and Kyle Davidson, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Wisconsin

765 F. Supp. 1393

Jose Ramon DUENAS, Plaintiff, v. James J. NAGLE, James P. Murphy, Marvin Prieve, and Kyle Davidson, Defendants.

No. 91-C-0024-C.

United States District Court, W.D. Wisconsin.

May 6, 1991.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James P. McLinden, Gonzalez & Assoc., Milwaukee, Wis., for plaintiff.

Eileen W. Pray, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, Wis., for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

CRABB, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff brings this civil action for monetary relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his procedural due process and Eighth Amendment rights in connection with prison disciplinary hearings. Jurisdiction is present under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Presently before the court is defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Defendants argue that the acts of which plaintiff complains were random and unauthorized, and therefore, the state's provision of postdeprivation remedies provided plaintiff all the process he was due. Plaintiff argues that defendants' acts were not random or unauthorized, and that defendants' departures from state regulations amounted to completed violations of his procedural due process rights that should not bar his claim under § 1983. I conclude that defendants are correct: their acts were random and unauthorized, and the state's provision of an adequate postdeprivation remedy provides plaintiff with all the process he is due under the Fourteenth Amendment.

For the purpose only of deciding the motion to dismiss, I take as true the following well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint. I have also taken judicial notice of certain regulations and procedures set out in the Wisconsin Administrative Code.

ALLEGATIONS OF FACT

Plaintiff is a citizen of Cuba currently incarcerated in the United States Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas. At all times material to this complaint, he was an inmate at the Columbia Correctional Institution in Portage, Wisconsin. At all times relevant to the complaint, defendant Murphy was the warden and superintendent at the Columbia Correctional Institution, defendants Prieve and Davidson served as members of the Adjustment Committee at Columbia, and defendant Nagle was the Security Director for the Division of Corrections of the State of Wisconsin.

Between December 1986 and March 1987, plaintiff was the subject of at least 31 disciplinary hearings.

Wisconsin Administrative Code §§ DOC 303.76, 303.78 and 303.82 govern the hearing procedure for major conduct violations. § 303.76 provides that an inmate be given prior written notice of the charges against him. Sections 303.76 and 303.81 allow an inmate to present evidence in his defense, and mandate that the accused be given a written copy of the evidence the adjustment committee relied on in making its decision. Within ten days of an adverse decision by the adjustment committee, an inmate may appeal to the superintendent under § 303.76(7).

With respect to a majority of plaintiff's hearings, defendant Prieve did not give plaintiff a conduct report or other written notice of the charges against him or notice of the subsequent disciplinary hearings. Also on several occasions, defendant Prieve denied plaintiff an opportunity to call witnesses and to present a meaningful defense.

When plaintiff arrived at Columbia Correctional Institution, defendant Nagle informed him that he would remain in adjustment segregation as long as defendant Nagle was security director. Defendant Nagle carried out this threat.

Defendant Murphy sat on the adjustment committee for certain of plaintiff's disciplinary hearings.

On several occasions when defendants Prieve and Davidson served as adjustment committee members, they failed to provide written statements of the evidence they relied on in making their decisions to impose disciplinary sanctions on plaintiff.

As a result of defendants' actions, plaintiff was placed in solitary confinement and segregation, suffered anxiety and mental distress, lost wages, lost the companionship of his family and friends, and was placed in federal custody as an INS detainee.¹

On November 30, 1988, the Corrections Complaint Examiner found that in a majority of plaintiff's hearings, plaintiff did not receive notice of the charges against him and was not allowed to select witnesses for his hearings, and that on several occasions, plaintiff did not receive a written statement of the reasons for the adjustment committee's decision. On December 21, 1988, the prison system administrator affirmed this finding, and ordered prison authorities to expunge the conduct reports for which plaintiff did not receive notice and was denied witnesses, and to expunge the conduct reports or hold new hearings for the occasions on which plaintiff was not given a written statement outlining the reasons for the disciplinary action.

OPINION

Plaintiff asserts that the state's regulations provide him a liberty interest in not being punished for major conduct violations in the absence of the procedural protections mandated by the Wisconsin Administrative Code, chapter DOC 303. However, this contention mischaracterizes the nature of the constitutional violations at issue.

In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), the Supreme Court established the minimum constitutional requirements of due process to be afforded prisoners facing major misconduct disciplinary penalties. Those protections are: 1) written notice of the charges against the inmate prior to the hearing; 2) the limited right to call witnesses and to present documentary evidence; 3) the right to an impartial hearing body; and 4) a written statement of the evidence on which the hearing committee relied and the reasons for its decision. Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1145 (7th Cir.1988) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67, 94 S.Ct. at 2978-80).

That Wisconsin chooses to provide additional procedural protections to its inmates, such as the right to an advocate (§ DOC 303.78) or the right to appeal an adverse decision to the superintendent (§ DOC 303.76(7)), does not change what the Supreme Court has determined to be the minimum procedures necessary to protect the liberty interest of an inmate facing major penalties for misconduct. To the extent that defendants ignored those state regulations that coincide with the procedures mandated in Wolff, their conduct would violate plaintiff's constitutional rights. To the extent that defendants ignored any other aspect of those regulations, they may have violated state law, but they did not offend any constitutional right on the part of plaintiff. See Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1097-98, 1101 (7th Cir.1982) (because a state-created procedural right is not itself a liberty interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, the question of what process is due is governed by federal constitutional law and not defined by the state procedures).

Defendants concede that they did not adhere to the procedures in question, but argue that plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim under § 1983 because it is barred by Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986).

In Parratt and in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984), the Supreme Court held that the deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest caused by a state employee's random, unauthorized act does not give rise to a procedural due process claim under § 1983 unless the state does not provide the plaintiff with an adequate post-deprivation remedy for the loss. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 110 S.Ct. 975, 978, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990). The Court reasoned that when a deprivation is the result of a state actor's random and unauthorized conduct, the state cannot predict that such conduct will occur, and consequently it is futile or impossible for the state to guard against the deprivation by mandating additional pre deprivation procedures. Therefore, the state can be expected only to provide an adequate post deprivation remedy. Id. In such cases, there is no constitutional violation unless and until the state fails to provide due process. Id. 110 S.Ct. at 983.

In Parratt, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, prison employees negligently lost a hobby kit an inmate had ordered by mail; in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, a prison guard deliberately destroyed the plaintiff's personal property in his cell. In both cases, the Supreme Court held that the prisoners had not been deprived of their property without due process because they could have utilized a state tort claim procedure to gain compensation for the loss, and it would have been impossible for the state to have provided an additional procedure that could have prevented the type of deprivation in question. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541, 101 S.Ct. at 1916. In short, the Court held that it was beyond the control of the state to prevent a property loss resulting from a random, unauthorized act that did not derive from any "established state procedure." Id. at 541, 101 S.Ct. at 1916; Hudson, 468 U.S. at 532, 104 S.Ct. at 3203.

The Parratt rule is equally applicable to deprivations of liberty where the state is truly unable to prevent the random conduct effecting the deprivation. Zinermon, 110 S.Ct. at 987. See also Guenther v. Holmgreen, 738 F.2d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1212, 105 S.Ct. 1182, 84 L.Ed.2d 329 (1985) (Parratt applicable to claims of false arrest and imprisonment). However, plaintiff contends that the deprivation in Parratt was caused by conduct that is very different from the conduct in the present case. He argues that Parratt involved an isolated instance of affirmative conduct, whereas this case involves noncompliance with procedures set up to prevent deprivations of liberty, which is an abuse of the state process...