Duffield v. School District of City of Williamsport

• Decision Date: 11 July 1894
• Docket Number: 496
• Citation: Duffield v. School District of City of Williamsport, 29 A. 742, 162 Pa. 476 (Pa. 1894)
• Parties: Andrew J. Duffield, Appellant, v. Williamsport School District
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

29 A. 742

162 Pa. 476

Andrew J. Duffield, Appellant, v. Williamsport School District

No. 496

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

July 11, 1894

Argued April 12, 1894

Appeal, No. 496, Jan. T., 1894, by plaintiff, from order of C.P. Lycoming Co., March T., 1894, No. 504, refusing writ of mandamus.Affirmed.

Mandamus to compel school board to admit pupil.

The facts appear by the opinion of the Supreme Court.

Errors assigned were (1) in overruling demurrer and (2) in refusing writ.

The learned judge of the court below reached a correct conclusion in this case, and his decree is now affirmed at the cost of the appellant.

W. H Spencer, for appellant.-- Nowhere do we find that the city of Williamsport has ever been given, in express terms, the power to enforce compulsory vaccination, and if the city has such power at all, it must arise by necessary implication.

Any fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of the power is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied: 1 Dillon'sMun. Corp., 3d ed §§ 89, 91 and note;Cooley's Con. Lim., 6th ed., pp. 227, 231, 487;Endlich, Stat. §§ 340, 352 and authorities cited;15 A. & E. Ency. L., p. 1041;2 Kent's Com., 12th ed., p. 298;Municipal Police Ord Horr & Bemis, § 17.

Against the body of a healthy man, no man or body of men has any right of assault whatever under the pretence of public health, nor any more against the body of a healthy child: Bertholf v. O'Rielly,74 N.Y. 509;Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 116;People v. Marx,99 N.Y. 386.

This ordinance is an exercise of the police power of the state.Now the police power is grounded upon inevitable necessity -- the necessity that all men are under of so exercising their own rights as not to infringe upon the equal rights of others: Cooley'sCon. Lim., 6th ed. 705;2 Kent'sCom., 12th ed. 340;Phila. v. Scott,81 Pa. 80;1 Dillon'sMun. Corp., 3d ed. 141.

Grant, however, that such a power could constitutionally be exercised; we claim that it belongs to a class of extraordinary powers that must be clearly conveyed.And if there be any doubt, it must be resolved against the corporation: 4 A. & E. Ency. L., pp. 212, 213 and notes;Breninger v. Belvidere,44 N.J.L. 350;Municipal Police Ord., Horr & Bemis, § 16;Green's Brice's Ultra Vires, 2d ed. 29, note; Potter's Dwarris on Stat., p. 255.

The act of 1851, P.L. 322, gives the city power to enforce its regulations by "fines and penalties incurring partial or total forfeitures."It is a well established proposition of law that when the charter or general law, under which a municipality is incorporated, prescribes the manner in which its by-laws or regulations are to be enforced, the corporation is precluded from enforcing them in any other way: 2 Bl. Com. 267;15 A. & E. Ency. L., p. 1042, § 3andnote; 17 Ib., art. xxviii, p. 260;1 Dillon'sMun. Corp., 3d ed. §§ 336, 337, 339, and note, 410;Mun. Police Ord., Horr & Bemis, § 148;Barterv. Com., 3 P. & W. 253;Leland v. Commissioners,42 N.J.L. 375;Hart v. Albany, 3 Paige, 811.

By act of May 8, 1854, P.L. 621, sec. 23, the board of directors are required to make school provision for all the children in the district, between the ages of six and twenty-one years, who may apply for admission.This law gives to every child in the school district the right to attend the public schools; and the only requisites necessary for admission are age and residence in the district: Nicklas's Petition, 146 Pa. 217;School Laws and Dec., 1892ed., p. 34;Cooley'sCon. Lim., 6th ed. 247;Livingston v. Wolf,136 Pa. 533.

The federal constitution prescribes that "no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law:" 14th amendment.And the constitution of Pennsylvania, art. 1, § 9: "nor can he be deprived of his life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land."And the provisions are declared to be identical in legal meaning: Cooley'sCon. Lim., 6th ed. 429;Tiedeman's Police Power, § 21;Stuart v. Palmer,74 N.Y. 190;Bertholf v. O'Rielly,74 N.Y. 516;People v. Marx,99 N.Y. 386.In all cases where persons are deprived of any rights, their forfeiture must be judicially determined: 1 Dillon'sMun. Corp., 3d ed. § 347 et seq.;Cooley's Con. Lim., 6th ed., pp. 125, 316, 318, 442, 444;Hodgson v. Millward, 3 Grant, 406;Mun. Police Ord., Horr & Bemis, § 163;Fetter v. Wilt,46 Pa. 460;Tiedeman's Police Power, § 31a;Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill (N.Y.), 146-7;Rockwell v. Nearing,35 N.Y. 302-7;Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 394-5, 419.

While the municipal authorities may classify its inhabitants, and prescribe different regulations for different classes, the classification must be based upon some reasonable distinction, and unless it is so based, and unless the regulation is made to apply impartially to all who are similarly situated, it is void: Cooley's Con. Lim., 6th ed., pp. 481, 484;1 Dillon'sMun. Corp., 3d ed. § 322;Reimer's Appeal, 100 Pa. 182, 185;Livingston v. Wolf,136 Pa. 533;Danville Boro. v. Peters,8 Luz. Leg. Reg. 273;Knoxville v. Bird,47 Am. R. 326;Gale v. Kalamazoo,9 Am. R. 81;Chicago v. Rumpff,45 Ill. 90;Shreveport v. Levy,21 Am. R. 553;1 Cooley'sCon. Lim., 6th ed. 240;1 Dillon'sMun. Corp., 3d ed. §§ 319, 320, 322;17 A. &E. Ency. L. 253.

The child is primarily subject to the control of the parent, and unless the parent permits the child to be vaccinated, he is unable to comply with the requirements of this ordinance.So that as to such children the ordinance prescribes an impossible condition: Morrow v. Wood,17 Am. R. 471;Rulison v. Post,79 Ill. 567;Trustees v. People,87 Ill. 303;1 Dillon'sMun. Corp., 3d. ed. § 319;Cooley'sCon. Lim., 6th ed. 240.

The police power, all pervading as it is, is always subservient to the constitution of the state: 1 Dillon'sMun. Corp., 3d ed. §§ 141, 142;Cooley's Con. Lim., 6th ed., pp. 78, 79, and note, 238-9;Tiedeman's Pol. Power, p. 5;18 A. & E. Ency. L., p. 746; Endlich on Stat. § 533;Constitution of Pa., art. 10, § 1;Laws of 1854, p. 621.

Art. 10, § 1, of the constitution contains a mandatory direction to the legislature to make school provision for all the children of the commonwealth above the age of six years; and by stating the conditions for admission, viz: residence and proper age, the constitution fixes the qualifications which school children must possess: Nicklas's Petition, 146 Pa. 217;School Laws and Dec., ed. 1892, p. 34;Cooley'sCon. Lim., 6th ed. 105;Page v. Allen,58 Pa. 347;Patterson v. Barlow,60 Pa. 85;Stuart v. Balmer,74 N.Y. 183;Henderson v. Mayor, 92 U.S. 268.

A school district is a quasi corporation: Cooley'sCon. Lim., 6th ed. 294;Wharton v. Directors,42 Pa. 362.It is directed for educational purposes and can exercise no power except for those purposes: 21 A. &E. Ency. L. 780;Ford v. School Dist.,22 W.N. 346;School Dist. v. Fuess,98 Pa. 600;School Dist. v. Thompson,5 Minn. 221;Stevenson v. School Dist.,87 Ill. 255.As such corporation, it can exercise only the following powers: (1) Those expressly granted; (2) those absolutely necessary to the accomplishment of the purpose for which school boards are created; (3) those necessarily or fairly implied in the powers expressly granted: 1 Dillon'sMun. Corp., 3d ed. §§ 24, 25, 89, 91, and notes;Cooley's Con. Lim., 6th ed., pp. 224, and note, 227, 231;Board v. Stephenson,16 W.N. 124;Ford v. School Directors,121 Pa. 543;School Directors v. Fuess,98 Pa. 600.The powers granted must be construed with reference to the object of the grant: Endlich on Stat. § 73;Cooley'sCon. Lim., 6th ed. 260;1 Dillon'sMun. Corp., 3d ed. § 91; and are to be strictly construed: 1 Dillon'sMun. Corp., 3d ed. § 91; Endlich on Stat. § 340;15 A. &E. Ency. L. 1041;2 Kent'sCom., 12th ed. 298.

An examination of all the statutes relating to the common schools, shows that the legislature has nowhere given to school boards in express terms the power to prescribe vaccination as a necessary qualification for admission into the common schools, or to suspend or expel pupils who fail to comply with a rule requiring vaccination: Brenninger v. Belvidere,44 N.J.L. 350;Green's Brice's Ultra Vires, 2d ed. 29; Potter's Dwarris on Stat. 255;Van Horn v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 316.

While the board may make reasonable regulations to preserve the order of the schools, and to protect the health, lives and limbs of the children while they are under its control, it is not a conservator of the public peace nor of the public health.Over the children it has but a limited control, derived entirely from the parents, viz: that of restraint and correction and then only for educational purposes: 1 Bl. Com., p. 453, and note;17 A. & E. Ency. L., p. 352;21 Ib. 768;Cooley'sCon. Lim., page 415;School Laws and Dec., ed. 1892, p. 58, § 101;Lander v. Seaver,76 Am. Dec. 156;State v. Mizner,32 Am. R. 128;Morrow v. Wood,17 Am. R. 471.And this control is concurrent with that of the parent.For all general purposes the parent's control follows the child into the schoolroom: Rulison v. Post,79 Ill. 567;Trustees v. People,87 Ill. 303;Morrow v. Wood,17 Am. R. 471;Dritt v. Snodgrass, 27 Am. R. 343.

A regulation of this character must, first of all, be general in its application and reasonable in its character: Reimer's Ap., 100 Pa. 182;Livingston v. Wolf,136 Pa. 533;1 Dillon'sMun. Corp., 3d ed. 319, 332;Cooley'sCon. Lim., 6th ed. 240, 481;Fertrich v. Michener,60 Am. R. 709.

Frank P. Cummings, for appellee.-- School districts are not municipal corporations, but are organized under the general laws of the state, and fall within the class of corporations known as quasi corporations: 1...