Duffy v. Bragg
Decision Date | 15 July 2014 |
Docket Number | C/A No. 2:14-2694-JMC-WWD |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Parties | Jermaine Charles Duffy, Petitioner, v. Travis Bragg, Warden, Bennettsville FCI, Respondent. |
Petitioner, Jermaine Charles Duffy ("Petitioner"), is a federal prisoner at the Federal Correctional Institution in Bennettsville, South Carolina ("FCI Bennettsville"). Petitioner, proceeding pro se and in forma paupers, filed this Petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the 300-month sentence imposed upon him by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 2-3 of 10.) This matter is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (DSC) for initial screening.
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of this Petition pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts,1 the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, and other habeas corpus statutes. Pro se petitions are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys; Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978); and a federal court is charged with liberallyconstruing a petition filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially-meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). When a federal court is evaluating a pro se petition, the petitioner's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of New York, 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990). Such is the case here.
Petitioner is challenging his enhanced sentence, imposed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), after a jury convicted him of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), i.e. being a felon in possession of a weapon.2 On February 3, 2009, theUnited States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence. See United States v. Duffy, 315 F. App'x 216 (11th Cir. 2009). Petitioner alleges in his current petition that his § 2255 motion was dismissed by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia on June 16, 2010. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 4 of 10.)
(Dkt. No. 1-1 at 3-4 of 9.) Petitioner asserts the conviction should not have served to enhance his sentence because "there was never a potential for physical injury, physical force, nor was there any actual use of force . . . ." (Id. at 4 of 9.) Petitioner seeks to have his "unconstitutional sentence" vacated, and to be resentenced "without the § 924(e) enhancement being applied." (Id. at 8 of 9.)
"[I]t is well established that defendants convicted in federal court are obliged to seek habeas relief from their convictions and sentences through § 2255." Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc)). A § 2255 motion must be brought in the sentencing court. Generally speaking, a "a § 2255 motion 'attacks the legality of detention,'" whereas "a § 2241 petition 'attacks the execution of a sentence rather than its validity.'" Brown v. Rivera, Civ. A. No. 9:08-cv-3177-PMD-BM, 2009 WL 960212, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 2009) ( ). A petition pursuant to § 2241 must be brought against the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).3 Because Petitioner is currently incarcerated in the District of South Carolina, this§ 2241 petition was properly filed in this Court.4 However, the threshold question in this case is whether Petitioner's claims are cognizable under § 2241.
Petitioner asserts that the "savings clause in § 2255(e) reaches [his] pure § 924(e)-Begay error claim of illegal detention above the statutory maximum penalty in § 924(a)." (Dkt. No. 1 at 8 of 10.) Petitioner asserts that § 2255 is "not adequate to test [his] continued detention" because of the "one year deadline that governs habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255." (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 4 of 9.) Citing to Bryant v. Warden, 738 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2013), Petitioner argues that he is entitled to proceed under § 2241. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6-7 of 9.)
The undersigned disagrees with Petitioner and therefore recommends that his § 2241 petition be dismissed. The Fourth Circuit has not extended the reach of the savings clause to petitioners who challenge only their sentences. See United States v. Poole, 531 F.3d 263, 267 n.7 (4th Cir. 2008); see also Darden v. Stephens, 426 F. App'x 173, 174 (4thCir. 2011) (the petitioner's claim that he was actually innocent of being a career offender) to extend the savings clause to reach .
Petitioner does not allege that the conduct for which he was sentenced, i.e. being a felon in possession of a weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), was rendered non-criminal by any substantive law change since the filing of his direct appeal. Further, Petitioner does not allege that he is or was factually innocent of his predicate convictions, which were considered by the sentencing court under § 924(e), which resulted in Petitioner's ACCA sentence enhancement. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to proceed under § 2241.
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioner's Motion "for a Change of Venue" (Dkt. No. 3) be DENIED, and that the instant § 2241 Petition be dismissed without prejudice and without requiring Respondent to file a return. Petitioner's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
/s/_________
WALLACE W. DIXON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
July 15, 2014
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) ( ).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk of Court
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
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