Duffy v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 December 1900
• Citation: Duffy v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 47 A. 905, 94 Me. 414 (Me. 1900)
• Parties: DUFFY v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

47 A. 905

94 Me. 414

DUFFY

v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Dec. 8, 1900.

(Official.)

Report from supreme Judicial court, Penobscot county.

Bill by Ellen Duffy against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Case reported, and bill dismissed.

Bill in equity to compel the defendant to return to the plaintiff a policy of life insurance, issued upon the life of her son, John M. Duffy, in which she was the beneficiary, and which she claimed she was induced to deliver to the company by the false and fraudulent representations of its agent. Her prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to deliver the policy to her, and for general relief.

The policy was issued April 7, 1898, to John M. Duffy. He died December 16, 1898, of consumption, and about the 1st of January, 1899, the company received a letter from Mrs. Duffy's attorney, asking for proofs of death under the policy, and, upon refusal to furnish same, this bill was filed.

The case was tried before a jury at the January term, 1900, of the supreme judicial court at Bangor, upon the following issues of fact: "Did the defendant company, by its agent Zimmerman, fraudulently, and for the purpose of deceiving the complainant, and of inducing her to surrender the policy of life insurance referred to, make false representations to the complainant, relative to certain alleged false statements and representations made by the insured in his application for insurance, as alleged in the complainant's bill, and was she thereby deceived and induced to surrender said policy? Ans. Yes.

"Was said John M. Duffy in sound health on the 7th day of April, 1898? Ans. Yes.

"Did said John M. Duffy have an habitual' cough on the 4th day of April, A. D. 1898? Ans. No.

"Did said John M. Duffy have consumption on either the 4th day of April, A. D. 1898, or the 7th day of April, A. D. 1898? Ans. No."

No decree was entered upon the return of the verdict, but the parties entered into a stipulation to report the case to the law court upon a full report of the evidence and the answers to the questions submitted to the jury; the law court to give such weight to the answers to the questions made by the jury as the court believes such answers are entitled to, and to decide all questions of law and fact involved, and to order such a decree as the rights of the parties require. It was further agreed that, in case the law court decided the case in favor of the plaintiff, a decree should be made for the payment of the amount due upon the policy.

Argued before WISWELL, C. J., and EMERY, WHITEHOUSE, SAVAGE, FOGLER, and POWERS, JJ.

P. H. Gillin and T. B. Towle, for plaintiff.

J. H. & J. H. Drummond, Jr., and L. C. Stearns, for defendant.

SAVAGE, J. On April 4, 1898, John M. Duffy made application to the defendant company for insurance on his own life for the benefit of his mother, Ellen Duffy, and on April 7th the defendant issued its policy, whereby, in the event of the death of John M. Duffy, it promised to pay $500 to Ellen Duffy, if living; otherwise, to the legal representatives of the insured. The premiums, of $3.01 each, were made payable on the 7th days of April, July, October, and January. The premiums for April and July, 1898, were paid, but none afterwards. In his application Duffy made the following representations: "I have never had any of following complaints or diseases: Consumption, * * * disease of the lungs, * * * habitual cough," and "I am now in sound health." It is conceded that by the terms and conditions of the application and policy, if these representations were untrue the policy was void. The defendant claims that they were untrue, and that Duffy, at the time he made his application, was not in sound health; that he had an habitual cough and incipient consumption.

On August 2, 1898, Ellen Duffy executed and delivered to an agent of the company a release, under seal, of all her rights under the policy, and delivered up the policy, which was then in her possession. The next day John Duffy joined in the release which his mother had signed, and the company paid him $15 therefor. Nothing further was done by Mrs. Duffy or John until after John's death, December 16, 1898, when Mrs. Duffy brought this bill of complaint, alleging, among other things, that the release which she signed was obtained from her without consideration, and by duress, and through the false and fraudulent representations of the agent of the company, and asking for a restoration of the policy.

In its answer the company asserts that John Duffy made the representations which we have referred to in his application, and that they were untrue, and it denies that the release was obtained by duress or fraud.

At the trial certain questions were submitted to a jury, who answered that the agent of the company did make false and fraudulent representations to the complainant for the purpose of deceiving her, and that she was thereby deceived and induced to surrender the policy. The jury also answered that John Duffy was in sound health, and had neither an habitual cough nor consumption, on the date of his application to the company. Thereupon the case was reported to the law court, with the stipulation that "the law court is to give so much weight to the answers to the questions made by the jury as the court believes such answers are entitled to, and to decide all questions of law and fact involved, and to order such a decree as the rights of the parties require."

A verdict of a jury, upon issues of fact tried before them in equity proceedings, is to be regarded as advisory only (Redman v. Hurley, 89 Me. 428, 36 Atl. 906), and as such we must regard the verdict in this case. It is our duty to examine the issues and the evidence as if originally submitted to us, and, while we may give great weight to the conclusions of the jury upon disputed issues of fact, still their findings should not be sustained unless they satisfy the conscience of the court Larrabee v. Grant, 70 Me. 79. In the case we are now considering, if the result could be based solely upon the answers to the question whether John Duffy made false representations in his application or not whether he was then in sound health or not, we might order a decree in accordance with the verdict, although possibly we might think that the evidence preponderated to the contrary. That is one of those doubtful questions involving a pure issue of fact, concerning which the judgment of 12 good men and true is of great value. But, when the verdict depends upon the proper application of somewhat complex rules of law to the evidence, it is necessarily of less weight. But a decision that John Duffy was in sound health when insured does not decide the case. The defendant claims that, in any event the complainant has released her interest under the policy. And that claim we must now consider. If the...