Dufresne v. O.F. Mossberg & Sons, Inc.
| Decision Date | 15 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:14cv21(WIG),3:14cv21(WIG) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | GARY DUFRESNE, Plaintiff, v. O.F. MOSSBERG AND SONS, INC., Defendant. |
Plaintiff Gary Dufresne has brought this action against O.F. Mossberg and Sons, Inc. ("Mossberg" or "Defendant") alleging Mossberg failed to hire him based on a perception of disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§12102 et seq. (the "ADA"). Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant failed to accommodate his perceived disability. Defendant has moved for summary judgment on all counts of Plaintiff's complaint. [Doc. # 37]. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is granted
The facts as presented are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.1 Defendant is a family-owned firearms manufacturer located in North Haven, Connecticut. On July 18, 2012, Plaintiff applied for a Third Shift Lead Production Operator position with Mossberg.2 Plaintiff had beenemployed as a machinist for all of his adult life. [Affidavit of Gary Dufresne, ¶ 4]. Plaintiff was interviewed for the position on July 23, 2012, and was offered the position conditional upon the successful completion of a pre-employment background check, drug test, and physical. These pre-employment procedures were typical. [Affidavit of Lawrence Lacoste ¶ 9]. The Third Shift Lead Production Operator position involved operating and working around large CNC machines. At the time Plaintiff applied for the position, there were only three to four employees who worked in the production area during the third shift. The production area is very spread out, so the Third Shift Lead Production Operator would not be working in close proximity to other workers. There is no supervisor in the production area during the third shift. [Affidavit of Lawrence Lacoste ¶ 13].
Plaintiff submitted to his pre-employment physical on July 31, 2012. Dr. Rhonda Gold conduced the exam at Concentra Medical Centers. The physical encompassed Plaintiff answering written questions involving his medical history, and an examination by Dr. Gold. In responding to written questions, Plaintiff circled "yes" to questions indicating he had a history of chest pain, fainting spells, heart disease, high blood pressure, shortness of breath, and surgery. [Ex. 2 to Affidavit of Lawrence Lacoste]. Dr. Gold's notes on the exam form indicate cardiac node ablation on May 2, 2012; a syncopal episode in June 2012; and that Plaintiff saw a cardiologist in July 2012. [Ex. 2 to Affidavit of Lawrence Lacoste]. Dr. Gold also noted that Plaintiff "still has near-syncopal sensations," would be returning to the cardiologist in October 2012, and "may need pacemaker." [Ex. 2 to Affidavit of Lawrence Lacoste]. Plaintiff denies experiencing near-fainting sensations, and asserts that his condition is not severe enough such that a pacemaker is necessary. [Affidavit of Gary Dufresne, ¶¶ 10-11]. As a result of her examination, Dr. Gold determined that Plaintiff was unable to perform the essential functions ofthe operator position; she specifically found that Plaintiff could not work without direct supervision and could not work around machinery or in a safety-sensitive position.
Because of the results of the pre-employment physical, Mossberg determined that Plaintiff was not qualified for the position and withdrew its job offer to Plaintiff. [Affidavit of Lawrence Lacoste ¶ 16].
Plaintiff concedes that he is not disabled. Plaintiff did not request any reasonable accommodation in connection with potential employment at Mossberg, and believes that he did not require any accommodations to perform the duties of the Third Shift Lead Production Operator position.
Rule 56(a) provides that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of any material factual issue genuinely in dispute. Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v. London Am. Int'l Corp. Ltd., 664 F.2d 348, 351 (2d Cir. 1981). The substantive law governing the claims in a case will identify those facts that are material. A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.
Thus, the Court's function in ruling on a motion for summary judgment is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 249. In making this determination, the Court should review all of the evidence in the record and resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor ofthe non-moving party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). The Court, however, may not make credibility determinations. Id. "Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849 (1991). Stated differently, "if there is any evidence in the record that could reasonably support a jury's verdict for the non-moving party," summary judgment must be denied. Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 286 (2d Cir. 2002).
The ADA directs that "no covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a). Under the ADA, employers may not discriminate "against a qualified individual with respect to hiring because of a real or perceived disability." E.E.O.C. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Connecticut, 30 F. Supp. 2d 296, 304 (D. Conn. 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). Here, Plaintiff claims that Mossburg violated the ADA by failing to hire him and by failing to accommodate him. Plaintiff's claims are governed by the burden shifting analysis from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Ruszkowski v. Kaleida Health Sys., 422 F.App'x 58, 60 (2d Cir. 2011). This framework first requires Plaintiff to make out a prima facie case of employment discrimination. Id. Plaintiff may not satisfy his burden at this step by "offering purely conclusory allegations of discrimination, absent any concrete particulars." Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir. 1985). Once Plaintiff has made a prima facie showing, "the burden of production shifts to the employer to demonstrate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision not to hire thePlaintiff." Ruszkoswki, 422 F.App'x at 60. "The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to present evidence that the employer's proffered reason is a pretext for an impermissible motivation." Id. Plaintiff can establish pretext by "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Meiri, 759 F.2d at 997.
To make out a prima facie case of disability discrimination with respect to his failure to hire claim, Plaintiff must show that (1) he is a person with a disability under the meaning of the ADA; (2) Defendant is an employer subject to the ADA; (3) he could perform the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) he was terminated or suffered some other adverse employment action because of his disability. Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 149-50 (2d Cir. 1998).
Defendant has moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's failure to hire claim on the grounds that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination. Because Plaintiff has not offered any evidence showing he is a person with a disability within the meaning of the ADA, or that Mossberg regarded him to be, the Court agrees.
The ADA defines disability as: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). "Major life activities" is defined by the regulations to include functions such as "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). Because the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") is responsible for implementing the ADA, courts defer to the EEOC regulations ininterpreting the ADA's terms. Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 747(2d Cir. 2001). To be considered disabled under the Act, the impairment must substantially limit one or more major life activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). An impairment "substantially limits a major life activity if it renders a person either (i) unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform that activity in comparison to the average person in the general population. Giordano at 747 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)) (internal quotation marks omitted). When, as here, the relevant life activity is "working," the EEOC regulations define "substantially limits" more precisely:
(i) The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having...
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