Dufur v. U.S. Parole Comm'n

Decision Date24 May 2018
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 17–677 (RDM)
Citation314 F.Supp.3d 10
Parties Artie DUFUR, Plaintiff, v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Artie Dufur, Bruceton Mills, WV, pro se.

Marsha Wellknown Yee, U.S. Attorney's Office, Civil Division, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RANDOLPH D. MOSS, United States District Judge

This case presents the question whether mandatory parole in the federal prison system is mandatory. It is not. That counterintuitive result understandably led Plaintiff Artie Dufur, a pro se prisoner who is serving a parole-eligible federal life sentence, to challenge the decision of Defendant United States Parole Commission ("the Commission") denying him parole. Dkt. 1 at 2–3 (Compl. ¶¶ 2–3, 5). As relevant here, there are two paths to parole for inmates in Dufur's position. First, the Commission applies a "two-thirds" rule for what it terms mandatory parole. Under that rule, the Commission is required to release an eligible prisoner, "serving a sentence of five years or longer," after the prisoner has served two-thirds of his sentence or after serving thirty years of a sentence of "more than forty-five years." 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d).1 The mandatory parole rule, however, is subject to exceptions; among other things, it does not apply if the Commission determines "that there is a reasonable probability that [the prisoner] will commit any Federal, State, or local crime." Id. Second, the Commission also possesses the discretion, subject to certain exceptions, to parole inmates who have served at least one-third of their sentence, or ten years in the case of a life sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 4205. Dufur's principal claim is that the Commission's recent decision to deny him mandatory parole violated various statutory, regulatory, and constitutional provisions. He also alleges that the Commission's earlier decisions denying him discretionary parole were unlawful. The Commission has moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.2 Dkt. 9.

For the reasons explained below, the Court agrees with Commission that Dufur has failed to state a claim. The Court will, accordingly, GRANT the Commission's motion, Dkt. 9, and will DISMISS the case.

I. BACKGROUND

On a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts the plaintiff's "well-pleaded factual allegations" as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The Court also considers "any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters" subject to judicial notice. See EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch. , 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The Court may, as a result, consider the three administrative decisions attached to Dufur's complaint. The Court may also consider the copies of Dufur's administrative appeal and amended administrative appeal, which are attached to the Commission's motion to dismiss. Although those latter documents were not attached to the complaint, they are referred to in it and are "integral to [the plaintiff's] claim." Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham , 798 F.3d 1119, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Kaempe v. Myers , 367 F.3d 958, 965 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ); see also Dkt. 1 at 4–5, 6–7 (Compl. ¶¶ 7, 10–11); id. at 10. More importantly, Dufur does not object to the Commission's reliance on these documents and, indeed, relies on them himself. See Dkt. 11 at 5 n.1. Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that it may rely on Dufur's administrative appeal and amended administrative appeal, which in any event only further explicate Dufur's claims, "without converting the motion into one for summary judgment." Banneker Ventures , 798 F.3d at 1133.

The events giving rise to Dufur's claims date back to the 1970s, when Dufur was serving a life sentence in California state prison for a double murder. Dkt. 1 at 9, 11. Dufur escaped in 1977, id. at 2–3 (Compl. ¶ 4); id. at 9, and eventually made his way to Canada, Dkt. 1 at 2–3 (Compl. ¶ 4). On May 24, 1979, Dufur entered the United States "at a customs check point on the Canadian border near Lynden, Washington." United States v. Dufur , 648 F.2d 512, 513 (9th Cir. 1980) ; Dkt. 1 at 2–3 (Compl. ¶ 4). After refusing to submit to a search by a United States Customs inspector, Dufur drew a firearm and shot the inspector to death. Dkt. 1 at 2–3 (Compl. ¶ 4). Dufur was apprehended and, on September 17, 1979, found guilty of first-degree murder of the inspector and armed assault on another federal officer. Id. (Compl. ¶ 5). On October 14, 1979, before he was sentenced on that conviction, he escaped from King County Jail in Seattle, Washington, where he was being held on the federal charges. Id. at 11–12. During the course of the second escape, he attempted to murder additional law enforcement officers, id. , and another inmate was killed, id. at 9. After his apprehension, Dufur pleaded guilty to further charges, including escaping custody while awaiting sentencing. Id. at 3 (Compl. ¶ 5). He was sentenced on October 17, 1979, on these new charges and the prior murder and assault charges to a minimum of ten years and a maximum of life with the possibility of parole. Id. (Compl. ¶ 5).

On June 22, 2004, the Commission calculated that Dufur would become eligible for mandatory parole on September 24, 2016. Id. at 11. The Commission also set a hearing for June 2006. Id. at 12. The record reveals no details about that proceeding, next referencing a May 25, 2016 parole hearing to consider Dufur's eligibility for mandatory parole. Id. at 3 (Compl. ¶ 6). After that hearing, the Commission concluded that Dufur should not be paroled because of the risk that he would commit a crime in the future, id. at 3–4 (Compl. ¶ 6), one of the enumerated exceptions in the mandatory parole statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d). Specifically, the Commission determined that "there [was] a reasonable probability that [Dufur would] commit [a] Federal, State or local crime." Dkt. 1 at 3–4 (Compl. ¶ 6). It "still viewed" Dufur "to be a high risk for violent crime on the basis of [ (1) ] the evidence that[,] while serving a prison sentence[,] [he] coordinated [an] [e]scape from prison custody for [himself] and other inmates[,] which resulted in the death of an inmate and injury to a law enforcement officer," and (2) the evidence that he previously "murder[ed] a U.S. Border Patrol Agent ... after ... escap[ing] from California [s]tate [c]ustody while serving another sentence for murder." Id. (Compl. ¶ 6). The Commission recognized that Dufur had "completed substantial program[m]ing" in prison, but found that "the nature and seriousness of [his] violent criminal behavior indicate[d] to the Commission that [he] remain[ed] a threat to the community if" he were to be paroled. Id. (Compl. ¶ 6). The Commission set a further hearing for June 2018, at which time it will once again review Dufur's eligibility for mandatory parole. Id. (Compl. ¶ 6).

Dufur appealed that decision to the Commission's National Appeals Board. Id. at 4–5 (Compl. ¶ 7). In that setting, he argued that the Commission (1) lacked "jurisdiction" over his escape from federal custody in 1979 because it occurred prior to the imposition of a sentence on the federal changes; (2) violated 28 C.F.R. § 2.14(b)(4)(i) by using the state and federal escapes to deny mandatory parole after having previously used those escapes to deny discretionary parole in 1989; and (3) violated 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d) by failing to grant him mandatory parole despite a "sentence expiration date of" September 24, 2016. See Dkt. 9–1 at 3–5, 8–10. He later amended his appeal, dropping the references to violations of Commission regulations and supplementing his other arguments. Id. at 7–9.

On November 25, 2016, the National Appeals Board affirmed the Commission's earlier decision denying mandatory parole. Dkt. 1 at 10. The Board first rejected Dufur's argument that it could "not take into account [his] escape on October 14, 1979, because it occurred before [he was] federally sentenced." Id. As the Board explained, Dufur was in federal custody at the time of his escape, and, indeed, that period of federal custody "was credited towards [his] federal sentence." Id. The Board also rejected Dufur's argument that he was denied mandatory parole in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d). Id. Although recognizing that § 4206(d) gives rise to "a presumption of mandatory parole release," the Board observed that, "if the Commission finds, after a hearing, that there is a reasonable probability that [a prisoner] would commit any crime if released, or that [a prisoner] ha[s] frequently or seriously violated institution rules, it ‘shall not release such prisoner.’ " Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d) ). The Board also concluded that it "could have found that [Dufur] seriously violated institution rules[ ] by escaping" in 1979. Id. Finally, the Board did not address Dufur's initial contention that the Commission had violated 28 C.F.R. § 2.14(b)(4)(i), presumably having determined that Dufur had abandoned the argument in his amended appeal. Dkt. 9 at 3 n.2.

Dufur brought the present action on April 17, 2017, seeking (1) a declaratory judgment that the Commission violated its regulations and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in denying him parole; and (2) an order directing that the Commission conduct a new parole hearing. Dkt. 1 at 7 (Relief Requested). He advances several theories as to why he is entitled to this relief. First, Dufur claims that the Commission violated § 4206(d) by failing to release him after he reached his mandatory parole date. Id. at 3–5 (Compl. ¶¶ 6–7); id. at 7 (Compl. ¶ 11). Second, he argues that the Commission violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 4161, 4163, 4205, and 4206(a) by denying him discretionary parole "at previous hearings." Id. at 7 (Compl. ¶ 11). Third, he argues that the Commission violated its own regulations by considering his...

To continue reading

Request your trial
21 cases
  • United States v. Lawson
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • 11 Julio 2022
    ...... habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. E.g., Dufur v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 314 F.Supp.3d 10, 16 (D.D.C. 2018) ......
  • Dufur v. U.S. Parole Comm'n
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • 20 Mayo 2022
    ...he had not plausibly alleged a violation of § 4206(d), "because ‘mandatory’ parole is not really mandatory." Dufur v. U.S. Parole Comm'n , 314 F. Supp. 3d 10, 15 (D.D.C. 2018). The district court considered, sua sponte , the implications for its subject matter jurisdiction of "whether Dufur......
  • Artie Dufur v. United States Parole Comm'n
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • 20 Mayo 2022
    ...jurisdiction of "whether Dufur's claims sound in habeas and, if so, whether and how that affects the Court's authority to adjudicate them." Id. at 16. The court explained that the habeas channeling rule requires prisoners to "proceed in habeas" if "success on the merits will 'necessarily im......
  • Artie Dufur v. United States Parole Comm'n
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • 20 Mayo 2022
    ...jurisdiction of "whether Dufur's claims sound in habeas and, if so, whether and how that affects the Court's authority to adjudicate them." Id. at 16. The court explained that the habeas channeling rule requires prisoners to "proceed in habeas" if "success on the merits will 'necessarily im......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT