Dugan v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.

• Decision Date: 31 March 1983
• Docket Number: No. 81,81
• Citation: 113 Ill.App.3d 740,447 N.E.2d 1055
• Parties: , 69 Ill.Dec. 620 Steve DUGAN, a minor, by his father and next friend Thomas DUGAN, Plaintiff- Appellant, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK AND COMPANY, a corporation and Roper Corporation, a corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1055

447 N.E.2d 1055

113 Ill.App.3d 740, 69 Ill.Dec. 620

Steve DUGAN, a minor, by his father and next friend Thomas

DUGAN, Plaintiff- Appellant, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK AND COMPANY, a corporation and Roper

Corporation, a corporation, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 81 3039.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District, Fifth Division.

March 31, 1983.

A. Denison Weaver, Robert J. Long, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.

Kasdin & Nathanson, Chicago, for defendants-appellees; Peter D. Kasdin, Philip J. Nathanson, Chicago, of counsel.

LORENZ, Justice:

Plaintiff filed a strict liability action on behalf of his minor son Steve to recover for injuries suffered when a lawnmower manufactured and sold by the defendants ejected a foreign object at high velocity and blinded the child's right eye. A jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and plaintiff appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by permitting introduction of evidence concerning industry safety standards, and evidence concerning the conduct of the lawnmower operator. Plaintiff also argues the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

We affirm. The following evidence is material to our decision.

Five year old Steve Dugan was sitting on the front porch of Carol Favia's house while Favia mowed her front lawn. She continued to mow the lawn in Steve's presence even though she admitted reading an owner's manual which included this warning:

"Do not allow anyone in the area while cutting. Keep children and pets in the backyard while mowing the front yard. Keep a wary eye out for children or passersby. Stop the engine while they are in the vicinity of your mower * * *. [A]lthough the area mowed should be completely cleared of all foreign objects, a small object may have been overlooked and could be accidentally thrown by the mower."

As Favia mowed the lawn in Steve's presence, the mower struck a foreign object and hurled it into his eye.

At trial, plaintiff asserted that the mower was unreasonably dangerous because it was defectively designed. In support of this theory, plaintiff presented expert opinion evidence that alternative designs were feasible and were safer than the designs used by the manufacturer. The defendants responded by presenting evidence that (1)

[69 Ill.Dec. 622] the suggested alternative designs were not required by safety standards promulgated by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), and (2) the conduct of Carol Favia constituted the sole proximate cause of the child's injury.

OPINION

Plaintiff initially argues that the ANSI Standards are irrelevant on the grounds that they didn't call for tests concerning the type of random discharge which caused the injury in question.

We disagree.

A defendant in a strict liability design-defect case can introduce evidence of industry standards--guidelines provided by an authoritative voluntary association such as ANSI--to show that the alternative designs suggested by plaintiff are not required by the guidelines. (Hubbard v. McDonough Power Equipment Inc. (1980), 83 Ill.App.3d 272, 277, 278, 38 Ill.Dec. 887, 404 N.E.2d 272.) For example, in Rucker v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (1979), 77 Ill.2d 434, 438, 33 Ill.Dec. 145, 396 N.E.2d 534, the defense introduced federal standards to show that the alternative design suggested by plaintiff was not required by the federal guidelines. The supreme court held that the standards were relevant because they had a tendency to show that the product in question was not defective or unreasonably dangerous, since the guidelines did not require the alternative design suggested by plaintiff. 77 Ill.2d 434, 439, 33 Ill.Dec. 145, 396 N.E.2d 534.

Plaintiff argues that Rucker only applies to government safety-standards, but "design standards of the industry, [and] design guidelines provided by an authoritative voluntary association" can also be relevant in strict liability design-defect cases. (Anderson v. Hyster Co. (1979), 74 Ill.2d 364, 368, 24 Ill.Dec. 549, 385 N.E.2d 690.) Accord, Cleary and Graham, Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 401.13, at 113 (1979) ("Evidence of standards, regulations, usage or customs is also admissible on behalf of the defendant to show lack of culpable conduct in a products liability action").

Plaintiff alleged that the product in the present case was defectively designed, and the defendants introduced ANSI standards to show that the alternative designs suggested by plaintiff were not required by this safety code. This evidence is relevant under Rucker because it has a tendency to show that the product was neither defectively designed nor unreasonably dangerous. The fact that the ANSI standards do not call for random-discharge testing is a circumstance which is germane to the weight or persuasiveness of this evidence, but it does not render the evidence irrelevant or inadmissible.

Plaintiff also argues that the probative value of...