Dugle v. State

• Decision Date: 10 February 1885
• Docket Number: 11,953
• Citation: 100 Ind. 259
• Parties: Dugle v. The State
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

100 Ind. 259

Dugle v. The State

No. 11,953

Supreme Court of Indiana

February 10, 1885

From the Ohio Circuit Court.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.

J. S Jelley, for appellant.

F. T Hord, Attorney General, G. E. Downey, Prosecuting Attorney and W. B. Hord, for the State.

OPINION

Niblack J.

This was a prosecution upon affidavit and information against Samuel Dugle, the appellant, for the crime of arson. R. S. 1881, section 1927.

So much of the affidavit as our attention has been specially called to is as follows:

"George Mapes swears that Samuel Dugle, * * * on or about the 29th day of May, A. D. 1884, did then and there, at and in said county of Ohio, and State of Indiana, unlawfully, feloniously, wilfully, purposely and maliciously set fire to, burn down and destroy, a certain frame building, commonly called a stable, the property of, and belonging then and there to, George Mapes, and then and there situate, and of the value then and there of one hundred dollars," etc.

It was, and still is, claimed that the affidavit was insufficient for its failure to aver the purpose for which the building burned was used, or intended to be used. Such an averment, however, in a charge of arson, is only required when necessary to indicate the character of the building burned, or other property similarly destroyed, and hence in this case would have been superfluous. Webster states the primary meaning of the word "stable" to be "a house, shed or building for beasts to lodge and feed in." Therefore, to call a building a stable sufficiently indicates the purpose for which it is, or is intended to be, used.

A trial resulted in a verdict of guilty as charged, in assessing a fine of $ 50 against the appellant, and in sentencing him to the State's prison for the period of eight years.

When one Stopher, who served as a juror in the cause, was examined on his oath touching his qualifications as a juror, he answered, substantially: "I have both formed and expressed my opinion in the cause. I was present and heard a part of the trial of the defendant before the justice on the preliminary examination of this charge. I heard some of the witnesses testify at that trial and the argument of counsel, and it was from the sworn statements of witnesses on that trial that I made up my opinion, which has been both formed and expressed, as above stated. It would not, however, require additional evidence to remove the opinion I have formed under the circumstances as I have stated them, and I feel able, notwithstanding such opinion, to render an impartial verdict in the cause upon the law and the evidence."

The appellant thereupon challenged Stopher for cause, but the circuit court held him to be a competent juror, and hence overruled the challenge.

The second clause of section 1793, R. S. 1881, declaring what shall be good causes for challenge to a person called to serve as a juror in a criminal trial, reads thus:

"That he has formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. But if a person called as a juror state that he has formed or...