Duhon v. Bd. of Supervisors For La. State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll.
| Decision Date | 20 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 20-2022 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
| Parties | GREGORY DUHON, M.D. v. THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY & AGRICULTURAL & MECHANICAL COLLEGE, et al. |
SECTION "H"
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint Under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) field by Defendants Neeraj Jain, M.D., Margaret Bishop-Baier, M.D. and the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College (Doc. 77). The Court heard oral argument on this Motion on February 17, 2021 and took the matter under advisement. For the following reasons the Motion is GRANTED.
Plaintiff Gregory Duhon, M.D. (“Duhon”), brings this action against multiple defendants for damages and injunctive relief arising from his suspension and termination from the cardiology fellowship program at Louisiana State University (“LSU”) and the subsequent loss of his Louisiana medical license. Below are the facts relevant only to the instant Motion.
Plaintiff was enrolled in the 2018-2019 cardiology fellowship program at LSU. On May 23, 2019, Plaintiff was advised by his Program Director, Neeraj Jain, M.D. (“Dr. Jain”), that he was being suspended effective immediately on suspicion of being mentally impaired and that he must obtain a fit-for-duty clearance from LSU's Campus Assistance Program (“CAP”). Plaintiff alleges that this action violated the terms of his contract with LSU as the contract only allowed the Program Director to summarily suspend a fellow without prior notice “whenever it is in good faith determined that the continued appointment of [Plaintiff] places the safety or health of patients or University personnel in jeopardy or to prevent imminent disruption of University Operations.”[1] The contract also provided that, in the event of a suspension, LSU would provide Plaintiff with written reasons for the action taken and that Plaintiff would have five days to respond in writing. Plaintiff contends that Dr. Jain's actions were not in good faith so as to warrant his immediate suspension and that neither Dr. Jain nor LSU ever provided him with written reasons.
As part of Plaintiff's initial evaluation by CAP, Plaintiff was required to submit to drug-testing and undergo a mental health evaluation. Scott Embley, the Assistant Director of CAP, was assigned to oversee Plaintiff's treatment. Embley, however, had also previously served as Plaintiff's therapist in several counseling sessions wherein Plaintiff divulged that he was treated for substance abuse disorder in 2011. Plaintiff alleges that, despite Plaintiff's negative drug screening and the lack of evidence of relapse, Embley “merged his sources of data and became fixated on the idea that [he] had relapsed but was concealing it.”[2] Plaintiff contends that it was the Medical Director of CAP, Dr. Margaret Bishop-Baier, M.D. (“Dr Bishop-Baier”), who improperly allowed Embley to serve in this “disciplinary role.”
CAP thereafter instructed Plaintiff to submit to an occupationally mandated psychological evaluation (“OMPE”) with Dr. Erik Whitfield (“Dr. Whitfield”), who was ultimately “unable to decide” whether Plaintiff was fit-for-duty. Plaintiff contends that the scope of Dr. Whitfield's report was “boundless, ” even though professional standards required him to remain narrowly focused on the “referral questions” and Plaintiff's “essential job functions.” Nevertheless, “CAP and Dr. Bishop-Baier” relied upon Dr. Whitfield's report and required that he register with Health Care Professionals Foundation of Louisiana (“HPFLA”), a “private not-for-profit corporation that offers assistance to health care professionals who may be suffering from mental health issues” by referring the professionals for evaluations and monitoring their treatment plans where appropriate.[3] After registering with HPFLA, Plaintiff was instructed to seek inpatient evaluation and treatment, which Plaintiff did at Professional Renewal Center (“PRC”) in Lawrence, Kansas. By the time of this inpatient stay, however, Plaintiff was allegedly “forced to resign from his fellowship position at LSU in order to evade that coercive force.”[4]
Following Plaintiff's time at PRC, HPFLA required that Plaintiff seek additional, costly inpatient treatment. As further detailed in this Court's previous Orders and Reasons, Plaintiff refused to comply with HPFLA's directives and HPFLA eventually reported Plaintiff as noncompliant with the Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners (“LSBME”). Plaintiff ultimately allowed his Louisiana medical license to lapse.
In this action, Plaintiff brings claims against a long list of defendants- including LSU, the LSBME, and the organizations and providers to which and to whom he was referred-for violations of procedural and substantive due process, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, [5] and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act.[6] Plaintiff also brings state tort claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315. Plaintiff contends that, at each step of the way, he was discriminated against “on the basis of a perceived disability and denied any notice or hearing on the actions taken against him and their supposed justification.”[7] Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the named defendants perceived him as having substance abuse disorder.[8] Plaintiff contends that the alleged discrimination cost him his fellowship position, his chance to transfer or become board-certified in cardiology, his reputation, the good standing of his Louisiana physicians license, and more than $50, 000 in unnecessary treatment.
Now before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College (hereinafter “LSU”), Dr. Jain, and Dr. Bishop-Baier (collectively, “Defendants”), wherein they ask the Court to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims against them. Plaintiff opposes.
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges the subject matter jurisdiction of a federal district court. “A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”[9] In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the court may rely on (1) the complaint alone, presuming the allegations to be true, (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts, or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts and by the court's resolution of disputed facts.[10] The proponent of federal court jurisdiction-in this case, the Plaintiff- bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.[11]
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead enough facts “to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”[12] A claim is “plausible on its face” when the pleaded facts allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”[13]A court must accept the complaint's factual allegations as true and must “draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.”[14] The court need not, however, accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.[15] To be legally sufficient, a complaint must establish more than a “sheer possibility” that the plaintiff's claims are true.[16] If it is apparent from the face of the complaint that an insurmountable bar to relief exists and the plaintiff is not entitled to relief, the court must dismiss the claim.[17] The court's review is limited to the complaint and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.[18]
In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants LSU, Dr. Jain, and Dr Bishop-Baier ask that this Court dismiss Plaintiff's claims against them. Specifically, LSU asks that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's claims against it for substantive and procedural due process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment and for violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Dr. Jain and Dr. Bishop-Baier (collectively, “the Individual Defendants”) also ask that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's claims against them for violations of procedural and substantive due process under 28 U.S.C. § 1983, disability discrimination under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. The Court will discuss the sufficiency of each claim in turn.
Counts One and Two of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint assert claims against LSU and the LSBME directly under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging violations of procedural and substantive due process. At oral argument, however, counsel for Plaintiff asked that these claims be voluntarily dismissed. Accordingly, these claims are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
Counts Three and Four of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint assert claims against the Individual Defendants in their individual and official capacities for deprivation of procedural and substantive due process under § 1983 and under the Ex Parte Young exception. “The Eleventh Amendment generally precludes actions against state officers in their official capacities.”[19] There are, however, two exceptions relevant to the § 1983 claims here. First the Ex parte Young doctrine allows a plaintiff to sue a state officer in his official capacity for prospective...
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