Duke Univ. v. Universal Prods. Inc.
Decision Date | 24 July 2014 |
Docket Number | 1:13CV701 |
Parties | DUKE UNIVERSITY, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSAL PRODUCTS INC., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
This case comes before the Court on the parties' Joint Motion to Re-Set Initial Pretrial Conference (Docket Entry 20). (See Docket Entry dated July 23, 2014.) For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the instant Joint Motion in that the Court will reschedule the Initial Pretrial Conference ("IPC") as requested, but will not excuse Attorney J. Daniel Bishop from attending the IPC.
Attorney Bishop appeared on behalf of Defendant by filing a Motion to Stay (with supporting brief) and an Answer on January 13, 2014. (Docket Entries 9, 10, 11.) Subsequently, Attorney Bishop filed a notice of special appearance for Defendant by Attorney Frank A. Mazzeo of Colmar, Pennsylvania. (Docket Entry 16.) The Court thereafter set this case for an IPC. (Docket Entry 19.) According to the instant Joint Motion, "the parties (through their lead counsel) timely held their initial discovery conference . . . and [are] generally in agreement as to discovery issues, with theexception of the number of interrogatories and possibly electronic discovery." (Docket Entry 20 at 1.)
The instant Joint Motion seeks postponement of the IPC for one week and asks that the Court set the time for the IPC no earlier than 11:00 a.m. (Id.) The parties have shown good cause for those reasonable scheduling requests (see id. at 1-2 ( )) and the Court thus will grant them, see M.D.N.C. LR7.3(j) (providing that motions seeking "to continue a pretrial conference . . . must state good cause"); Christmas v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, ___, 2014 WL 3110021, at *10 (E.D.N.C. July 7, 2014) (); Brown-Pfifer v. St. Vincent Health, Inc., No. 1:06CV236-SEB-JMS, 2007 WL 2757264, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 20, 2007) (unpublished) (); Alexander S. by and through Bowers v. Boyd, 929 F. Supp. 925, 936 (D.S.C. 1995) ().
The instant Joint Motion "also requests . . . local counsel [for Defendant] be[] excused from attending the [IPC]." (Docket Entry 20 at 1-2.) As grounds for that request, the instant Joint Motion states: "Lead counsel [for Defendant] is most knowledgeableabout this case, especially the interrogatories issue, and it would be significantly more expensive for [D]efendant to have both its counsel attend the hearing." (Id. at 2.) That statement does not provide a proper basis to relieve Attorney Bishop of his obligation to attend the IPC.
"Litigants in civil and criminal actions . . . before this Court, except parties appearing pro se, must be represented by at least one attorney who is a member of the bar of this Court." M.D.N.C. LR83.1(c)(1). "Attorneys who are members in good standing of the bar of the highest court of any state or the District of Columbia may practice in this Court for a particular case in association with a member of the bar of this Court." M.D.N.C. LR83.1(d)(1). M.D.N.C. LR83.1(d)(2) (emphasis added); see also M.D.N.C. LR83.1(c)(2) ("All pleadings and papers presented to the clerk for filing, except by attorneys representing governmental agencies or parties appearing pro se, shall be signed by a member of the bar of this Court."); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) ().
"Rules requiring foreign counsel to associate with local counsel . . . have been consistently upheld . . . [and represent] a reasonable means by which the district court may regulate the practitioners who appear before it." United States v. Menner, 374 F. App'x 446, 447-48 (4th Cir. 2010). "The purpose of [such] rule[s] is self-evident, namely to allow out-of-state counsel to appear only with the support and supervision of a local attorney." Brown v. Phillip Morris Inc., 291 F. Supp. 2d 3, 6 (D. Mass. 2003). In that regard, In re Groth Bros. Oldsmobile,Inc., BAP No. NC-12-1482-DJuPa, 2013 WL 5496514, at *11 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Oct. 3, 2013) (unpublished).
Moreover, by explicitly declaring that members of the bar of this Court who appear along with specially-appearing counsel remain "responsible to this Court for the conduct of the litigation" and by requiring said members to sign all court filings and to attend most court proceedings, M.D.N.C. LR83.1(d)(2), the Local Rules of this Court Lenoir v. Pyles, 320 F. Supp. 2d 365, 367 (D. Md. 2004). "[Such] rule[s] impose[] a significant, ongoing responsibility on [so-called] local counsel and should not be taken lightly." Brown, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 6.
This Court's approach in this area reflects the long-time, national norm, as another court explained nearly a quarter of a century ago:
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