Dukes v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Office
| Decision Date | 08 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 17-cv-7095 |
| Parties | WILLIAM DUKES, Plaintiff, v. COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE; THOMAS J. DART, in his official capacity as SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY; COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS; MEDICAL DIRECTOR OF CERMAK HEALTH SERVICES OF COOK COUNTY, in his or her official capacity; DIRECTOR OF NURSING OF CERMAK HEALTH SERVICES OF COOK COUNTY, in his or her official capacity; M. ADDISON; E. ALTMAN; J. ARIAS; M. BOZYK; N. BUCHANAN-SMITH; R. FOSTER; C. GALINDO; J. MERAZ; P. MIRANDA; J. OGRODNIK; W. PARTEE; Z. PERRY; A. QURESHI; W. RIVERA; J. RODRIGUEZ; D. SALMON; S. TAYLOR; J. TORRES; L. TORRES; C. ANDREWS; A. BLOODWORTH; Q. DUNMARS; P. GREEN; S. JAMES; L. LOCKE; S. PRATT; and D. TRIPLETT, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff William Dukes ("Plaintiff") brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking redress for Defendants' alleged failure to address his complaints of chest pain or provide him with his prescribed heart medications on a regular, uninterrupted basis when he was housed within the Cook County Department of Corrections ("CCDOC"). Currently before the Court are motions to dismiss the governing third amended complaint filed by Defendants Altman and Partee [128] and Defendants Cook County, Addison, Andrews, Aria, Bloodworth, Boyzk, Buchanan-Smith, Dart, Dunmars, Foster, Galindo, Green, Locke, Meraz, Miranda, Ogrodnik, Qureshi, Rivera, Rodriguez, Salmon, L. Torres, and Triplett [129]. For the following reasons, both motions, [128] and [129], are denied. The parties are directed to file a joint status report that includes a proposed fact discovery cutoff date no later than March 22, 2021. In addition, counsel may contact the Courtroom Deputy at any time if they desire a referral to the Magistrate Judge for a settlement conference.
According to the allegations of the complaint, which the Court must accept as true for present purposes, Plaintiff has a history of heart issues within his extended families. On October 4, 2012, while incarcerated at Pontiac Correctional Center, Plaintiff suffered a heart attack. Afterward, he was given a stent and prescribed medications to manage his blood pressure and cholesterol. Plaintiff was also prescribed nitroglycerin "to act as a safety medication." [90] at 7. Medical staff informed Plaintiff that his medications were needed to protect him from further complications of heart disease and that he would need to regularly take those medications for the rest of his life. While living at Pontiac Correctional Center, Plaintiff regularly received his medications, without interruption. In October 2015, Plaintiff's conviction was overturned. Plaintiff remained incarcerated until July 2019, awaiting a new trial. During this period, Plaintiff was housed primarily at the Livingston County Jail, where he regularly received his medications without interruption. Medical Staff at the Livingston County Jail were aware of Plaintiff's heart disease and past heart attack.
As a pre-trial detainee, Plaintiff was transferred to the CCDOC from time to time so he could attend court proceedings. The Cook County Sheriff's Office operates the CCDOC and provides and supervises security staffing within the CCDOC. Defendant Dart is the Sheriff of Cook County. Plaintiff names Dart as a Defendant in his official capacity as a policy-making official for the CCDOC. Cook County provides and supervises medical staff within the CCDOCthrough Cermak Health Services of Cook County ("Cermak"). Plaintiffs names Cermak's Medical Director and Director of Nursing as Defendants in their official capacities as policy-making officials for Cook County.
Defendants Addison, Altman, Arias, Bozyk, Buchanan-Smith, Foster, Galindo, Meraz, Miranda, Ogrodnik, Partee, Perry, Qureshi, Rivera, Rodriguez, Salmon, Taylor, J. Torres, and L. Torres are all correctional officers who were assigned to monitor the tiers to which Plaintiff was assigned during certain specified months between November 2015 and November 2017. Plaintiff refers to these Defendants collectively as "Defendant Security Staff" "[d]ue to the highly repetitive nature of Plaintiff's interactions with security staff while housed within his cell." [90] at 5. Defendants Andrews, Bloodworth, Dunmars, Green, James, Locke, Pratt, and Triplett, whom Plaintiff refers to collectively as "Defendant Medical Staff," are medical personnel who were assigned to administer medications and address the medical needs of inmates within Plaintiff's housing unit while he was in CCDOC custody.
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff was transferred to CCDOC approximately twelve times between November 2015 and November 2017 to attend court proceedings. Some of the transfers lasted a week, while others lasted months. Each time Plaintiff was transferred into the CCDOC, he was accompanied by transfer paperwork documenting his family history of cardiovascular disease, his past heart attack, his ongoing heart disease, and his medications. Each time Plaintiff was transferred to the CCDOC, and while he was housed there, he had issues with regularly receiving his heart disease medications without interruption. Whenever Plaintiff failed to receive his heart disease medications at the CCDOC, he would experience chest pains. Plaintiff alleges that he "reported his chest pains to the correctional officers assigned to his housing unit" and also "reported his medication issues to the correctional officers assigned to his housing unit."[90] at 8. However, the correctional officers "did not take any actions on his behalf to address his chest pains or to resolve his medication issues." Id. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that he "reported his medication issues to the nurses who administered medications to his housing unit," but "[t]he nurses who administered medications to Plaintiff's housing unit did not take any actions on his behalf to address his chest pains or to resolve his medication issues." Id. Plaintiff alleges that he "submitted numerous health service request slips and grievances to seek treatment for his chest pains and to address the interruptions in receiving his heart disease medications, but his requests were largely ignored." Id.
Based on these facts, Plaintiff asserts three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Counts I and II are deliberate indifference claims against Defendant Security Staff and Defendant Medical Staff, respectively. Count III is a Monell claim brought against Dart and Cermak's Medical Director and Director of Nursing, in their official capacities.
For purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court "'accept[s] as true all of the well-pleaded facts in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.'" Calderon-Ramirez v. McCament, 877 F.3d 272, 275 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 480-81 (7th Cir. 2016)). The Court reads the complaint and assesses its plausibility as a whole. See Atkins v. City of Chicago, 631 F.3d 823, 832 (7th Cir. 2011). The Court may also consider "documents that are attached to the complaint, documents that are central to the complaint and are referred to in it, and information that is properly subject to judicial notice." O'Brien v. Village of Lincolnshire, 955 F.3d 616, 621 (7th 2020). In opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff is "free to 'elaborate on his factual allegations so long as the new elaborations are consistent with the pleadings.'" Peterson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.,986 F.3d 746, 753 n.2 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012)). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege facts which, when taken as true, "'plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level.'" Cochran v. Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., 828 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007)).
Plaintiff brings suit against the individual Defendants for failing to do anything when he told them that he was experiencing chest pains and not receiving his heart medication. "Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials are responsible for providing healthcare to incarcerated persons who cannot obtain healthcare on their own." Howell v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 987 F.3d 647, 653 (7th Cir. 2021). "To determine if the Eighth Amendment has been violated in the prison medical context, we perform a two-step analysis, first examining whether a plaintiff suffered from an objectively serious medical condition, and then determining whether the individual defendant was deliberately indifferent to that condition." Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 727-28 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc); see also Peterson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 986 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 2021). "Denying or delaying appropriate treatment to an incarcerated person suffering from avoidable pain can violate the Eighth Amendment." Howell, 987 F.3d at 653.
Plaintiff brings his deliberate indifference suit against the individual Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Suits under § 1983 are meant to deter state actors from using the 'color of state law' to deprive individuals of rights guaranteed by the Constitution." Tom Beu Xiong v.Fischer, 787 F.3d 389, 397 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Fries v. Helsper, 146 F.3d 452, 457 (7th Cir. 1998)). To bring a Section 1983 claim against an individual, "the plaintiff must show two elements: (1) the party against whom the claim is brought qualifies as a 'person acting under the color of state law'; and (2) the conduct alleged amounted to a deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities under the Constitution or the laws of the United States." Id. (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981...
To continue reading
Request your trial