Dulles v. Dulles
Decision Date | 07 January 1952 |
Parties | DULLES v. DULLES et al. |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued November 23, 1951
Appeal, No. 170, Jan. T., 1951, from decree of Court of Common Pleas No. 2 of Philadelphia County, March T., 1946 No. 3685, in case of Gweneth Betty Dulles v. Leib Harrison Dulles and Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Company. Decree affirmed.
Proceeding upon petition of defendant and rule to show cause why injunction entered in equity action should not be dissolved. Before GORDON, P.J.
Decree entered modifying injunction and releasing part of restricted funds. Defendant appealed.
Decree affirmed at the cost of appellant.
Edwin P. Rome , with him Gray Anderson, Schaffer & Rome , for appellant.
Henry A. Craig , with him Edward J. Kirchner and Kirchner & Strassner , for appellee.
Before DREW, C.J., STERN, STEARNE, LADNER and CHIDSEY, JJ.
In 1946 plaintiff, Gweneth Betty Dulles, filed a bill in equity against defendant, Leib Harrison Dulles, in which she averred that she, a British subject, and he, a citizen of the United States, but both of them residents of and domiciled in France, were united in marriage in Paris in 1932; that because of their matrimonial residence and domicile in France all the property of which either was possessed was, under French law, community property; that this community of property would be dissolved by divorce or judicial separation and the joint assets would then be divided between them; that some of this property consisted of securities held for defendant by the Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Company of Philadelphia; that plaintiff and defendant had each filed a petition for divorce in the Civil Tribunal of the First Instance at Grasse, both of which proceedings were then pending; that she feared that defendant, unless restrained, would take possession of the property at the Trust Company and deal with it as his separate property without her consent. She therefore prayed that a decree be entered enjoining the Trust Company from transferring any of the assets of the fund in its possession until both of the divorce proceedings were finally terminated and until a distribution of the community property had been awarded by the French court.
Defendant filed an answer denying that under the facts alleged in the bill plaintiff had any community rights in the property held by the Trust Company. By the time the case came on for hearing the Civil Tribunal of the First Instance at Grasse had granted plaintiff a limited divorce and at the same time had granted defendant an absolute divorce, the latter, of course, making the former unimportant; plaintiff had appealed from the judgment of absolute divorce to the Court of Appeals in Aix-en-Provence, which appeal was then pending. At the hearing an expert in French law testified that the community system applied to the parties, and that, upon the termination of the divorce proceedings, their property would be divided between them by a notary as directed by the court. The impression was thus given, and counsel for both parties apparently were therefore of the belief, that the property rights of the parties would be determined in and by the divorce proceedings and that no other actions would be necessary, or in order, for that purpose. The result was that, under date of January 3, 1947, counsel agreed to a consent decree terminating the hearing. This decree provided for the issuance of an injunction restraining the Trust Company from transferring to defendant any of the assets it held for him. It further provided as follows: (Italics supplied.)
In 1949 the present proceedings were instituted by the filing by defendant of a petition to dissolve the injunction of January 3, 1947. At a hearing held thereon it appeared that shortly after the consent decree had been entered the Court of Appeals in Aix-en-Provence had affirmed the judgment of absolute divorce in defendant's favor, that plaintiff had then appealed to the Court of Cassation, the highest court in France, and that that court also had affirmed the judgment, whereby the divorce proceedings had been finally and irrevocably determined. It further appeared that, contrary to the impression obtained at the original hearing on the bill in equity, the controversy as to the property rights of the parties was not, and under French procedural law could not have been, adjudicated in the divorce proceedings, but that it was necessary for such purpose to resort to a separate action; that plaintiff had instituted such an...
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