Dulong v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 12 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2020-173-Appeal.,PC 17-1288 |
| Citation | 272 A.3d 120 |
| Parties | Steven DULONG v. MERRIMACK MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY d/b/a The Andover Companies. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Mark A. Fay, Esq., for Plaintiff.
Mark P. Dolan, Esq., Stanley F. Pupecki, Esq., Mark P. Dolan, Jr., Esq., for Defendant.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
The plaintiff, Steven Dulong, appeals from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendant, Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance Company, doing business as The Andover Companies (Andover), following the denial of his request for declaratory judgment and grant of Andover's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the hearing justice erred by finding that an endorsement excluding household members other than those explicitly named, as well as entrustment of vehicles to non-named household members, from personal umbrella liability coverage was valid and binding at the time of an accident between a non-named household member and the plaintiff. Accordingly, the plaintiff asks this Court to reverse the hearing justice's entry of summary judgment and denial of declaratory judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
We glean the underlying facts of this case from plaintiff's complaint, the submissions of the parties, and the transcript. On or about April 3, 2014, plaintiff and Chelsea Galli were involved in an accident.1 On the date of the accident, Chelsea was driving a vehicle that was registered to her mother, Perrin Galli, while plaintiff was operating a motorcycle. The plaintiff claims that, as a result of the accident, he suffered property damage and extreme bodily injury, which ultimately led to the amputation of his left leg.
According to plaintiff, after the accident occurred, he asserted claims against Travelers Insurance, the Gallis’ primary motor vehicle insurer, and was offered the full policy limits for both bodily injury and property damage. However, plaintiff contends that the Travelers Insurance coverage was insufficient to fully compensate him for his damages. Therefore, plaintiff made an additional claim against both Chelsea and Perrin through an Andover policy that plaintiff asserts provided coverage to the entire Galli family. Andover denied the claim.
Joseph Galli, the named insured, maintained a homeowner's policy with Andover that ran from November 2013 to November 2014 (the 2013 policy), and which was therefore in effect on the date of the accident in April 2014.2 It is undisputed that the 2013 policy provided coverage to some members of the Galli family through a personal umbrella liability endorsement. However, the heart of this action is the dispute between plaintiff and Andover as to whether Chelsea, the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident, and Perrin, the person to whom the vehicle involved in the accident was registered, were covered by the 2013 policy's personal umbrella liability endorsement or were excluded from coverage by a restricted insured endorsement (RIE).
On October 22, 2012, before the 2012 policy became effective, Joseph executed the RIE. Andover contends that, because of Chelsea's driving record, it required the RIE as a condition precedent to issuing an umbrella liability endorsement in the 2012 policy. In relevant part, the RIE provided that:
Thus, the RIE purports to exclude all but named drivers from coverage related to the use of a car, and to exclude named drivers from coverage for entrustment of the car to a non-named driver. Because the RIE names all but one member of the Galli family—Chelsea—if effective, it would exclude coverage for Chelsea as a driver and coverage for the entrustment of vehicles to Chelsea by other family members.
In addition to the text quoted supra , the one-page RIE also provides a space for a policy number, where the policy number found on both the 2012 policy and the 2013 policy was typed in. The RIE also contains a signature line, executed with Joseph's signature. Underneath the signature line is the designation, "Insured's Signature(s)[.]" Whether the RIE was attached to the 2013 policy is a disputed fact; plaintiff contends that it was not.
The declarations pages of the 2013 policy mention the RIE in two places. The third page of the declarations pages contains a section titled "Forms and Endorsements[,]" under which the RIE's form number (H-145 06/96) is listed, within a group of more than twenty other endorsements and forms similarly listed by their form numbers. The fifth page of the declarations pages also references the RIE and does so in more detail. Under the heading "Description of Additional Coverages" there is a subheading, "Personal Umbrella Restricted Insured Endorsement"; under the subheading, the text reads, "Insured definition with respect to an automobile, motorcycle, motorhome, or recreational vehicle includes the following individuals:" and is followed by the names of Joseph, Perrin, and Lindsay.3
In March 2017, plaintiff filed a complaint in Providence County Superior Court that was shortly thereafter amended. The amended complaint named Andover as a defendant and sought a declaratory judgment, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-30-1, that the RIE was null and void and that Andover was required to provide plaintiff with "full insurance coverage/indemnification" for his claims against Chelsea and Perrin.4
In January 2019, Andover moved for summary judgment. The hearing justice heard arguments on the motion in March 2020, and, in a bench decision rendered on the same day, granted the motion for summary judgment as to all of plaintiff's claims. The order granting summary judgment was entered on April 27, 2020, and judgment for Andover as to all claims was also entered on the same day. The plaintiff timely appealed the judgment.
"This Court will review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo , employing the same standards and rules used by the hearing justice." Bank of America, N.A. v. Fay , 242 A.3d 38, 42 (R.I. 2020) (quoting Nelson v. Allstate Insurance Company , 228 A.3d 983, 984-85 (R.I. 2020) ). "We will affirm a summary judgment if, after reviewing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Shorr v. Harris , 248 A.3d 633, 636 (R.I. 2021) (quoting Midland Funding LLC v. Raposo , 222 A.3d 484, 486 (R.I. 2019) ).
"Furthermore, the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving by competent evidence the existence of a disputed issue of material fact and cannot rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, mere conclusions or mere legal opinions." Fay , 242 A.3d at 42 (quoting Nelson , 228 A.3d at 985 ). We also note that "[i]t is a fundamental principle that summary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously." Shorr , 248 A.3d at 636 (quoting Lehigh Cement Co. v. Quinn , 173 A.3d 1272, 1275 (R.I. 2017) ).
Additionally, "[a] decision to grant or deny declaratory or injunctive relief is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial justice and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the record demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion or the trial justice committed an error of law." Kayak Centre at Wickford Cove, LLC v. Town of Narragansett , 116 A.3d 250, 253 (R.I. 2015) (quoting Foster Glocester Regional School Building Committee v. Sette , 996 A.2d 1120, 1124 (R.I. 2010) ).
On appeal, plaintiff contends that the hearing justice erred by granting summary judgment in favor of defendant and by denying declaratory judgment. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the hearing justice erred in finding that (1) the RIE did not need to be attached to the 2013 policy to be valid and effective; (2) the RIE was binding even though it was signed only by the named insured; (3) the RIE was unambiguous; (4) the 2013 policy was a renewal and not a new policy; and (5) the RIE applied to renewal policies and not only to the 2012 policy for which it was issued. We address each claim of error seriatim .
First, plaintiff argues that the hearing justice erred by finding that the RIE need not have been attached to the 2013 policy to be effective. The plaintiff contends that Rhode Island law requires that all endorsements be attached to their respective insurance policies to be valid. Because the attachment of the RIE to the 2013 policy is a disputed fact, according to plaintiff there is a material disputed fact at issue, and thus summary judgment should not have been granted.
Based on a careful review of the law, we do not agree that attachment is a material fact in this case, because Rhode Island law does not require the attachment of endorsements to their respective policies in every instance, and therefore the RIE could be effective without attachment.
The plaintiff points to Children's Friend & Service v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company , 893 A.2d 222 (R.I. 2006), in support of his contention that in Rhode Island endorsements must be...
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