Dumangue v. Daniels
| Decision Date | 24 October 1891 |
| Citation | 28 N.E. 900,154 Mass. 483 |
| Parties | DUMANGUE v. DANIELS. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
W.W. Rice, H.W. King, and C.M. Rice, for plaintiff.
F.P Goulding, for defendant.
The only questions argued related to the admission of evidence.
1. The testimony of La Motte was competent. The plaintiff's claim against Thomas Daniels arose out of an accident to the plaintiff, which occurred December 7, 1888. Twelve days afterwards Daniels made to his wife, through a third person the conveyances which are sought to be avoided as being in fraud of the plaintiff's rights. La Motte's testimony was that a week or a week and a half after the accident he sought to collect from Daniels the sum due to the plaintiff for wages, and that on the following day he told Daniels that the plaintiff intended to hold him liable for the accident and therefore declined to give him a receipt in full of all demands. Taking it at the longest, that statement to Daniels, that the plaintiff intended to hold him liable for the accident, must, according to the testimony, have preceded the conveyances, and it was clearly competent, as bearing upon the alleged fraudulent intent of Daniels.
2. We cannot say that there was any error in law in admitting the testimony of Rice. The fact that Daniels had no other property at the time of making the conveyances, if it could be proved, would obviously be of some significance. Bank v. Keavy, 128 Mass. 298, 303. Evidence that at some previous time he had no other property would clearly be competent, if there was nothing to show a change in this respect. Cozzens v. Holt, 136 Mass. 237. But his condition as to property at a subsequent time would also have some tendency to show his condition at the time of the conveyances, provided it was not too remote. Where the mental condition of a testator at the time of making his will is to be determined, we have recently held that acts and declarations several months afterwards might be put in evidence, under special circumstances. See Lane v. Moore, 151 Mass. 87, 23 N.E. 828, and cases there cited, etc. Similar reasons apply to the question of one's pecuniary condition. It is for the presiding judge to determine, in the first instance, whether the circumstances and the length of time are such as to render the evidence of no value, and very much is necessarily and properly left to his discretion. Com....
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