Dumas v. First Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n

• Decision Date: 27 August 1981
• Docket Number: No. 81-7205,81-7205
• Citation: 654 F.2d 359
• Parties: Thomas R. DUMAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION d/b/a Savannah First Federal, Defendants-Appellees. Summary Calendar. . Unit B
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 359

654 F.2d 359

Thomas R. DUMAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION d/b/a Savannah

First Federal, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 81-7205

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Unit B

Aug. 27, 1981.

Lee & Clark, Fred S. Clark, Savannah, Ga., Joseph M. Glickstein, Jr., Jacksonville, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.

Charles Rippin, Savannah, Ga., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia.

Before RONEY, FRANK M. JOHNSON, Jr. and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff Thomas R. Dumas, a Florida real estate investor and developer, brought this diversity action seeking to enjoin the violation of an alleged contract and to obtain damages. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant First Federal Savings and Loan Association (the bank), concluding that no binding contract had arisen between the parties. We affirm.

In 1979, the bank foreclosed on Sunset Plaza Shopping Center in Moultrie, Georgia, and initiated an advertising campaign to attract prospective buyers. Plaintiff responded to the advertisements and negotiations ensued between plaintiff and bank officials. On July 3, 1980, plaintiff presented a letter to the bank which was to "act as the basic agreement, subject to a mutually acceptable Purchase and Sale Agreement." The two-page letter contained rather complex details of the proposed sale and specified that the bank was to retain an interest in future appreciation and act as a primary creditor. Both parties initialed the letter and plaintiff tendered a five-thousand dollar check as "initial earnest money." In return, the bank agreed to withdraw the shopping center from active marketing until the proposal could be developed further and a possible sale arranged. Plaintiff eventually submitted a draft of the purchase and sale agreement called for in the letter, but the bank considered it unacceptable. In a letter dated July 25, the bank listed twenty-three points of disagreement, returned the earnest money deposit and made it clear that the obligation to deal exclusively with the plaintiff had ceased. On October 20, the parties again met and plaintiff was informed of the shopping center's imminent sale to a third party. This action seeking to enjoin the sale and obtain damages was filed shortly after the meeting.

The district court denied the motion for temporary restraining order and granted summary judgment in favor of the bank. The court concluded that the "letter agreement" was not a binding contract and therefore unenforceable as a matter of law. Plaintiff argues that the parties intended the letter agreement to be a contract and that this issue of intent precludes the court from granting summary judgment. The contention is not meritorious.

A binding contract must be predicated upon a meeting of the minds. Jack V. Heard Contractors v. A. L. Adams Const. Co., 155 Ga.App. 409, 271 S.E.2d 222 (1980). If terms and conditions are left to future negotiations, the requisite meeting of the minds is absent and no contract is formed. Nuclear Assurance Corp. v. Dames & Moore, 137 Ga.App. 688, 225 S.E.2d 97 (1976); Malone Const. Co., Inc. v. Westbrook, 127 Ga.App. 709, 194 S.E.2d 619 (1972). The letter agreement initialed by appellant and representatives of the bank was made expressly contingent upon a "mutually acceptable" purchase and sale agreement. Clearly, "mutually acceptable" connotes that the terms of the agreement are still subject to negotiation and not final. Any other reading would obfuscate the plain...