Dumas v. Ropp

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: McFADDEN; BAKES; SHEPARD
• Citation: Dumas v. Ropp, 98 Idaho 61, 558 P.2d 632 (Idaho 1977)
• Decision Date: 05 January 1977
• Docket Number: No. 12221,12221
• Parties: Ronald I. DUMAS and Shannon Dumas, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Mary ROPP, as widow and sole heir of Kenneth Ropp, et al, Defendants-Respondents.

Page 632

558 P.2d 632

98 Idaho 61

Ronald I. DUMAS and Shannon Dumas, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Mary ROPP, as widow and sole heir of Kenneth Ropp, et al, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 12221.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Jan. 5, 1977.

Daniel P. Featherston, Sandpoint, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Nicholas M. Lamanna of Cooke & Lamanna, Priest River, Paul D. McCabe, Coeur d'Alene, for defendants-respondents.

McFADDEN, Chief Justice.

This action was instituted by plaintiffs-appellants Ronald I. Dumas and Shannon Dumas, his wife, against Mary Ropp (widow and sole heir of Kenneth Ropp, deceased), Rueben Akre and wife, and Diamond International Corporation as defendants-respondents. The action was filed on July 22, 1975, seeking damages for a trespass which occurred in 1970. On motion the action was dismissed on the grounds that the statute of limitations for trespass (I.C. § 5-218) had run against the plaintiffs-appellants, from which ruling this appeal was perfected. Although the method by which the issue as to the applicability of the statute of limitations was raised was somewhat unorthodox, appellants make no issued of it on this appeal.

In their complaint the appellants allege they owned a quarter section of land adjoining a quarter section owned by respondent Ropp. They further allege that the respondents jointly, without knowledge or consent of appellants 'did * * * wrongfully, wilfully, maliciously, and unlawfully enter upon the property of the plaintiffs' and that they 'did cut, girdle, or otherwise injury, destroy and take trees and timber on the land of the plaintiffs. * * * .' Appellants allege damages for the reasonable value of the timber removed, further damages for the cost of cleaning up and restoring the natural condition of the land caused by respondents destroying and defacing the property and 'leaving a mess.' The appellants then allege that: 'All or part of these damages constitute mesne profits for which the plaintiffs herein are entitled to recover from the defendants.' They further allege that 'by reason of the willful, intentional and unlawful trespass upon their property by the defendants, (they) are, pursuant to Idaho Code 6-202, entitled to treble the damages * * *.'

The trial court, in its order granting respondents' motion for judgment, held that the action was barred by the provisions of I.C. § 5-218. ¹ The court rejected appellants' contention that the action was one for 'mesne profits,' which would be governed by the provisions of I.C. § 5-215, ² a six year statute. On this appeal, it is the appellants' position that the trial court erred in its ruling because of an erroneous concept of the meaning of the term 'mesne profits.'

In general, a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts which would entitle them to relief. Wackerli v. Martindale, 82 Idaho 400, 353 P.2d 782 (1960); Stewart v. Arrington Construction Co., 92 Idaho 526, 446 P.2d 895 (1968).

Appellants' complaint is basically couched in the language of I.C. § 6-202, which provides an action for damages in trespass, as follows:

'Any person * * * who cuts down or carries off any wood or underwood, tree, or timber, or girdles or otherwise injures any tree or timber on the land of another person * * * is liable to the owner of such land * * * for treble the amount of damages which may be assessed therefor in a civil action * * *'

Nevertheless, appellants in their complaint allege that 'All or part of these damages (taking of trees and timber and 'leaving a mess') consitute mesne profits for which the plaintiffs herein are entitled to recover from the defendants.'

The term, 'mesne profits' means 'intermediate profits: that is, profits which have been accruing between two given periods.' Blacks Law Dictionary, Rev. 4th ed., 1968. Mesne profits is most often defined as the value of the use or occupation of the land during the time it was held by one in wrongful possession and is commonly measured in terms of rents and profits. See Stokes v. Van Seventer, 355 P.2d 594 (Alaska 1960); Stein v. Green, 6 Ill.2d 234, 128 N.E.2d 743 (1955); Sabourin v. Woish, 117 Vt. 94, 85 A.2d 493 (1952).

In an action for mesne profits, the plaintiff may recover the mesne profits of the land and also all damages which have been sustained by reason of the disturbance of his possession by the defendant. See Henry v. Davis, 149 Ala. 359, 43 So. 122 (1907); Kester v. Bostwick, 153 Fla. 437, 15 So.2d 201 (1943). The value of timber cut and removed is recoverable as damages. Henry v. Davis, supra; Anglin et al. v. Pennington, 296 Ky. 142, 176 S.W.2d 277 (1943); Neal v. Farm Development Corp., 42 So.2d 319 (La.App. 1949). Therefore, although appellants are somewhat imprecise in their statement that the damages they have allegedly sustained 'constitute' mesne profits, the value of the timber may be recoverable as damages in an action for mesne profits.

An action for mesne profits is closely tied to an action in ejectment. See 3 Blackstone's Commentaries 198, 21st Ed.; Martin v. Smith, 214 Minn. 9, 7 N.W.2d 481 (1942). As such, it must necessarily be available as a remedy only where there has been an ouster or dispossession of the plaintiff, as this is a prerequisite to an action in ejectment. See Long v. Godfrey, 198 Ga. 652, 32 S.E.2d 306 (1944); Winters v. Birch, 169 Okl. 237, 36 P.2d 907 (1934). In general, any acts of ownership or control over the property to the exclusion of the plaintiff (emphasis ours) will constitute an ouster. Inman v. Ollson, 213 Or. 56, 321 P.2d 1043 (1958).

The district court ruled that appellants had not sufficiently alleged a claim of mesne profits in that no proprietary interest in the appellants' property was claimed and that there was, therefore, no allegation of the requisite wrongful detention or dispossession. Appellants have, however, alleged that they are entitled to mesne profits and, given the liberal pleading provisions of I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1), we cannot say that it appears beyond doubt that appellants cannot prove facts to support such a claim.

Judgment reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

DONALDSON, BAKES and BISTLINE, JJ., concur.

BAKES, Justice, concurring specially:

I agree with the majority that this complaint could not properly be dismissed unrer a 12(b)(6) motion for the additional reason that under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure the defense of the statute of limitations should not ordinarily be considered before a responsive pleading to the complaint is filed. Motions to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b) go to the initial question of whether, for a variety of procedural or jurisdictional reasons, the court may consider the case, or whether there is a prima facie case to be considered. They do not permit factfinding with regard to the merits of a claim or a defense, and they do not contemplate requiring a party to develop facts in order to negate the merits of a claim or a defense. On the contrary, I.R.C.P. 8(c) provides that affirmative defenses, including the defense of the statute of limitations, must be pleaded in answer to...