Dumond v. Denehy

• Decision Date: 04 February 1958
• Citation: 139 A.2d 58,145 Conn. 88
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Frederick L. DUMOND, Administrator d.b.n. (ESTATE of Donald P. DUMOND) v. Richard DENEHY et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 58

139 A.2d 58

145 Conn. 88

Frederick L. DUMOND, Administrator d.b.n. (ESTATE of Donald P. DUMOND) v. Richard DENEHY et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Feb. 4, 1958.

Milton M. Koskoff, Plainville, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Walter J. Sullivan, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Joseph V. Fay, Jr., Hartford, for the appellees (defendants).

Before WYNNE, C. J., and BALDWIN, DALY, KING and MURPHY, JJ.

MURPHY, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff's decedent, Donald Dumond, died almost instantly on June 11, 1954, after his automobile had been in collision with one operated by the defendant Richard Denehy. The decedent's administrator brought suit against Denehy and his father, the owner of the automobile, to recover for Dumond's death. Upon the trial of the case, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants which the trial court refused to set aside. From the judgment entered thereon the plaintiff has appealed.

Error has been assigned as to certain portions of the charge as given and as to the failure of the court to charge as requested. Because of the narrow scope of the appeal, it can be properly treated without detailed recitation of the facts which were claimed to have been proved.

Upon arraignment in criminal court, Richard Denehy, hereinafter called the defendant, pleaded guilty to a charge of negligent operation of a motor vehicle so as to cause loss of human life. Cum. Sup. 1955, § 1316d. Evidence of this plea and the finding of guilty thereon was admitted in the instant case. The plaintiff requested the court to charge that as a result of the plea the defendant was negligent as a matter of law; that his negligence was as a matter of law the proximate cause of the death of Dumond; that contributory negligence would not be a defense in such a situation; and that therefore the verdict should be for the plaintiff. The trial court instructed the jury that the plea of guilty to the criminal charge could be considered by them as an admission by the defendant that he was negligent and that his negligence was a proximate cause of Dumond's death; that such an admission was inconsistent with the defendant's present claim that he was not negligent; that the defendant could explain his reason for pleading guilty and that such a plea did not conclusively establish responsibility for the collision. In thus charging the jury, the trial court was correct. Bradley v. Niemann, 137 Conn. 81, 83, 74 A.2d 876; Moulin v. Bergeron, 135 Conn. 443, 445, 65 A.2d 478; Perry v. Simpson Waterproof Mfg. Co., 40 Conn. 313, 317.

In rather ambiguous language, the plaintiff requested the court to charge on reckless driving and reckless and wanton misconduct and that contributory negligence is not a defense to the reckless operation of a motor vehicle. The court did not comply with the request. To determine whether the court erred, we must examine the pleadings and ascertain whether the plaintiff alleged a cause of action in reckless misconduct.

The plaintiff tried the case under a substituted complaint to which contributory negligence had been pleaded by the defendants as a special defense. The plaintiff alleged that the collision and death 'were caused by the negligence, carelessness and recklessness of the defendants' and then detailed...