Dunbar v. Department of Mental Health

• Decision Date: 17 November 1992
• Docket Number: Docket No. 128317
• Citation: 197 Mich.App. 1,495 N.W.2d 152
• Parties: , 8 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. (BNA) 473 Charles DUNBAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 152

495 N.W.2d 152

197 Mich.App. 1, 8 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. (BNA) 473

Charles DUNBAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant.

Docket No. 128317.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 3, 1992, at Detroit.

Decided Nov. 17, 1992, at 9:25 a.m.

Released for Publication Feb. 17, 1993.

Goodman, Eden, Millender & Bedrosian by William H. Goodman, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Sol. Gen., and Gary P. Gordon and Leo H. Friedman, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendant-appellee.

Before SAWYER, P.J., and MURPHY and BORRELLO, ^* JJ.

MURPHY, Judge.

Plaintiff appeals, and defendant cross appeals, from a judgment of the Court of Claims awarding damages on plaintiff's retaliatory discharge claim. We affirm.

Plaintiff was a registered nurse at the Northville Regional Psychiatric Hospital from April 1981 through February 1983. At two different times in July 1982, plaintiff injured his shoulder while separating patients who were fighting. After the second incident, plaintiff reported the injury to his supervisor and was sent to the hospital. On November 22, 1982, plaintiff was working at the Northville hospital when he injured the same shoulder a third time. Once again, plaintiff's injury was a result of his efforts to subdue an unruly patient. On January 26, 1983, pursuant to the Northville hospital employment policies, the assistant director of personnel informed plaintiff that he had to furnish medical documents by February 2, 1983, in order to qualify for a leave of absence.

On February 2, 1983, plaintiff contacted the personnel department to inform it that the documents were forthcoming. In addition, plaintiff's doctor contacted the personnel office on February 3, 1983, to inform it that the documents had been prepared. On February 16, 1983, defendant had still not received the documents and therefore discharged plaintiff for vacating his position without notice. On February 23, 1983, the Northville hospital received the documents from plaintiff's physician, but failed to reinstate plaintiff.

On May 17, 1984, plaintiff filed suit in the Wayne Circuit Court, alleging a violation of the Handicappers' Civil Rights Act (HCRA), M.C.L. Sec. 37.1101 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 3.550(101) et seq. Pursuant to defendant's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), Wayne Circuit Judge Helene White dismissed the claim. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, alleging that defendant violated the HCRA and also that defendant discharged him in retaliation for his request for benefits under the Workers' Disability Compensation Act. See M.C.L. Sec. 418.301(11); M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(301)(11). Defendant then moved for summary disposition of both counts of plaintiff's amended complaint.

On May 8, 1987, the circuit court again dismissed plaintiff's claim of violation of the HCRA for failure to state a claim, although it allowed plaintiff to move for reconsideration of this ruling. Judge White transferred the retaliatory discharge claim to the Court of Claims because she determined that the circuit court could not exercise jurisdiction over the claim. On May 19, 1987, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the circuit court's summary dismissal of his claim of violation of the HCRA. The motion was granted and the claim was reinstated in the circuit court. The HCRA and retaliatory discharge claims were consolidated, and Judge White sat as judge in both the circuit court and the Court of Claims.

Thereafter, defendant moved to strike plaintiff's demand for a jury trial, alleging that plaintiff was not entitled to a jury with regard to the retaliatory discharge claim because it was in the Court of Claims. See M.C.L. Sec. 600.6443; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.6443. Judge White reserved ruling on the motion to strike the jury demand and empaneled a jury. On December 11, 1987, the jury returned a verdict of no cause of action with respect to the HCRA claim. However, the jury awarded plaintiff $477,000 in damages with respect to the retaliatory discharge claim.

Following numerous posttrial motions by both parties, Judge White issued her first opinion and order on October 11, 1989, which incorporated her findings with respect to jurisdiction and plaintiff's right to a jury, and also included her findings of fact and conclusions of law. The judge concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to a jury in regard to the retaliatory discharge claim because it was a claim for damages against the state. She also concluded that defendant's termination of plaintiff was in retaliation for his having filed a petition for workers' compensation benefits and awarded plaintiff $30,000 in mental anguish damages. Finally, she agreed with the jury that plaintiff failed to state a claim under the HCRA.

On February 13, 1990, the judge issued a supplemental opinion and order increasing plaintiff's damages to $37,500. The damages represented $30,000 for plaintiff's mental anguish with respect to the wrongful discharge, $5,000 for plaintiff's mental anguish associated with his loss of fringe benefits, and $2,500 to compensate plaintiff for supplemental pay he would have received had he not been terminated.

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the Court of Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to decide his claim for retaliatory discharge because the Court of Claims Act expressly prevents it from exercising jurisdiction over claims for compensation under the WDCA. We disagree.

The Court of Claims is created by statute and the scope of its subject-matter jurisdiction is explicit. Lim v. Dep't. of Transportation, 167 Mich.App. 751, 753, 423 N.W.2d 343 (1988). According to the provisions of the Court of Claims Act, M.C.L. Sec. 600.6401 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.6401 et seq., the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages against the state, whether those claims are ex contractu or ex delicto. See M.C.L. Sec. 600.6419(1)(a); M.S.A. Sec. 27A.6419(1)(a); Kell v. Johnson, 186 Mich.App. 562, 564, 465 N.W.2d 26 (1990). Unless there are contradictory legislative enactments that expressly divest the Court of Claims of jurisdiction over an action against the state or a department thereof, the Court of Claims is the appropriate forum to litigate the dispute.

Plaintiff argues that the trial court clearly erred because it ignored M.C.L. Sec. 600.6419(3)(a); M.S.A. Sec. 27A.6419(3)(a). However, this section of the act does not divest the Court of Claims of subject-matter jurisdiction over this claim. M.C.L Sec. 600.6419(3); M.S.A. Sec. 27A.6419(3) states as follows:

The court of claims shall not have jurisdiction of any claim for compensation under the provisions of either of the following:

(a) The worker's disability compensation act of 1969, Act No. 317 of the Public Acts of 1969, being sections 418.101 to 418.941 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.

The question is whether an employee who is terminated in retaliation for filing a claim for benefits under the WDCA states a claim for "compensation" within the meaning of the WDCA. We conclude that the claim is not one for "compensation" under the WDCA.

In general terms, a wrongful discharge claim against the State of Michigan must be filed in the Court of Claims. Doster v. Dep't. of Mental Health, 161 Mich.App. 436, 442, 411 N.W.2d 725 (1987). This Court has recognized that an employee's claim of discharge in retaliation for the filing of a petition for benefits under the WDCA is a type of wrongful discharge. Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich.App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976). In this case, plaintiff's claim that he was discharged in retaliation for his request for benefits under the WDCA is, therefore, a type of wrongful discharge.

Unfortunately, the Legislature has not shed any light on this issue because it did not define "compensation" within the WDCA. However, the primary goal of workers' compensation legislation is to promptly deliver benefits to employees injured in the scope of their employment. Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 139 Mich.App. 177, 182, 362 N.W.2d 240 (1984). Pursuant to M.C.L. Sec. 418.301(1); M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(301)(1), an employee who suffers a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment is entitled to compensation under the act. Therefore, plaintiff's retaliatory discharge claim is not a request for "compensation" for personal injury under the WDCA but, instead, is a request for damages for wrongful discharge.

This Court recognized a claim for retaliatory discharge in connection with the act even before the Legislature codified the claim under M.C.L. Sec. 418.301(11); M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(301)(11). See Hrab v. Hayes-Albion Corp., 103 Mich.App. 90, 94, 302 N.W.2d 606 (1981); Sventko, supra. In addition, this Court recently concluded that the WDCA does not give the Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation jurisdiction to hear a claim for retaliatory discharge under M.C.L. Sec. 418.301(11); M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(301)(11). Delke v. Scheuren, 185 Mich.App. 326, 331-332, 460 N.W.2d 324 (1990). Under the jurisdictional provisions of the WDCA, the bureau has jurisdiction to hear any dispute or controversy concerning compensation. See M.C.L. Sec. 418.841; M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(841). Inasmuch as the jurisdictional provisions provide the bureau with the authority to hear any disputes concerning compensation, it is significant that this Court has excluded the pure retaliatory discharge claim from this jurisdictional provision. ¹

We believe that the Legislature's intent in adopting the section of the Court of Claims Act that precludes the Court of Claims from exercising jurisdiction over claims for compensation under the WDCA (M.C.L. Sec. 600.6419[a]; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.6419[a] was to prevent a conflict of jurisdictional authority between the Court of Claims and the administrative bodies created to carry out the provisions of the WDCA. The Legislature wanted to...