Duncan v. H. & G. Iron Works
| Decision Date | 06 October 1890 |
| Docket Number | 106 |
| Parties | P. S. DUNCAN ET AL. v. H. & G. IRON WORKS |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued April 24, 1890 [Copyrighted Material Omitted] [Copyrighted Material Omitted] [Copyrighted Material Omitted]
APPEAL BY PLAINTIFFS FROM THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF BLAIR COUNTY.
No. 106 January Term 1890, Sup. Ct.; court below, No. 90, Eq. D., C.P.
In the court below, Peter S. Duncan, Sarah F. Duncan and John W. Duncan filed their bill in equity against the Hollidaysburg & Gap Iron Works, showing their title to certain ore lands under the will of Peter Shoenberger, who died in 1854, and, averring that the defendants were "constantly, continuously and daily" trespassing upon said lands and taking ore therefrom, prayed: 1. For discovery of the defendants' title. 2. For an injunction. 3. For "an account, which would be such an account as would depend upon the construction of the rights of the defendants; being total, if the court are of opinion that the defendants possess no rights in complainants' property; or partial, if the court are of opinion that although such right existed the supply taken was excessive." The provisions of the will of Peter Shoenberger, deceased, the averments of the bill and of the answers filed, sufficiently appear in the opinion of the Supreme Court.
Issue having been joined, the cause was referred to Mr. H. M. Baldridge, as examiner and master, who subsequently reported in part as follows:
The principal subject of contention arises upon the construction of the last will and testament of Dr. Peter Shoenberger, under whom both parties claim, and relates to the ore rights or privileges pertaining to what is known as the Bloomfield Furnace Mines.
Dr. Shoenberger, in his lifetime, was extensively engaged in the iron business, and owned large and valuable properties, including rolling-mills, furnaces, forges, ore-banks, etc. Among his properties were Bloomfield Furnace, Sarah Furnace, Rebecca Furnace, Gap Furnace and Forge, and a large body of valuable iron-ore deposits known as the Bloomfield Mines. Dr. Shoenberger died in June, 1854, leaving a will dated June 14, 1852, with six codicils thereto, the last of which was dated May 11, 1854, and which will and codicils were duly admitted to probate in Philadelphia on the 28th and 29th of June, 1854. By the seventh clause of his said will he devised unto his daughter Martha Duncan during her natural life, inter alia, Bloomfield Furnace, with all the lands and tenements thereto belonging in a schedule therein mentioned, and, also, generally, all other lands which he might in his lifetime purchase for and attach to said Bloomfield Furnace, although not specifically named, and in said devise made the following reservation:
And at her death he devised said lands, etc., unto her surviving children as tenants in common, and "as purchasers, and not by descent."
Mrs. Martha Duncan died March 28, 1863, leaving surviving her her husband, John W. Duncan, and three children, viz., Peter S. Duncan, John Collins Duncan, and Sarah F. Duncan. John Collins Duncan died September 1, 1878, intestate, unmarried, without issue, and leaving to survive him his father John W. Duncan, and his brother Peter S. Duncan, and sister Sarah F. Duncan. The said John W. Duncan having died since the closing of the testimony in this case, the whole title to the Bloomfield Furnace property becomes vested in Peter S. Duncan and Sarah F. Duncan, who with John W. Duncan were the complainants in this bill.
The respondents are the present owners of the Gap Furnace property, which at one time belonged also to Dr. P. Shoenberger. . . .
The master then traced the title to the Gap Furnace property, from Peter Shoenberger through the Juniata Iron Manufacturing Co., and others, into the defendants; and, having stated the grounds upon which the plaintiffs claimed in their bill to be entitled to the relief prayed for, proceeded:
And the learned counsel of complainants in their arguments before the master did not abandon any of these positions. They denied that the defendants had any rights whatever in the premises. They claimed that under the will of Dr. Shoenberger there was no express devise of an ore privilege to Gap Furnace; that, while by the seventh clause or item in the will, Dr. Shoenberger reserved and excepted in the devise of Bloomfield Furnace to Mrs. Duncan and her children, "the right and privilege hereinbefore and hereinafter devised to the owners of Rebecca Furnace, Sarah Furnace, and Gap Furnace," yet in the fourth and fifth items of the will no ore rights were given to the devisees, and there was no hereinafter devise to Gap Furnace; and that the conveyance between the date of his will and the last codicil was a revocation of the devise. They further urged that there was no implied right or privilege under the reservation in the seventh clause of the will, and that, if there was, it was personal to the McCormicks, to whom Gap Furnace was first devised; and that if it could be held that there was some sort of an implied right which in some manner passed by subsequent devise, then such subsequent devise would merely vest the personal right in E. F. Shoenberger, and would not pass to his vendee. And in the amended bill the prayer is, "And if it be decreed that the defendants have any rights whatever in the premises, then in the alternative," &c. The complainants, therefore, denying that the defendants have any rights whatever in the premises, has the equity side of the court jurisdiction of the matter in controversy? The master is of the opinion it has not.
The questions are purely legal, and depend entirely on the construction to be placed on the will of Dr. Shoenberger. Courts of equity will interfere by injunction to protect the clear rights of suitors, but not when they are uncertain, doubtful, or disputed, and depend on the legal construction of deeds, etc. The Supreme Court, in Grubb's App., 90 Pa. 228, say that the proper construction of a deed is a legal question, and is not the subject of equity jurisdiction. On the same principle, equity has not jurisdiction where the title depends on the construction of a will. The reason for the rule is the same. The same case rules that "a bill in equity is not a panacea;" it was never intended nor has it ever been used to settle disputed rights in trespass; that where the right is clear it will restrain the commission of repeated acts of trespass, on the sole ground of preventing a multiplication of suits.
Here the plaintiffs charge the defendants to be trespassers, having no rights in the premises; while the defendants claim they have a clear right, exercised and recognized for years. In North Penna. Coal Co. v. Snowden, 42 Pa. 488, it was held that while it may be admitted that a bill will lie by one tenant in common to restrain waste or procure partition, yet even in such cases, confessedly within the jurisdiction of a court of equity, such a court would not interfere if complainant's title be denied, without he has vindicated it at law; that, to obtain an injunction the plaintiff's right must be acknowledged or established; that, where the title is legal, the case is not within the jurisdiction of a court of equity. There, no tenancy in common was charged, and the bill, as in this case, as the gravamen of complaint denied the defendant's title.
In Long's App., 92 Pa. 179, it was ruled that when an account prayed for is but incidental to and dependent upon the determination of the title, the title must first be settled in favor of the plaintiff or he can have no account. An injunction will never be granted except in a clear case; never, when the whole title is in dispute; nor, unless the plaintiff is without an adequate legal remedy. If the defendants have no rights, they are trespassers and plaintiffs have a complete remedy. If suit were brought by plaintiffs for damages and a recovery were had, no doubt the defendants would desist their mining operation; or, if not, after the title should thus be established then injunction would lie; but, until plaintiffs' exclusive rights are acknowledged or established, we are of opinion an injunction would not be allowed.
The plaintiffs claim that this is not an ejectment bill, as claimed by defendants, because they as well as the defendants are in possession, and therefore it is unlike the case of Tillmes v. Marsh, 67 Pa. 507, cited by defendants. We are inclined to the opinion that ejectment would lie, if plaintiffs were entitled to the exclusive possession, and they were deprived of this by reason of the joint possession of the defendants. But, however this may be, an action of trespass would be an adequate legal remedy, if the defendants have no rights in the premises.
Plaintiffs further...
To continue reading
Request your trial