Duncan v. Henry

Decision Date23 January 1995
Docket NumberNo. 94-941.,94-941.
Citation513 U.S. 364
PartiesDUNCAN, WARDEN v. HENRY
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Per Curiam.

Respondent, a rector and dean of a church day school, was tried and convicted in state court of sexually molesting a 5-year-old student. At trial, respondent objected to testimony by the parent of another child who claimed to have been molested 20 years previously. His objection was based on Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 352 (West 1966). On direct appeal, he pursued his evidentiary objection and requested the appellate court to find that the error was a "miscarriage of justice" under the California Constitution. California applies this provision in determining whether or not an error was harmless. People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 299 P. 2d 243 (1956). The California Court of Appeal found the error harmless and affirmed respondent's conviction. People v. Henry, No. CR23041 (2d Dist. 1990), App. D to Pet. for Cert. 6.

Respondent then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court, alleging that the evidentiary error amounted to a denial of due process under the United States Constitution. The District Court granted the petition and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Henry v. Estelle, 33 F. 3d 1037 (1994). The court held that respondent had exhausted his state remedies even though he had not claimed a violation of any federal constitutional right in the state proceedings:

"In his direct appeal in state court, Henry did not label his claim a federal due process violation; he argued rather that Hackett's testimony was erroneously admitted because irrelevant and inflammatory, and that its admission resulted in a `miscarriage of justice' under the California Constitution. However, to state a federal due process claim it is not necessary to invoke `the talismanic phrase "due process of law"` or cite `book and verse on the federal constitution' . . . ." Id. , at 1040 (citations omitted).

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270, 275 (1971), we said that exhaustion of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly present" federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the "`opportunity to pass upon and correct' alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state court. Accord, Anderson v. Harless, 459 U. S. 4 (1982).

Picard and Harless control the outcome in this case. Respondent did not apprise the state court of his claim that the evidentiary ruling of which he complained was not only a violation of state law, but denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The failure is especially pronounced in that respondent did specifically raise a due process objection before the state court based on a different claim—that the pleading was uncertain as to when the offense occurred. App. D to Pet. for Cert. 8. The California Court of Appeal analyzed the evidentiary error by asking whether its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, not whether it was so inflammatory as to prevent a fair trial. 33 F. 3d, at 1046. As recognized by dissenting Judge Brunetti, those standards are no more than "`somewhat similar,' " id. , at 1047, not "virtually identical" as claimed by Justice Stevens, post, at 369. Both Picard and Harless emphasized that mere similarity of claims is insufficient to exhaust. Picard, supra, at 276; Harless, supra, at 6. The state court, when presented with respondent's claim of error under the California Evidentiary Code, understandably confined its analysis to the application of state law.

Accordingly, the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer join, concurring in the judgment.

I concur in the judgment because respondent's "miscarriage of justice" claim in state court was reasonably understood to raise a state-law issue of prejudice, not a federal issue of due process. Consequently, no federal claim was "fairly presented to the state courts" within the meaning of Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270, 275 (1971).

Justice Stevens, dissenting.

Today's opinion sets forth a new rule of law that is a substantial departure from our precedents. In my opinion, it is unwise for the Court to announce a new rule without first hearing argument on the issue. The Court's opinion is especially distressing because it creates an exacting pleading requirement that serves no legitimate purpose in our habeas corpus jurisprudence.

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270 (1971), after full briefing and argument, the Court issued an opinion carefully explaining the rule that a state prisoner must exhaust his statecourt remedies before applying for a federal writ of habeas corpus. We held that the exhaustion requirement is satisfied when "the federal claim has been fairly presented to the state courts." Id., at 275. We made it clear, however, that the prisoner need not place the correct label on his claim, or even cite the Federal Constitution, as long as the substance of the federal claim has been fairly presented.

As we explained: "Obviously there are instances in which `the ultimate question for disposition,' United States ex rel. Kemp v. Pate, 359 F. 2d 749, 751 (CA7 1966), will be the same despite variations in the legal theory or factual allegations urged in its support. A ready example is a challenge to a confession predicated upon psychological as well as physical coercion." Id., at 277. Thus, until today, prisoners have not been required to exhaust their federal claims "by citing `book and verse on the federal constitution.' " Id., at 278 (citation omitted). Rather, the rule has been simply that they must present "the substance of a federal habeas corpus claim . . . to the state courts." Ibid.

Today the Court tightens the pleading screws by adding the requirement that the state courts "must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution." Ante, at 365-366. As support for that proposition the Court cites Picard and Anderson v. Harless, 459 U. S. 4 (1982), but neither case is in point. In the former, the Court pointed out that the claim asserted in state court—that an indictment was invalid under Massachusetts law—was different from the equal protection claim first raised in federal court; in the latter, the Court carefully explained why it concluded that the state-law basis for objecting to a jury instruction differed from the federal rule announced in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510 (1979). While I disagreed with the view that Harless' federal claim had not been fairly presented to the state courts, see 459 U. S., at 9-12 (dissenting opinion), I surely did not understand the Court's opinion to hold that the exhaustion doctrine includes an exact labeling requirement.

Nor have the Courts of Appeals demonstrated any such understanding of Harless or Picard. To the contrary, the Circuits have analyzed the exhaustion question without rigidly insisting that a prisoner invoke the "talismanic" language of federal law. See Tamapua v. Shimoda, 796 F. 2d 261, 263 (CA9 1986); see also, e. g., Hawkins v. West, 706 F. 2d 437, 439-440 (CA2 1983); Lesko v. Owens, 881 F. 2d 44, 50 (CA3 1989), cert. denied, 493 U. S. 1036 (1990); West v. Wright, 931 F. 2d 262, 266 (CA4 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 505 U. S. 277 (1992); Satter v. Leapley, 977 F. 2d 1259, 1262 (CA8 1992); Bowser v. Boggs, 20 F. 3d 1060, 1063 (CA10), cert. denied, post, p. 926; Nichols v. Sullivan, 867 F. 2d 1250, 1252-1253 (CA10), cert. denied, 490 U. S. 1112 (1989); Hutchins v. Wainwright, 715 F. 2d 512, 518-519 (CA11 1983), cert. denied, 465 U. S. 1071 (1984).

The new rule the Court announces today is hypertechnical and unwise. It will prolong litigation without serving any valid purpose. The example of a challenge to a coerced confession cited in Picard, 404 U. S., at 277, illustrates the point. If a prisoner presents all his evidence to a state court, and if the standard for judging the voluntariness of a confession under state law is the same as under federal law, the state court has had a fair opportunity to pass on the claim regardless of whether the prisoner relies on both the State and Federal Constitutions or just the former. If the state courts have considered and rejected such a claim on state-law grounds, nothing is to be gained by requiring the prisoner to present the same claim under a different label to the same courts that have already found it insufficient. The cost of needless litigation is, however, significant both to the judicial system, see Harless, 459 U. S., at 8 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and to persons like respondent who are imprisoned despite their meritorious federal claims.

In the case before us today, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit carefully analyzed the exhaustion issue. On the merits, respondent presented the Court of Appeals with a federal due process claim, the crux of which was that the testimony of Thomas Hackett, a witness for the prosecution, was so inflammatory and irrelevant as to render his trial fundamentally unfair. Cf. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U. S. 62, 75 (1991) (severely prejudicial evidentiary errors may violate due process). Respondent had challenged the admission of Hackett's testimony on direct appeal in state court. 33 F. 3d 1037, 1040 (CA9 1994). To be sure, he...

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