Duncan v. Peterson

• Decision Date: 10 May 2011
• Docket Number: No. 2–09–1078.,2–09–1078.
• Citation: 349 Ill.Dec. 668,408 Ill.App.3d 911,947 N.E.2d 305
• Parties: Richard A. DUNCAN, Plaintiff–Appellee,v.Bervin PETERSON and The Moody Church, Defendants (Hope Church, Plaintiff; Erwin Lutzer, Defendant–Appellant).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

408 Ill.App.3d 911

947 N.E.2d 305

349 Ill.Dec. 668

Richard A. DUNCAN, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Bervin PETERSON and The Moody Church, Defendants (Hope Church, Plaintiff; Erwin Lutzer, Defendant–Appellant).

No. 2–09–1078.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Dec. 30, 2010.Rehearing Denied May 10, 2011.

James W. Ford, Brenner, Ford, Monroe & Scott, Ltd., Chicago, J. Shelby Sharpe, Law Offices of J. Shelby Sharpe, Fort Worth, TX, for Erwin Lutzer.John W. Quinn, Churchill, Quinn, Richtman & Hamilton, Ltd., Grayslake, for Richard Duncan.David W. Schopp, Law Office of David W. Schopp, Aurora, for Amicus Curiae American Center for Law & Justice.Andy R. Norman, Mauck & Baker, LLC, Chicago, J. Michael Johnson, Alliance Defense Fund, Shreveport, LA, Kelly J. Shackelford, Jeffrey C. Mateer, Hiram S. Sasser III, Roger L. Byron, Erin Leu, Liberty Institute, Plano, TX, for Amicus Curiae Alliance Defense Fund and Liberty InstituteJustice HUTCHINSON delivered the opinion of the court:

[349 Ill.Dec. 672 , 408 Ill.App.3d 911] Defendant, Erwin Lutzer, appeals the trial court's judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, Richard Duncan, on plaintiff's complaint alleging claims of false light invasion of privacy and conspiracy. Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it failed to grant his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In the alternative, defendant contends that the trial court erred when it failed to grant a new trial. We affirm.

This matter was initiated when plaintiff and Hope Church filed a complaint against plaintiff's former church and its senior clergy after the senior pastor at the former church sent a bundle of letters to board members of Hope Church. The bundle of letters contained language accusing plaintiff of having an extramarital affair, filing a divorce petition against his wife, misusing church funds, and abusing alcohol. The bundle of letters also contained language purporting to strip plaintiff of his ordination as a minister and requesting that he no longer function in a ministerial capacity. The trial court initially determined that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applied and thus found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' claims. It granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. This court reversed, holding that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine did not apply. See Duncan v. Peterson, 359 Ill.App.3d 1034, 296 Ill.Dec. 377, 835 N.E.2d 411 (2005). On remand, the jury found defendant, the senior pastor of the former church, liable and awarded plaintiff $276,306 in damages. Defendant appealed.

The evidence adduced at trial established the following. In 1989, plaintiff was ordained as a minister by the Moody Church. For the next several years, plaintiff worked in that capacity under defendant. In 1992, plaintiff resigned his position with the Moody Church in order to become the senior pastor for the Village Church of Lincolnshire. Subsequently, with the help of some fellow churchgoers, including Robert Dickman, Alvin Puccinelli, and Albert Nader, plaintiff founded Hope Church. Dickman, Puccinelli, and Nader became board members of Hope Church. In 2000, plaintiff's marriage experienced difficulties, and in March 2000 plaintiff's wife filed for divorce. Plaintiff sought and received an order of protection against his wife after she gave Puccinelli documents that she claimed were e-mails between plaintiff and another woman. Puccinelli gave the documents to Nader. During the divorce proceedings, Nader testified on behalf of plaintiff's wife, and

[349 Ill.Dec. 673 , 947 N.E.2d 310]

plaintiff's wife accused plaintiff of abusing alcohol.

In late March 2000, Nader called defendant and informed him that plaintiff's marriage was in trouble. Subsequently, Dickman and Nader met with defendant and the board of elders of the Moody Church to discuss plaintiff's marriage. In April 2000 plaintiff received a letter dated April 23, 2000, and signed by “The Elders of Moody Church,” including defendant. The letter provided in part:

“1. You have had an improper relationship with a divorced single woman, violating the Biblical teaching that an elder be ‘above reproach.’

2. Your decision to file a divorce petition against your wife violates the Biblical admonition that husbands are to love their wives ‘as Christ loved the church[.]’

3. Your misuse of alcohol violates the Biblical admonition that an elder be ‘temperate, self-controlled.’ * * *

4. Your misuse of personal funds as well as the deceitful means used to obtain the Hope Church Bank account violates the Biblical admonition that an elder should not be a ‘lover of money.’ * * *

* * *

We want to give you an opportunity to reply to these charges. If you contact any one of us before Thursday, May 4, 2000, we will be glad to set up a meeting with you to which we will invite the former members of your church Board, and if necessary, other witnesses. * * *

If you do not reply to us by the May 4 date, we will have no choice but to rescind your ordination to the Christian ministry that we granted you.”

In response to the letter, plaintiff contacted John Welch, a signatory of the letter. Plaintiff denied the allegations and inquired as to why the Moody Church was getting involved in his personal affairs.

On May 5, 2000, plaintiff received a second letter from the Moody Church, requesting that plaintiff appear in person in front of its executive committee. The letter stated in part:

“[Given] the seriousness of this matter, we have chosen this Monday evening, May 8, to make a final decision regarding your credentials for ministry that we conferred upon you. If you are unwilling to appear, with deep regret we will have to rescind your ordination and licensing.”

Plaintiff did not attend the May 8, 2000, meeting of the Moody Church executive committee.

Plaintiff subsequently received a third letter from the Moody Church, dated May 9, 2000, and signed by defendant and another Moody Church elder, Bervin Peterson. The letter stated:

“This letter is to inform you that last night, May 8, 2000, the Executive Committee of the Moody Church, upon the recommendation of the Elders, voted to rescind the licensing and ordination that this body conferred to you in March, 1989.

* * *

Effective immediately, in light of our decision to revoke your licensing and ordination, we now request the following:

1. That you no longer function in the role of minister.

2. That you no longer accept the title ‘Reverend’ Duncan, or ‘Pastor’ Duncan, or any other such title that would imply that you have credentials for spiritual leadership and ministry.

[947 N.E.2d 311 , 349 Ill.Dec. 674]

3. That you inform the leadership and membership of Hope Church of our action.”

Before plaintiff received his own copy of the May 9, 2000, letter, his children's guardian ad litem showed him a copy of the letter at a dissolution proceeding. This copy included a cover letter, signed by defendant. The cover letter was addressed to Puccinelli, Dickman, and Nader and noted three enclosures: the April 23, 2000, letter; the May 5, 2000, letter; and the May 9, 2000, letter. The cover letter stated, “We are sending you this information and it is up to you as to what is done with it.”

On May 8, 2001, plaintiff and Hope Church filed their complaint against defendant, Peterson, and the Moody Church, based upon the letters. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff and Hope Church appealed, and this court remanded the case after determining that genuine issues of material fact existed to preclude summary judgment on plaintiff's false-light-invasion-of-privacy and conspiracy claims. See Duncan, 359 Ill.App.3d 1034, 296 Ill.Dec. 377, 835 N.E.2d 411. This court affirmed the judgment against Hope Church, because no injury was alleged against it. On remand, the trial court entertained defendant's motion to bar the testimony of a woman who alleged that defendant had touched her inappropriately, but it ultimately denied defendant's motion. The case proceeded to a jury trial. A verdict was subsequently entered against defendant and in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $276,306. Peterson and the Moody Church were found not liable. Defendant timely appealed. Hope Church, Peterson, and the Moody Church are not parties to this appeal.

Defendant's initial contention is that the trial court erred when it failed to grant defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We review de novo a trial court's decision to deny a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Thornton v. Garcini, 382 Ill.App.3d 813, 817, 321 Ill.Dec. 284, 888 N.E.2d 1217 (2008), citing McClure v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 188 Ill.2d 102, 132, 241 Ill.Dec. 787, 720 N.E.2d 242 (1999). The trial court may enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict only when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, it so overwhelmingly favors the movant that a contrary verdict could not stand. Williams v. City of Chicago, 371 Ill.App.3d 105, 106, 308 Ill.Dec. 550, 861 N.E.2d 1115 (2007).

In support of his contention, defendant argues that (1) the undisputed facts established that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to decide the false-light-invasion-of-privacy claim; (2) the undisputed facts established that the false-light-invasion-of-privacy claim is defeated by the religion and speech clauses of the first amendment as read into the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution; (3) the undisputed facts established that the false-light-invasion-of-privacy claim is defeated by conditional privilege; and (4) plaintiff's failure to prove the necessary elements of his false-light-invasion-of-privacy claim precluded a judgment in his favor. We review each of defendant's arguments in turn.

Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for judgment notwithstanding...