Duncan v. State
Decision Date | 18 March 2005 |
Docket Number | CR-03-1634. |
Citation | 925 So.2d 245 |
Parties | Trace Royal DUNCAN v. STATE of Alabama. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
M. Bradley Almond, Tuscaloosa, for appellant.
Troy King, atty. gen., and Jasper B. Roberts, Jr., asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
On November 2, 1995, the appellant, Trace Royal Duncan, was convicted of the capital offenses of kidnapping-murder, a violation of § 13A-5-40(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975, and robbery-murder, a violation of § 13A-5-40(a)(2), Ala.Code 1975. By a vote of 10-2, the jury recommended that he be sentenced to death. On March 8, 1996, the trial court accepted the jury's recommendation and sentenced him to death. This court affirmed the appellant's convictions on direct appeal, see Duncan v. State, 827 So.2d 838 (Ala.Crim.App.1999); the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed our judgment, see Ex parte Duncan, 827 So.2d 861 (Ala.2001); and the United States Supreme Court denied the appellant's petition for certiorari review, see Duncan v. Alabama, 537 U.S. 860, 123 S.Ct. 237, 154 L.Ed.2d 99 (2002). The relevant facts of the case are set forth in this court's opinion on direct appeal. This court issued a certificate of judgment on February 26, 2002.
On July 29, 2003, the appellant, through counsel, filed a Rule 32 petition, challenging his convictions. Thereafter, the appellant, through counsel, filed amended Rule 32 petitions on August 21, 2003, on November 4, 2003, and on March 29, 2004. After the State responded, the circuit court summarily denied the petition and the amendments thereto. This appeal followed.
As an initial matter, we note that, in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1200, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), the United States Supreme Court held that "[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed." Because this case is before this court on appeal from the denial of the appellant's Rule 32 petition, we must determine whether Roper applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. In Clemons v. State, [Ms. CR-01-1355, August 29, 2003] ___ So.2d ___, ___ (Ala.Crim.App.2003), when concluding that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), applies retroactively to cases on collateral review, we reasoned:
(Footnote omitted.) Similarly, Roper prohibits the execution of offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed, regardless of the procedures followed. Therefore, we conclude that the decision in Roper falls within Teague's first exception to the general rule of nonretroactivity and applies retroactively to cases that are on collateral review.
The record clearly establishes that the appellant was 17 years old at the time of the offense in this case. Therefore, pursuant to Roper, his sentence of death is unconstitutional and must be set aside. For the reasons set forth herein, we conclude that the circuit court properly denied his requests for post-conviction relief as to the guilt phase of his trial and that his conviction is valid. However, in accordance with Roper, we must remand this case to the circuit court for that court to set aside the appellant's sentence of death and to resentence him to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole. Further, because the sentence of death is no longer valid, it is not necessary to review the appellant's claims regarding the penalty phase of his trial because error, if any, in that regard is rendered harmless by Roper, and any arguments concerning the penalty phase of his trial are now moot. See Rule 45, Ala. R.App. P.
The appellant raises several arguments, including claims that his attorneys rendered ineffective assistance during the proceedings. In reviewing the circuit court's rulings on the appellant's arguments, we apply the following principles:
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