Duncan v. State Dept. of Human Resources

• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
• Writing for the Court: ROBERTSON
• Citation: Duncan v. State Dept. of Human Resources, 627 So.2d 427 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993)
• Decision Date: 23 April 1993
• Parties: Dorothy DUNCAN v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES. AV92000088.

Page 427

627 So.2d 427

Dorothy DUNCAN v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES.

AV92000088.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

April 23, 1993.

Rehearing Denied May 21, 1993.

Certiorari Denied Aug. 27, 1993

Alabama Supreme Court 1921343.

Fulton S. Hamilton, Huntsville, for appellant.

William Prendergast and Sharon E. Ficquette, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

ROBERTSON, Presiding Judge.

This appeal stems from an administrative hearing conducted by a hearing officer for the State Department of Human Resources (DHR). Dorothy Duncan, a day care worker employed by the Hillsboro Heights Baptist Church Day Care Center (Center), was found to have "corporally/physically punished" two of the children in her care. The hearing officer found that such punishment was intentional and violated the Center's policy, DHR rules, and the Alabama Child Care Act of 1971.

The hearing officer directed that the "indicated" dispositions of physical abuse on both children be entered against Duncan in the central registry. The central registry was established by DHR pursuant to § 26-14-8, Code 1975, and maintains reports of child abuse and neglect. The purpose of this registry is to protect children from child abuse, and the information in the registry is confidential and shall not be disclosed except for those reasons enumerated in § 26-14-8(b)(1)-(8), Code 1975.

Duncan appealed to the circuit court, where the administrative order was affirmed. On appeal to this court, she contends that the hearing officer unreasonably relied on hearsay evidence to reach his legal conclusions, that the hearing officer's decision was premised on an abuse of discretion, and that the hearing officer's decision was clearly erroneous.

Judicial review of the agency's decision is limited by § 41-22-20(k), Code 1975, which provides in part:

"Except where judicial review is by trial de novo, the agency order shall be taken as prima facie just and reasonable, and the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact, except where otherwise authorized by statute."

In this instance the appeal is on the record, and there is no statutory provision for a trial de novo. See Benton v. Alabama Board of Medical Examiners, 467 So.2d 234 (Ala.1985).

A presumption of correctness attaches to a decision by an administrative agency, and judicial review is limited to determining whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence, whether the agency's decision is reasonable and not arbitrary, and whether its actions were within its statutory and constitutional powers. Ferlisi v. Alabama Medicaid Agency, 481 So.2d 400 (Ala.Civ.App.1985). A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact, and the agency's decision is to be upheld unless it is unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. Screws v. Ballard, 574 So.2d 827 (Ala.Civ.App.1990).

The record reflects that the hearing officer made several findings of fact after a lengthy hearing. The record of that hearing is contained in almost 1400 pages of transcribed testimony. A recitation of that testimony would serve no useful purpose in this appeal. The record does reflect that Lois Duckworth, who worked at the Center for three months as a teacher's aide or "floater," reported two separate...