Duncan v. State of Louisiana

Citation88 S.Ct. 1444,391 U.S. 145,20 L.Ed.2d 491
Decision Date20 May 1968
Docket NumberNo. 410,410
PartiesGary DUNCAN, Appellant, v. STATE OF LOUISIANA
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

See 392 U.S. 947, 88 S.Ct. 2270.

Richard B. Sobol, New Orleans, La., for appellant.

Mrs. Dorothy D. Wolbrette, New Orleans, La., for appellee.

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellant, Gary Duncan, was convicted of simple battery in the Twenty-fifth Judicial District Court of Louisiana. Under Louisiana law simple battery is a misdemeanor, punishable by a maximum of two years' imprisonment and a $300 fine. Appellant sought trial by jury, but because the Louisiana Constitution grants jury trials only in cases in which capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor may be imposed,1 the trial judge denied the request. Appellant was convicted and sentenced to serve 60 days in the parish prison and pay a fine of $150. Appellant sought review in the Supreme Court of Louisiana, asserting that the denial of jury trial violated rights guaranteed to him by the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court, finding '(n)o error of law in the ruling complained of,' denied appellant a writ of certiorari.2 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s 1257(2) appellant sought review in this Court, alleging that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution secure the right to jury trial in state criminal prosecutions where a sentence as long as two years may be imposed. We noted probable jurisdiction,3 and set the case for oral argument with No. 52, Bloom v. State of Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d —-.

Appellant was 19 years of age when tried. While driving on Highway 23 in Plaquemines Parish on October 18, 1966, he saw two younger cousins engaged in a conversation by the side of the road with four white boys. Knowing his cousins, Negroes who had recently transferred to a formerly all-white high school, had reported the occurrence of racial incidents at the school, Duncan stopped the car, got out, and approached the six boys. At trial the white boys and a white onlooker testified, as did appellant and his cousins. The testimony was in dispute on many points, but the witnesses agreed that appellant and the white boys spoke to each other, that appellant encouraged his cousins to break off the encounter and enter his car, and that appellant was about to enter the car himself for the purpose of driving away with his cousins. The whites testified that just before getting in the car appellant slapped Herman Landry, one of the white boys, on the elbow. The Negroes testified that appellant had not slapped Landry, but had merely touched him. The trial judge concluded that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Duncan had committed simple battery, and found him guilty.

I.

The Fourteenth Amendment denies the States the power to 'deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.' In resolving conclicting claims concerning the meaning of this spacious language, the Court has looked increasingly to the Bill of Rights for guidance; many of the rights guaranteed by the first eight Amendments to the Constitution have been held to be protected against state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That clause now protects the right to compensation for property taken by the State;4 the rights of speech, press, and religion covered by the First Amendment;5 the Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and to have excluded from criminal trials any evidence illegally seized;6 the right guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to be free of compelled self-incrimination;7 and the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel,8 to a speedy9 and public10 trial, to confrontation of opposing witnesses,11 and to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses. 12

The test for determining whether a right extended by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments with respect to federal criminal proceedings is also protected against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment has been phrased in a variety of ways in the opinions of this Court. The question has been asked whether a right is among those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions," Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67, 53 S.Ct. 55, 63, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932);13 whether it is 'basic in our system of jurisprudence,' In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273, 68 S.Ct. 499, 507, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948); and whether it is 'a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial,' Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343—344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1492, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964); Pointer v. State of Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1067, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). The claim before us is that the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment meets these tests. The position of Louisiana, on the other hand, is that the Constitution imposes upon the States no duty to give a jury trial in any criminal case, regardless of the seriousness of the crime or the size of the punishment which may be imposed. Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which—were they to be tried in a federal court would come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee.14 Since we consider the appeal be- fore us to be such a case, we hold that the Constitution was violated when appellant's demand for jury trial was refused.

The history of trial by jury in criminal cases has been frequently told. 15 It is sufficient for present purposes to say that by the time our Constitution was written, jury trial in criminal cases had been in existence in England for several centuries and carried impressive credentials traced by many to Magna Carta.16 Its preservation and proper operation as a protection against arbitrary rule were among the major objectives of the revolutionary settlement which was expressed in the Declaration and Bill of Rights of 1689. In the 18th century Blackstone could write:

'Our law has therefore wisely placed this strong and two-fold barrier, of a presentment and a trial by jury, between the liberties of the people and the prerogative of the crown. It was necessary, for preserving the admirable balance of our constitution, to vest the executive power of the laws in the prince: and yet this power might be dangerous and destructive to that very constitution, if exerted without check or control, by justices of oyer and terminer occasionally named by the crown; who might then, as in France or Turkey, imprison, dispatch, or exile any man that was obnoxious to the government, by an instant declaration that such is their will and pleasure. But the founders of the English law have, with excellent forecast, contrived that * * * the truth of every accusation, whether preferred in the shape of indictment, information, or appeal, should afterwards be confirmed by the unani- mous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours, indifferently chosen and superior to all suspicion.'17

Jury trial came to America with English colonists, and received strong support from them. Royal interference with the jury trial was deeply resented. Among the resolutions adopted by the First Congress of the American Colonies (the Stamp Act Congress) on October 19, 1765—resolutions deemed by their authors to state 'the most essential rights and liberties of the colonists'18—was the declaration:

'That trial by jury is the inherent and invaluable right of every British subject in these colonies.'

The First Continental Congress, in the resolve of October 14, 1774, objected to trials before judges dependent upon the Crown alone for their salaries and to trials in England for alleged crimes committed in the colonies; the Congress therefore declared:

'That the respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England, and more especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according to the course of that law.'19

The Declaration of Independence stated solemn objections to the King's making 'judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries,' to his 'depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury,' and to his 'transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offenses.' The Constitution itself, in Art. III, § 2, commanded:

'The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed.'

Objections to the Constitution because of the absence of a bill of rights were met by the immediate submission and adoption of the Bill of Rights. Included was the Sixth Amendment which, among other things, provided:

'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.'20

The constitutions adopted by the original States guaranteed jury trial. Also, the constitution of every State entering the Union thereafter in one form or another protected the right to jury trial in criminal cases.

Even such skeletal history is impressive support for considering the right to jury trial in criminal cases to be fundamental to our system of justice, an importance frequently recognized in the opinions of this Court. For example, the Court has said:

'Those who emigrated to this country from England brought with them this great privilege 'as their birthright and inheritance, as a part of that admirable common law which had fenced around and interposed barriers on every side against the approaches of arbitrary power."21

Jury trial continues to receive strong...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3027 cases
  • People v. Fields
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • 29 Diciembre 1983
    ...was not applicable to the states. (DeStefano v. Woods (1968) 392 U.S. 631, 88 S.Ct. 2093, 20 L.Ed.2d 1308; Duncan v. Louisiana (1968) 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491.) This court has previously noted that Witherspoon was decided on due process "neutrality" principles and involve......
  • Carrillo v. Biter
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Eastern District of California
    • 3 Febrero 2012
    ...by jury in all criminal cases that would come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee if tried in a federal court. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (9th Cir. 1968). A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial is violated when the "essential feature" of the jury is not preserved......
  • State v. Castonguay
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • 4 Septiembre 1984
    ...This guarantee has been made applicable to the states by incorporation into the fourteenth amendment. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968)."The constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 8, provides in pertinent part: 'In all criminal prosecutions, ......
  • People v. Rodriguez
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • 23 Octubre 1986
    ...for preventing miscarriages of justice and for assuring that fair trials are provided for all defendants" (Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, 391 U.S. at p. 158, 88 S.Ct. at p. 1452). Finally, the Cook rule's "intrusion" is, in any event, minimal. In the vast majority of cases the rule has no appl......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
154 books & journal articles
  • Whitewashing the Fourth Amendment
    • United States
    • Georgetown Law Journal No. 111-5, May 2023
    • 1 Mayo 2023
    ...Steiker ed., 2006). For example, Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643 (1961), Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Duncan v. Louisiana , 391 U.S. 145 (1968), all involved defendants of color. And although, as Steiker notes, the Court did not focus on issues of racial equality in issuing the......
  • Toward the decentralization of criminal procedure: state constitutional law and selective disincorporation.
    • United States
    • Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Vol. 87 No. 1, September 1996
    • 22 Septiembre 1996
    ...of protection for the rights of our citizens."). (7) Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right toe obtain favorable witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.......
  • THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF CHICKEN STEALING: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE PATH TO POLYGAMY.
    • United States
    • Albany Law Review Vol. 84 No. 2, June 2021
    • 22 Junio 2021
    ...and "lacking even a thin veneer of law." Id. at 716. (179) Id. at 670-71 (majority opinion). (180) Id. at 663 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-49 (1968)). (181) Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 665-69 (first citing Loving V NAME, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); then citing Griswold v. Connectic......
  • The jurisprudence of the PLRA: inmates as "outsiders" and the countermajoritarian difficulty.
    • United States
    • Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology No. 2001, September 2001
    • 22 Septiembre 2001
    ...is fundamental); Shapiro v. Thompson, 304 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969) (holding that the right to travel is fundamental); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161-62 (1968) (holding that the right to trial by jury is fundamental); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1063) (holding that the......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT