Duncan v. State of Louisiana, No. 410

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtWHITE
Citation88 S.Ct. 1444,391 U.S. 145,20 L.Ed.2d 491
Decision Date20 May 1968
Docket NumberNo. 410
PartiesGary DUNCAN, Appellant, v. STATE OF LOUISIANA

391 U.S. 145
88 S.Ct. 1444
20 L.Ed.2d 491
Gary DUNCAN, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF LOUISIANA.

No. 410.
Argued Jan. 17, 1968.
Decided May 20, 1968.
Rehearing Denied June 17, 1968.

See 392 U.S. 947, 88 S.Ct. 2270.

Richard B. Sobol, New Orleans, La., for appellant.

Mrs. Dorothy D. Wolbrette, New Orleans, La., for appellee.

Page 146

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellant, Gary Duncan, was convicted of simple battery in the Twenty-fifth Judicial District Court of Louisiana. Under Louisiana law simple battery is a misdemeanor, punishable by a maximum of two years' imprisonment and a $300 fine. Appellant sought trial by jury, but because the Louisiana Constitution grants jury trials only in cases in which capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor may be imposed,1 the trial judge denied the request. Appellant was convicted and sentenced to serve 60 days in the parish prison and pay a fine of $150. Appellant sought review in the Supreme Court of Louisiana, asserting that the denial of jury trial violated rights guaranteed to him by the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court, finding '(n)o error of law in the ruling complained of,' denied appellant a writ of certiorari.2 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

Page 147

s 1257(2) appellant sought review in this Court, alleging that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution secure the right to jury trial in state criminal prosecutions where a sentence as long as two years may be imposed. We noted probable jurisdiction,3 and set the case for oral argument with No. 52, Bloom v. State of Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d —-.

Appellant was 19 years of age when tried. While driving on Highway 23 in Plaquemines Parish on October 18, 1966, he saw two younger cousins engaged in a conversation by the side of the road with four white boys. Knowing his cousins, Negroes who had recently transferred to a formerly all-white high school, had reported the occurrence of racial incidents at the school, Duncan stopped the car, got out, and approached the six boys. At trial the white boys and a white onlooker testified, as did appellant and his cousins. The testimony was in dispute on many points, but the witnesses agreed that appellant and the white boys spoke to each other, that appellant encouraged his cousins to break off the encounter and enter his car, and that appellant was about to enter the car himself for the purpose of driving away with his cousins. The whites testified that just before getting in the car appellant slapped Herman Landry, one of the white boys, on the elbow. The Negroes testified that appellant had not slapped Landry, but had merely touched him. The trial judge concluded that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Duncan had committed simple battery, and found him guilty.

I.

The Fourteenth Amendment denies the States the power to 'deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.' In resolving conclicting

Page 148

claims concerning the meaning of this spacious language, the Court has looked increasingly to the Bill of Rights for guidance; many of the rights guaranteed by the first eight Amendments to the Constitution have been held to be protected against state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That clause now protects the right to compensation for property taken by the State;4 the rights of speech, press, and religion covered by the First Amendment;5 the Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and to have excluded from criminal trials any evidence illegally seized;6 the right guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to be free of compelled self-incrimination;7 and the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel,8 to a speedy9 and public10 trial, to confrontation of opposing witnesses,11 and to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses. 12

The test for determining whether a right extended by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments with respect to federal criminal proceedings is also protected against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment has been phrased in a variety of ways in the opinions of this Court. The question has been asked whether a right is among those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions," Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67, 53 S.Ct. 55, 63, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932);13 whether

Page 149

it is 'basic in our system of jurisprudence,' In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273, 68 S.Ct. 499, 507, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948); and whether it is 'a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial,' Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343—344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1492, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964); Pointer v. State of Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1067, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). The claim before us is that the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment meets these tests. The position of Louisiana, on the other hand, is that the Constitution imposes upon the States no duty to give a jury trial in any criminal case, regardless of the seriousness of the crime or the size of the punishment which may be imposed. Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which—were they to be tried in a federal court would come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee.14 Since we consider the appeal be-

Page 150

fore us to be such a case, we hold that the Constitution was violated when appellant's demand for jury trial was refused.

Page 151

The history of trial by jury in criminal cases has been frequently told. 15 It is sufficient for present purposes to say that by the time our Constitution was written, jury trial in criminal cases had been in existence in England for several centuries and carried impressive credentials traced by many to Magna Carta.16 Its preservation and proper operation as a protection against arbitrary rule were among the major objectives of the revolutionary settlement which was expressed in the Declaration and Bill of Rights of 1689. In the 18th century Blackstone could write:

'Our law has therefore wisely placed this strong and two-fold barrier, of a presentment and a trial by jury, between the liberties of the people and the prerogative of the crown. It was necessary, for preserving the admirable balance of our constitution, to vest the executive power of the laws in the prince: and yet this power might be dangerous and destructive to that very constitution, if exerted without check or control, by justices of oyer and terminer occasionally named by the crown; who might then, as in France or Turkey, imprison, dispatch, or exile any man that was obnoxious to the government, by an instant declaration that such is their will and pleasure. But the founders of the English law have, with excellent forecast, contrived that * * * the truth of every accusation, whether preferred in the shape of indictment, information, or appeal, should afterwards be confirmed by the unani-

Page 152

mous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours, indifferently chosen and superior to all suspicion.'17

Jury trial came to America with English colonists, and received strong support from them. Royal interference with the jury trial was deeply resented. Among the resolutions adopted by the First Congress of the American Colonies (the Stamp Act Congress) on October 19, 1765—resolutions deemed by their authors to state 'the most essential rights and liberties of the colonists'18—was the declaration:

'That trial by jury is the inherent and invaluable right of every British subject in these colonies.'

The First Continental Congress, in the resolve of October 14, 1774, objected to trials before judges dependent upon the Crown alone for their salaries and to trials in England for alleged crimes committed in the colonies; the Congress therefore declared:

'That the respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England, and more especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according to the course of that law.'19

The Declaration of Independence stated solemn objections to the King's making 'judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries,' to his 'depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury,' and to his 'transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offenses.' The Constitution itself, in Art. III, § 2, commanded:

'The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall

Page 153

be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed.'

Objections to the Constitution because of the absence of a bill of rights were met by the immediate submission and adoption of the Bill of Rights. Included was the Sixth Amendment which, among other things, provided:

'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.'20

The constitutions adopted by the original States guaranteed jury trial. Also, the constitution of every State entering the Union thereafter in one form or another protected the right to jury trial in criminal cases.

Even such skeletal history is impressive support for considering the right to jury trial in criminal cases to be fundamental to our system of justice, an importance

Page 154

frequently recognized in the opinions of this Court. For example, the Court has said:

'Those who emigrated to this country from England brought with them this great privilege 'as their birthright and inheritance, as a part of that admirable common law which had fenced...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2989 practice notes
  • Colgrove v. Battin 8212 1442, No. 71
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 21, 1973
    ...Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 177, 72 S.Ct. 205, 212, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952) (Black, J., concurring). See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 169, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1457, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). Since some definition of 'jury' must be chosen, I would therefore rel......
  • Barber v. Ponte, No. 84-1750
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • September 18, 1985
    ...v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 84-85, 62 S.Ct. 457, 471, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942) (citing 2 Story Const. Sec. 1779). 2 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 3 The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1861-1874 (1976), specifically declares the cr......
  • Davis v. Warden, Joliet Correctional Inst. at Stateville, No. 88-1590
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • May 9, 1989
    ...motion to alter or amend the judgment and the respondent appealed. II. ANALYSIS A. Supreme Court Precedent In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1967), the Supreme Court extended the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury to defendants in state proceedings......
  • Emory v. Peeler, No. 83-8477
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)
    • April 8, 1985
    ...by the people." 7 The first amendment is made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Duncan v. State of Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1446-47, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). We have been pointed to no authority, nor have we found any, which holds that all r......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2978 cases
  • Colgrove v. Battin 8212 1442, No. 71
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 21, 1973
    ...Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 177, 72 S.Ct. 205, 212, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952) (Black, J., concurring). See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 169, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1457, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). Since some definition of 'jury' must be chosen, I would therefore rel......
  • Barber v. Ponte, No. 84-1750
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • September 18, 1985
    ...v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 84-85, 62 S.Ct. 457, 471, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942) (citing 2 Story Const. Sec. 1779). 2 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 3 The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1861-1874 (1976), specifically declares the cr......
  • Davis v. Warden, Joliet Correctional Inst. at Stateville, No. 88-1590
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • May 9, 1989
    ...motion to alter or amend the judgment and the respondent appealed. II. ANALYSIS A. Supreme Court Precedent In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1967), the Supreme Court extended the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury to defendants in state proceedings......
  • Emory v. Peeler, No. 83-8477
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)
    • April 8, 1985
    ...by the people." 7 The first amendment is made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Duncan v. State of Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1446-47, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). We have been pointed to no authority, nor have we found any, which holds that all r......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
12 books & journal articles
  • ICEBERG AHEAD: WHY COURTS SHOULD PRESUME BIAS IN CASES OF EXTRANEOUS JUROR CONTACTS.
    • United States
    • Case Western Reserve Law Review Vol. 72 Nbr. 2, December 2021
    • December 22, 2021
    ...See id. (noting some confusion regarding which acts of Parliament the Declaration of Independence referred to). (13.) Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968); see infra Part (14.) Compare Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 150 (1892) ("Private communications ... between jurors ......
  • Indigenous Subjects.
    • United States
    • Yale Law Journal Vol. 131 Nbr. 8, June 2022
    • June 1, 2022
    ...states. Whereas rights apply to the states if they are "necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty," Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14 (1968), personal rights are "fundamental" in the territories only if they are "the basis of all free government," CNMI v. Atalig,......
  • The Insular Cases Run Amok: Against Constitutional Exceptionalism in the Territories.
    • United States
    • Yale Law Journal Vol. 131 Nbr. 8, June 2022
    • June 1, 2022
    ...Supreme Court never weighed in on that question. See Morales v. Bd. of Registration, 33 P.R. 76 (1924). (92.) Sec Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (incorporating the right to a trial by jury into the Fourteenth Amendment). The right to an indictment by a grand jury still does not ap......
  • BEYOND STRICKLAND PREJUDICE: WEAVER, BATSON, AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT.
    • United States
    • University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 170 Nbr. 4, March 2022
    • March 1, 2022
    ...out a claim of race discrimination."). (138) Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2241. (139) Cf. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908. (140) Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the right to trial by jury against the (141) Id. ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT