Duncan v. Stephens
| Decision Date | 22 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. H-14-3125 |
| Parties | ADRIAN VINCENT DUNCAN, (TDCJ-CID #1711676) Petitioner, v. WILLIAM STEPHENS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Petitioner, Adrian Vincent Duncan, seeks habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a conviction in the 263rd Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas. Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment, (Docket Entry No. 13), and copies of the state court record. (Docket Entry Nos. 10, 11, & 17). Duncan has filed his response. (Docket Entry Nos. 15 & 16). After consideration of the motion and response, the record, and applicable authorities, the court grants respondent's motion. The reasons for this ruling are stated below.
A jury found Duncan guilty of the felony offense of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit theft. (Cause Number 1266187). Duncan pleaded true to the enhancement paragraphs relating to prior convictions for burglary of a building in Cause Number 567136 and theft in Cause Number 642604. On March 28, 2011, the jury sentenced Duncan to thirty-five years imprisonment. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed Duncan's conviction on April 3, 2012. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused Duncan's petition for discretionary review on August 22,2012. Duncan filed an application for state habeas corpus relief on May 7, 2013, which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied without written order on August 20, 2014. (Docket Entry No. 11-20, p. 1).
On October 31, 2014, this court received Duncan's federal petition. Duncan contends that his conviction is void for the following reasons:
(1) The State withheld exculpatory evidence;
(2) The evidence was legally insufficient;
(3) He was denied due process when the court of appeals affirmed the burglary conviction on a different statutory basis;
(4) His trial attorney, Steven Greenlee, was ineffective in:
x. failing to conduct an independent investigation, and
xi. failing to understand the law;(5) He was constructively denied representation under the Sixth Amendment due to his disagreements with Greenlee;
(6) The State's inadequate investigation denied him due process;
(7) The State allowed false testimony to go uncorrected;
(8) He was denied his right to a speedy trial; and
(9) The denial of bail denied him due process.
(Docket Entry No. 1, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, pp. 7-12).
"[C]ollateral review is different from direct review," Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633 (1993), and the writ of habeas corpus is "an extraordinary remedy," Id., reserved for those petitioners whom "society has grievously wronged." Id. at 634. It "is designed to guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice system." Id. (). It provides an important, but limited, examination of an inmate's conviction and sentence. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (). Accordingly, the federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner petitions is exceedingly narrow. "Indeed, federal courts do not sit as courts of appeal and error for state court convictions." Dillard v. Blackburn, 780 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1986). They must generally defer to state court decisions on the merits, Moore v. Cockrell, 313 F.3d 880, 881 (5th Cir. 2002), and on procedural grounds. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30(1991); Muniz v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 214, 220 (5th Cir. 1998). They may not grant relief to correct errors of state constitutional, statutory, orprocedural law, unless a federal issue is also present. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); West v. Johnson, 92 F.3d 1385, 1404 (5th Cir. 1996).
A federal court can only grant relief if "the state court's adjudication of the merits was 'contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,'" Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 378 (2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)), or "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2012). The focus of this well-developed standard "is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable - a substantially higher threshold." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007).
Moreover, the federal court's focus is on the state court's ultimate legal conclusion, not whether the state court considered and discussed every angle of the evidence. Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc); see also Catalan v. Cockrell, 315 F.3d 491, 493 (5th Cir. 2002) (). Indeed, state courts are presumed to know and follow the law. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537U.S. 19, 24 (2002). Factual findings, including credibility choices, are entitled to the statutory presumption, so long as they are not unreasonable "in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Further, factual determinations made by a state court enjoy a presumption of correctness which the petitioner can rebut only by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Clark v. Quarterman, 457 F.3d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 2006) (). The presumption of correctness applies not only to express findings of fact, but also to "unarticulated findings which are necessary to the statecourt's conclusions of mixed law and fact." Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 948 n.11 (5th Cir. 2001).
The AEDPA provides as follows, in pertinent part:
In sum, the federal writ serves as a "guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems," not as a vehicle for error correction. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). "If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be." Id.
While, "[a]s a general principle, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, relating to summary judgment, applies with equal force in the context of habeas corpus cases," Clark v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 764 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 831 (2000), the rule applies only to the extent that it does not conflict with the habeas rules. Section 2254(e)(1) - which mandates that findings of fact made by a state court are "presumed to be correct" - overrides the ordinary rule that, in a summary judgment proceeding, all disputed facts must be construed in the light most favorableto the nonmoving party. Unless the petitioner can "rebut[ ] the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence" as to the state court's findings of fact, those findings must be accepted as correct. Smith v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 661, 668 (5th Cir. 2002).
Duncan is a pro se petitioner. In this circuit pro se habeas petitions are construed liberally and are not held to the same stringent and rigorous standards as are pleadings filed by lawyers. See Martin v. Maxey, 98 F.3d 844, 847 n.4 (5th Cir. 1996); Guidroz v. Lynaugh, 852 F.2d 832, 834 (5th Cir. 1988); Woodall v. Foti, 648 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981). This court accords Duncan's state and federal habeas petitions a broad interpretation. Bledsue v. Johnson, 188 F.3d 250, 255 (5th Cir. 1999).
To prove an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a petitioner must satisfy both prongs of the test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-94 (1984), by showing not only constitutionally deficient performance by counsel, but also actual prejudice to his legal position. Motley v. Collins, 18 F.3d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1994) (). The Court need not address both components if the petitioner makes an insufficient showing on one. Strickland, 466U.S. at 697. To demonstrate deficiency, a petitioner must show that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687. A court considering such a claim "must apply a 'strong presumption' that counsel's representation was within the 'wide range' of reasonable professional assistance."...
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