Dunellen LLC v. Getty Properties Corp.
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
| Writing for the Court | Mary M. Lisi |
| Citation | Dunellen LLC v. Getty Properties Corp., 557 F.Supp.2d 263 (D. R.I. 2008) |
| Decision Date | 02 May 2008 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. 06-014-ML. |
| Parties | DUNELLEN LLC, Plaintiff, v. GETTY PROPERTIES CORP., Defendant. |
Gerald J. Petros, Mitchell R. Edwards, Hinckley, Allen & Snyder LLP, Providence, RI, for Plaintiff.
James W. Ryan, Robert K. Taylor, Partridge, Snow & Hahn LLP, Providence, RI, for Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on cross motions for partial summary judgment. The matter was originally filed in Rhode Island Superior Court and removed to this Court. Removal jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). This matter involves the question of whether an entity that has a usage interest in a pier is responsible for a portion of the expenses associated with the pier's upkeep.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).1 An issue is "genuine" if the pertinent evidence is such that a rational factfinder could resolve the issue in favor of either party, and a fact is "material" if it "has the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation under the applicable law." Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. Town. of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir.1995). Cross motions for summary judgment "simply require [the court] to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not disputed." Barnes v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, N.A., 370 F.3d 164, 170 (1st Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The moving party bears the burden of showing the Court that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Nat'l Amusements, 43 F.3d at 735. Once the movant has made the requisite showing, the nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The Court views all facts and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Continental Casualty Co. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 370 (1st Cir.1991). The legal standard for summary judgment is not changed when parties file cross motions for summary judgment. Adria International Group, Inc. v. Ferre Development, Inc., 241 F.3d 103 (1st Cir.2001). "The court must rule on each party's motion on an individual and separate basis, determining, for each side, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard." Bienkowski v. Northeastern University, 285 F.3d 138, 140 (1st Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiff, Dunellen, LLC, ("Plaintiff) is the current owner of the Wilkesbarre Pier ("Pier") which is located on the Seekonk River in the City of East Providence. Defendant, Getty Properties Corporation ("Defendant") has a right to use the north side of the Pier. The Pier has a long and complicated history of ownership, with various parties asserting a right of use, and has been the subject of previous litigation in this court and in the state courts. See generally Getty Petroleum Marketing, Inc. v. Capital Terminal Co., C.A. No. 00-381, slip op. (D.R.I Sept. 5, 2003); Providence and Worcester Co. v. Exxon Corporation, 116 R.I. 470, 359 A.2d 329 (1976).
The Pier was constructed in the 1870s and was originally used as a facility for unloading coal from deep water vessels. Later, it was used as a facility for offloading petroleum products. Since its construction, a number of different parties have owned the Pier and the underlying land. See generally Getty Petroleum Marketing, Inc.. C.A. No. 00-381 ("Getty I"); Providence and. Worcester Co., 359 A.2d 329. Over the years the users of the Pier have operated under the terms of several Pier Operating Agreements. In January 1991, Getty Petroleum Corp., Union Oil Company of California, Capital Properties, Inc. and Providence and Worcester Railroad Company ("P & W"), Plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest, entered into a Pier Operating Agreement. According to the agreement, the parties agreed to pay taxes and Pier repair expenses in proportion to their use of the Pier.
In March 1997, Getty Petroleum Corp. spun off its petroleum marketing business to Getty Petroleum Marketing, Inc.("Getty Marketing"). In connection with the spin off, Getty Petroleum changed its name to Getty Realty Corporation ("Getty Realty"). Following the Getty spin off, a dispute arose between P & W and Getty Realty involving the parties' respective Pier repair obligations. In October 1997 Getty Realty sent a letter to the other signatories of the 1991 Pier Operating Agreement and notified the parties, among other things, that it would be withdrawing from the 1991 Pier Operating Agreement effective April 1, 1998, and that it would cease using the Pier no later than December 31, 1997. In December 1997, Getty Realty and P & W entered into an agreement to settle an arbitration dispute involving the responsibility for the payment of Pier related expenses ("settlement agreement"). The settlement agreement provided, among other things, that Getty Realty was withdrawing from the 1991 Pier Operating Agreement and was making a lump sum payment to P & W representing its accrued and final obligations under the 1991 Pier Operating Agreement. The settlement agreement also provided that P & W agreed to execute a pier usage agreement with Getty Realty's tenant, Getty Marketing, known as the Throughput Agreement.2 From January 1, 1998, until March 2003, Getty Marketing used the Pier and made payments to Capital Terminal Company, ("Capital Terminal") another of Plaintiffs predecessor's in interest, pursuant to the Throughput Agreement.3
In August 2002, Defendant filed a second amended complaint against Capital Terminal, seeking a declaratory judgment confirming its right to use the north side of the Pier and appurtenant facilities. Plaintiff was added to that suit by stipulation of the parties. This Court determined that it was "undisputed" that Defendant had the right to use the north side of the Pier based upon a reservation of rights in a 1941 deed conveying the Pier, appurtenant facilities, and the underlying land, ("1941 deed"), and subsequent agreements. See Getty I, slip op. at 25.4 The Court declined to decide Defendant's obligations associated with its right to use the north side of the Pier. The Throughput Agreement expired in March 2003.
In 2003, Plaintiff developed a schedule of improvement projects for the Pier. Plaintiff has completed several of the projects. On November 10, 2005, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant requesting payment for half of the Pier expenses beginning in January 2003. On November 24, 2005, Defendant sent a letter to Plaintiff refusing to reimburse Plaintiff for any portion of the expenses. In December 2005, Plaintiff filed this suit against Defendant requesting a declaratory judgment to establish the obligations associated with Defendant's right to use the north side of the Pier. Defendant had not used the Pier since December 1997. Getty Marketing has not used the Pier since 2003. There is no pier operating agreement in effect.
In its motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff contends that Defendant's rights are "in the nature of an easement, which it uses in common with [Plaintiff], the [P]ier owner." Complaint at ¶ 14. Thus, Plaintiff argues that, because Defendant has an "easement" on the north side of the Pier, Defendant is responsible for the expenses associated with the upkeep of the Pier because, with the benefits of an easement, comes the burden of contributing to the expenses associated with its upkeep. Defendant counters that the Pier is personalty, not realty, and as such, Defendant does not have any obligation to pay expenses associated with the maintenance and repair of the Pier regardless of whether it is using the Pier. Defendant also argues that even if easement law can be applied by analogy to the Pier, case law demonstrates that Plaintiff is responsible for repairs and maintenance.
In its motion for summary judgment, Defendant reiterates its personalty argument and also argues that Plaintiffs claim is barred by res judicata and the settlement agreement. Plaintiff counters that its claim is not barred by res judicata or the settlement agreement and that the claim is governed by the law applicable to easements.
Plaintiff avers that Defendant's right to use the Pier is an easement and as the holder of an easement Defendant must pay a portion of any Pier-related expenses. Defendant counters that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has ruled that the Pier is personal property, thus, the scope of the right to use the Pier is defined like any other contract right—through an applicable agreement. See Providence & Worcester Co., 359 A.2d 329; see generally Rhode Island Economic Development Corp. v. The Parking Co., L.P., 892 A.2d 87, 107 (R.I.2006) () (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendant concludes that since there is no applicable agreement currently in effect between the parties imposing the obligation to pay Pier related expenses regardless of use, it is not responsible for any Pier related expenses.
Providence & Worcester Co. involved the parties predecessors' in interest5 and the "rights, status and other legal relations of the parties" with respect to the Pier. Providence & Worcester Co., 359 A.2d at 331. As part if its decision, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs "correctly perceived the meaning of the trial justice's order as requiring defendants to give plaintiffs a fee simple to personalty,...
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