Dunham v. Kootenai County

Decision Date10 February 2010
Docket NumberCase No. CV-09-129-N-BLW.
Citation690 F. Supp.2d 1162
PartiesBlair Winfield DUNHAM, Plaintiff, v. KOOTENAI COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Idaho

Larry Dean Purviance, Larry D. Purviance Attorney at Law, Hayden, ID, for Plaintiff.

Peter C. Erbland, Seann Michael Mumford, Paine Hamblen LLP, Coeur D'Alene, ID, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

B. LYNN WINMILL, Chief Judge.

INTRODUCTION

The Court has before it Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 20) and Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Augment Record (Docket No. 29). The Court heard oral argument on the motions on January 14, 2010 and now issues the following decision.

BACKGROUND

On May 21, 2008, Lisa Whitney contacted animal control Officer Karen Williams and told her that she recently purchased a horse from Blair Dunham. Whitney told Officer Williams that she was concerned about the condition of that horse, as well as other horses in Dunham's possession. (Williams Aff., ¶ 19.)

On May 25, 2008, David Carter also contacted animal control regarding Dunham. Mr. Carter told Officer Williams that he was concerned about the condition of several horses in Dunham's possession. Mr. Carter stated that the horses were located at 5630 W. Mallory Rd. (Williams Aff., ¶ 23.)

West Mallory Rd. runs east and west, and is located in rural Kootenai County, just east of Rathdrum, Idaho. The location is a 5.03-acre tract of land on the south side of W. Mallory Rd. Jay and Kathy Nelson own the property. (Dunham depo., pp. 92-93).

On May 27, 2008, Officer Williams went to the Nelsons' property to investigate the allegations of animal cruelty. (Williams Aff., ¶ 26.) Officer Williams parked her vehicle in the residential driveway and approached the residence to speak with someone inside. (Williams Aff., ¶ 27.) Officer Williams knocked on the door of the residence, but nobody answered. (Williams Aff., ¶ 28.) Officer Williams testified in her affidavit that at that point she could see horses located near the back of the property, as well as a second driveway that appeared to lead to their location. (Williams Aff., ¶ 27.) Using that driveway, Officer Williams drove her vehicle back to the horses. She testified in her affidavit that when she arrived at the location of the horses, she observed five horses in a round-pen which was approximately twenty feet in diameter. (Williams Aff., ¶ 29.) Inside the pen, she observed a water trough partially full of dirty, debris ridden, stagnant water. (Id.) She did not observe any evidence of feed in the pen or on the property. (Id.)

Officer Williams then physically examined each horse in the round-pen. She scored four of the five horses a 2.0 or lower on the Henneke Body Scoring System. (Williams Aff., ¶¶ 31-33.) Based upon the condition of the horses, and the conditions they were living in, Officer Williams testified in her affidavit that she was concerned for the horses, and that she believed they may be victims of animal abuse and/or animal neglect. (Williams Aff., ¶ 35.) Officer Williams then left the property without attempting to contact Dunham because, based upon her apparent prior experience with Dunham, she believed Dunham would remove the horses from the property. (Id.)

Officer Williams contacted Idaho Department of Agriculture Senior Livestock Investigator Amity Larsen. (Williams Aff., ¶ 36.; Larsen Aff., ¶ 14) Officer Williams asked Investigator Larsen to assist her in further investigating the condition of the horses. (Williams Aff., ¶ 29; Larsen Aff., ¶ 15.) On May 29, 2008, Officer Williams and Investigator Larsen went to the property. (Williams Aff., ¶ 37; Larsen Aff., ¶ 15.) Investigator Larsen testified in her affidavit that she could see the horses inside a fenced, wooded area from W. Mallory Rd. (Larsen Aff., ¶ 15.) As she pulled into the driveway, she could see additional horses located in a round-pen. (Larsen Aff., ¶ 16.) She and Officer Williams then turned down the second driveway and exited their vehicles. (Larsen Aff., ¶ 16.)

Officer Williams testified in her affidavit that at that point two of the horses which were originally inside the round-pen on May 27, 2008 were no longer present. However, she observed two other horses on the property which had not been there on her earlier visit. (Williams Aff., ¶ 37.) She and Investigator Larsen inspected the condition of the horses. (Williams Aff., ¶¶ 38-39; Larsen Aff., ¶ 18.) After inspecting the condition of the horses, Officer Williams returned to the round-pen, where she noted that the water level of the trough inside the round-pen had dropped to approximately three inches of dirty, debris ridden, stagnant water, and there was no evidence of any feed available to the horses inside the pen. (Williams Aff., ¶ 40.) Investigator Larsen examined the three horses in the round-pen. She gave two horses a score of 2.0 and one horse a score of 3.0 on the Henneke Body Scoring System. (Larsen Aff., ¶ 19.)

After observing the conditions inside the round-pen, Officer Williams contacted Dunham by telephone, and asked her to come to the property to speak with the officers regarding the condition of the horses. Dunham complied. (Williams Aff., ¶ 41.)

After speaking with Dunham, Officer Williams and Investigator Larsen visited Mary Ann Jennings, who had sold the horses to Dunham. (Williams Aff., ¶ 42.) Officer Williams and Investigator Larsen then returned to the Mallory property. (Williams Aff., ¶ 55; Larsen Aff., ¶ 36.

The officers determined that the three horses inside the round-pen were not receiving adequate nutrition and that they needed to be removed from the property pursuant to I.C. §§ 25-3504 and 25-3511. Officer Williams called Shirley Jones from Panhandle Equine Rescue, who then removed the three horses from the property. (Williams Aff., ¶¶ 55 & 58; Larsen Aff., ¶ 38.) Later, it was determined that Dunham had sold two of those horses, and those horses were given to their new owners when the Panhandle Equine Rescue Facility considered them healthy. (Dunham depo., pp. 139-140.)

On June 19, 2008, the Honorable Scott Wayman signed an Order Finding Probable Cause existed to believe Dunham committed three counts of cruelty to animals and three counts of permitting animals to go without care. (Mumford Aff., ¶ 3.) On the same day, a Criminal Complaint was filed against Dunham charging her with three counts of cruelty to animals and three counts of permitting animals to go without care. (Mumford Aff., ¶ 4.) The three counts of permitting animals to go without care were later dropped. (Mumford Aff., ¶ 5.) Dunham was tried and found not guilty of the remaining charges. (Mumford Aff. ¶ 6.) The remaining unsold horse was returned to Dunham.

Dunham did not reside at 5630 W. Mallory Rd. on May 27 and 29, 2008. However, the Nelsons gave Dunham complete access to their house, and they allowed her to keep her horses on the land. (Nelson Aff., ¶ 5.)

ANALYSIS
I. Summary Judgment Standard of Review

One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment "is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims...." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). It is "not a disfavored procedural shortcut," but is instead the "principal tool by which factually insufficient claims or defenses can be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private resources." Id. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548. "The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, and the Court must not make credibility findings. Id. Direct testimony of the non-movant must be believed, however implausible. Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir.1999). On the other hand, the Court is not required to adopt unreasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence. McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir.1988).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). To carry this burden, the moving party need not introduce any affirmative evidence (such as affidavits or deposition excerpts) but may simply point out the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir.2000).

This shifts the burden to the non-moving party to produce evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict in her favor. Id. at 256-57, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and show "by her affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file" that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. However, the Court is "not required to comb through the record to find some reason to deny a motion for summary judgment." Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting Forsberg v. Pac. Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1418 (9th Cir.1988)). Instead, the "party opposing summary judgment must direct the Court's attention to specific triable facts." Southern California Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.2003). Statements in a brief, unsupported by the record, cannot be used to create an issue of fact. Barnes v. Independent Auto. Dealers, 64 F.3d 1389, 1396 n. 3 (9th Cir.1995).

II. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants seek summary judgment on all claims in Dunham's Complaint. The Court will address each claim below.

A. Unreasonable Search and Seizure Claims

Dunham...

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