Duniver v. Clark Material Handling Co.
| Decision Date | 27 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1-20-0818 |
| Citation | 2021 IL App (1st) 200818,186 N.E.3d 564,452 Ill.Dec. 840 |
| Parties | Darrius DUNIVER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CLARK MATERIAL HANDLING COMPANY ; Battery Handling Systems, Inc.; Equipment Depot of Illinois, Inc.; and Neovia Logistics Services, LLC, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Michael Rathsack, Michael R. Grieco, and Michael E. Holden, all of Chicago, for appellant.
Julie A. Teuscher and Christopher Cassidy, of Cassiday Schade LLP, Kurt E. Olsen, of Krakar & Olsen, Brian W. Bell, Michael A. McCaskey, and Catherine B. Weiler, of Swanson, Martin & Bell, LLP, and Michael E. Kujawa and Deborah A. Ostvig, of Schain, Banks, Kenny & Schwartz, Ltd., all of Chicago, for appellees.
¶ 1 Plaintiff Darius Duniver filed a personal injury action against Clark Material Handling Company (Clark), Battery Handling Systems, Inc. (Battery Handling Systems), Equipment Depot of Illinois, Inc. (EDI), and Neovia Logistics Services, LLC (Neovia) (collectively, "Defendants"). The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding Duniver was judicially estopped and lacked standing to bring his claim because he failed to disclose his personal injury action to the bankruptcy court. Duniver appeals, arguing the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment. We find that Duniver received no significant benefit in the bankruptcy proceedings, he did not deliberately fail to disclose his personal injury claim to the bankruptcy court, and judicial estoppel is not warranted. Therefore, we reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 3 On July 30, 2017, Duniver was injured during his employment, resulting in the loss of his leg. While working on a forklift recently modified with changed batteries by Battery Handling Systems, Duniver alleged that his forklift suddenly reversed directions. He attempted to stop the forklift but claimed the forklift did not have a functioning emergency stop button. On January 16, 2019, Duniver filed a personal injury lawsuit against defendants in the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 4 On February 8, 2019, Duniver filed for voluntary Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois. One of the forms he was required to complete asked if he had any claims against third parties, regardless of whether he pursued legal action. Duniver responded, "No." Another schedule asked if there were any "Other contingent and unliquidated claims of every nature, including counterclaims of the debtor and rights to set off claims." Duniver marked "Yes" and described the claim as "Darrius Duniver Workman's Comp Desparti Law Group Rommiumicci & Blanch v." Duniver's statement of financial affairs required him to list all lawsuits and court actions to which he was a party. He disclosed a collection action but did not include this personal injury action.
¶ 5 On March 14, 2019, Duniver testified under oath in the bankruptcy proceeding, and confirmed that the petition and schedules were accurate and complete. When asked whether he was suing anyone, Duniver said "no." On July 24, 2019, the bankruptcy court entered an order that confirmed Duniver's Chapter 13 plan.
¶ 6 On September 10, 2019, Neovia moved for summary judgment in the personal injury suit. Neovia claimed Duniver's personal injury suit was barred by judicial estoppel, and he lacked standing under Illinois law because his personal injury claim was required to be brought by the bankruptcy estate. Clark, Battery Handling Systems, and EDI joined in the motion. In response, Duniver argued that he relied on his bankruptcy counsel to inform him of any inaccuracies and judicial estoppel was inapplicable because his failure to disclose the personal injury action was inadvertent.
¶ 7 On January 22, 2020, Duniver amended his Chapter 13 bankruptcy forms to include his personal injury lawsuit. On February 19, 2020, the bankruptcy court dismissed Duniver's bankruptcy case for failure to make confirmed plan payments.
¶ 8 The circuit court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on February 24, 2020. The circuit court found the elements of judicial estoppel were satisfied, and Duniver intentionally deceived the trustee in the bankruptcy proceeding.
¶ 9 Duniver filed a motion to reconsider the summary judgment ruling on March 24, 2020, and the motion was denied. Duniver filed a timely notice of appeal.
¶ 11 On appeal, Duniver argues judicial estoppel was inappropriate because defendants did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that his failure to list the personal injury claim resulted from an intention to deceive the bankruptcy court and the court erred in granting summary judgment. Duniver asks this court to reverse the circuit court's grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 12 We traditionally review the circuit court's discretionary rulings for an abuse of discretion, but where the circuit court's ruling on judicial estoppel terminates the litigation, our review is de novo. Seymour v. Collins , 2015 IL 118432, ¶¶ 48-49, 396 Ill.Dec. 135, 39 N.E.3d 961. This matter was resolved in the circuit court pursuant to summary judgment, and we review a circuit court's entry of summary judgment de novo. Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. Korzen , 2013 IL App (1st) 130380, ¶ 14, 377 Ill.Dec. 771, 2 N.E.3d 1052. De novo review is without deference to the trial court's judgment or reasoning." People v. Randall , 2016 IL App (1st) 143371, ¶ 44, 408 Ill.Dec. 64, 64 N.E.3d 1149. Summary judgment is appropriate if no material fact is in dispute, if reasonable persons could not draw differing "inferences from the undisputed material facts," and if reasonable persons could not "differ on the weight to be given the relevant factors of a legal standard." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Seymour , 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 42, 396 Ill.Dec. 135, 39 N.E.3d 961. In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we strictly construe the record against the movant and view it in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. ¶ 49. Summary judgment is a drastic measure and should only be granted if the movant's right to judgment is clear and free from doubt. Id.
¶ 13 The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a party from taking contradictory positions in separate judicial proceedings. Moy v. Ng , 371 Ill. App. 3d 957, 962, 309 Ill.Dec. 511, 864 N.E.2d 752 (2007). Judicial estoppel aims "to protect the integrity of the judicial process, [citation], by prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New Hampshire v. Maine , 532 U.S. 742, 749-50, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001). Our supreme court has identified the prerequisites to determine whether judicial estoppel applies. Seymour , 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 37, 396 Ill.Dec. 135, 39 N.E.3d 961. The party to be estopped must have "(1) taken two positions, (2) that are factually inconsistent, (3) in separate judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings, (4) intending for the trier of fact to accept the truth of the facts alleged, and (5) have succeeded in the first proceeding and received some benefit from it." Id. We review these factors de novo. Id. ¶ 49.
¶ 14 If all prerequisites have been established, the court must then determine whether judicial estoppel should be applied. Id. Multiple factors may affect that decision, including the significance or impact of the party's action in the first proceeding and "whether there was an intent to deceive or mislead, as opposed to the prior position having been the result of inadvertence or mistake." Id.
¶ 15 As a preliminary matter, defendants argue in the alternative that Duniver lacked standing to pursue his personal injury lawsuit in his own name. Defendants contend that because Duniver's bankruptcy case was dismissed, he can no longer request permission from the bankruptcy court to pursue his personal injury lawsuit on behalf of his estate. In response, Duniver claims the circuit court already established he has standing. The circuit court entered a memorandum opinion on February 24, 2020, acknowledging that Duniver could still obtain permission from the bankruptcy court but found that it would be "futile in light of the ruling with regard to judicial estoppel." In similar cases, we have found that standing can revest in the debtor when the bankruptcy trustee abandons the personal injury claim. See Johnson v. Fuller Family Holdings, LLC , 2017 IL App (1st) 162130, ¶ 29, 418 Ill.Dec. 836, 91 N.E.3d 537 ; Board of Managers of the 1120 Club Condominium Ass'n v. 1120 Club, LLC , 2016 IL App (1st) 143849, ¶ 42, 408 Ill.Dec. 858, 66 N.E.3d 863. Here, the bankruptcy trustee did not abandon the personal injury claim; Duniver's bankruptcy was dismissed. The dismissal of Duniver's Chapter 13 bankruptcy, in effect, revested his standing. Therefore, we find that Duniver had standing to pursue his personal injury claim.
¶ 16 We must next determine whether judicial estoppel supported the grant of summary judgment. The dispositive issue in this case is whether the plaintiff intentionally failed to disclose his personal injury claim to the bankruptcy court, but we first examine the five elements of judicial estoppel to determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence to support its application. Davis v. Pace Suburban Bus Division of the Regional Transportation Authority , 2021 IL App (1st) 200519, ¶ 39, ––– Ill.Dec. ––––, ––– N.E.3d ––––. Duniver does not dispute that his actions satisfy four of the five elements. Duniver satisfied the first and second elements by taking two factually inconsistent positions when he made the attestation that he had no claims against third parties during his bankruptcy proceeding. Duniver satisfied the third element by...
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