Dunn, Matter of, 49277

• Decision Date: 25 October 1985
• Docket Number: No. 49277,49277
• Citation: 238 Kan. 31,707 P.2d 1076
• Parties: In the Matter of Edward S. DUNN, Petitioner.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 1076

707 P.2d 1076

238 Kan. 31

In the Matter of Edward S. DUNN, Petitioner.

No. 49277.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Oct. 25, 1985.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Factors to be considered in determining whether a former attorney should be readmitted to the practice of law include: (1) the present moral fitness of the petitioner; (2) the demonstrated consciousness of the wrongful conduct and disrepute which the conduct has brought to the profession; (3) the extent of petitioner's rehabilitation; (4) the seriousness of the original misconduct; (5) conduct subsequent to discipline; (6) the time elapsed since the original discipline; (7) the petitioner's character, maturity and experience at the time of the original discipline; and (8) the petitioner's present competence in legal skills. Following State v. Russo, 230 Kan. 5, 630 P.2d 711 (1981).

2. The seriousness of the underlying offense which led to the prior discipline may, as a threshold matter, preclude reinstatement such that further inquiry as to rehabilitation of the petitioner is not warranted. Following State v. Russo, 230 Kan. 5, 630 P.2d 711 (1981).

3. To deny, as a threshold matter, consideration of reinstatement based upon the original misconduct requires that it be of such seriousness and nature that the possibility of rehabilitation is remote and that the protection of the public and the preservation of the ethical and moral standards of the legal profession preclude reinstatement.

Roger Walter, Disciplinary Counsel, Topeka, argued for the State of Kansas, respondent.

Wayne T. Stratton, of Goodell, Stratton, Edmonds & Palmer, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Thomas L. Bell, of the same firm, and Thomas E. King, of Morris, Larson King, Stamper and Bold, of Kansas City, Missouri, and Donald H. Loudon, of the same firm, were with him on the Memorandum for petitioner.

PER CURIAM:

Edward S. Dunn, of Holton, Kansas, has petitioned this court for reinstatement to the practice of law in the State of Kansas. Mr. Dunn was indefinitely suspended from practice by this Court on the 23rd day of September, 1977. In re Dunn, 223 Kan. 9, 569 P.2d 366 (1977). Petitioner's suspension resulted from his plea of nolo contendere following plea negotiations in federal district court to one count of filing a false and fraudulent federal income tax return.

Upon receipt of the petition for reinstatement, it was referred to the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys for investigation, hearing and recommendations. A three member panel of the Board undertook such investigation and hearing and on December 12, 1984, filed its report with the Clerk of the Appellate Courts wherein a majority of the panel recommended that petitioner be reinstated to the practice of law. In arriving at its recommendations, the panel relied upon State v. Russo, 230 Kan. 5, 630 P.2d 711 (1981), in concluding that Mr. Dunn had been rehabilitated to the extent that he should be reinstated to the practice of law. In Russo we set forth eight factors which should be considered in any reinstatement action. We held:

"Factors to be considered in determining whether a former attorney should be readmitted to the practice of law include: (1) the present moral fitness of the petitioner; (2) the demonstrated consciousness of the wrongful conduct and disrepute which the conduct has brought the profession; (3) the extent of petitioner's rehabilitation; (4) the seriousness of the original misconduct; (5) conduct subsequent to discipline; (6) the time elapsed since the original discipline; (7) the petitioner's character, maturity and experience at the time of the original discipline; and (8) the petitioner's present competence in legal skills." Syl. p 4.

We also determined that the nature and seriousness of the original conduct which led to disbarment or suspension may, as a threshold matter, be such as to preclude reinstatement. In doing so, we held:

"The seriousness of the underlying offense which led to the prior discipline may, as a threshold matter, preclude reinstatement such that further inquiry as to rehabilitation of the petitioner is not warranted." Syl. p 5.

To deny, as a threshold matter, consideration of reinstatement based upon the original misconduct requires that it be of such seriousness and nature that the possibility of rehabilitation is remote and that the...