Dunn v. City of Emporia, 53621

Decision Date22 April 1982
Docket NumberNo. 53621,53621
PartiesRobin R. DUNN, Appellant, v. CITY OF EMPORIA, Kansas, Appellee.
CourtKansas Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court

1. Under K.S.A. 60-518, actions "commenced within due time," in which the plaintiff fails other than upon the merits, may be refiled within six months without regard to otherwise applicable statutes of limitations.

2. In order to qualify as an action "commenced within due time" under K.S.A. 60-518, service of process must have been effected in the time and manner prescribed by the applicable statute.

3. To commence an action against a Kansas city, service must be made by serving the clerk or mayor, all as prescribed by K.S.A. 60-304(d ).

4. Before irregularities or omissions in service of process can be cured under K.S.A. 60-204, there must be substantial compliance with some method of process provided in K.S.A. 60-301, et seq.

5. In an action against a city, service of process on the city attorney, rather than on the clerk or mayor as required by law, is void, not voidable, and is insufficient to "commence" an action under K.S.A. 60-518.

6. In an action filed beyond the statute of limitations, it is held : (a) A previous identical action against the city was not "commenced within due time" under K.S.A. 60-518, where service was made upon the city attorney and not upon the mayor or clerk as required by K.S.A. 60-304(d ); (b) such service on the city attorney was void, not merely voidable; and (c) the provisions of K.S.A. 60-518 being inapplicable to extend the statute of limitations, the action of the trial court in dismissing this cause was proper.

Thomas E. Gleason, Jr., of Thomas E. Gleason, Chartered, Ottawa, for appellant.

Dale W. Bell, of Guy, Helbert, Bell & Smith, Chartered, Emporia, for appellee.

Before FOTH, C. J., presiding, TERRY L. BULLOCK, District Judge, and FREDERICK WOLESLAGEL, District Judge Retired, assigned.

BULLOCK, District Judge:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the trial court dismissing plaintiff's personal injury action on the grounds that it had not been commenced within the applicable statute of limitations. The material facts are undisputed.

On October 10, 1977, plaintiff, Robin R. Dunn, "stepped into a meter tile causing injuries to herself." Thereafter, she filed a timely claim with the City of Emporia, which was denied.

On October 10, 1979, exactly two years after the incident, plaintiff filed a petition in the Lyon County District Court which was assigned case No. 79C602 (Dunn I ). Paragraph one of the petition stated that service could be had upon the defendant city by serving the city clerk or mayor. Thomas E. Gleason, Jr., plaintiff's attorney, testified that he personally brought the petition to the office of the clerk of the court to be filed. He further stated:

"(I) spoke at the time of filing with one of the personnel in the clerk's office. I do not know-I do not have a conscious recollection of which person it was to whom I spoke.

"I suggested to the clerk that she might determine the City's normal procedure in receiving service of summons and that the procedure might be carried out. The clerk's office, whoever I spoke to, indicated that that would be all right. Having left the Petition and service and copy, and receiving a receipt for the filing fee, I left and returned to Ottawa. I at no time suggested by word, design or deed, or omission thereof, that service should be accomplished by service upon the city attorney."

When summons was issued, however, it was directed to the City of Emporia by serving the city attorney, Merlin Wheeler. The Return of Service indicates Mr. Wheeler was served personally.

The City answered on November 13, 1979. Among the affirmative defenses raised by the City in that answer was improper service of process. At this time, plaintiff had about 60 days remaining under K.S.A. 60-203 to check the clerk's file, discover the inadequate service and obtain service on the clerk or mayor. Instead, plaintiff ignored the warning of defendant's answer and merely replied, on November 28, 1979, denying all affirmative defenses.

On November 13, 1980, Dunn I was dismissed for lack of prosecution, the court not having ruled on any of the affirmative defenses presented in defendant's answer. On December 22, 1980, the petition in this case, alleging the same cause of action and assigned case No. 80C1074 (Dunn II ), was filed. Praecipe for summons in Dunn II was directed to the city clerk of the City of Emporia and the return of service indicates the clerk was personally served.

On February 11, 1981, defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging (1) that the petition in Dunn II failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and (2) a violation of the statute of limitations. Following a hearing and arguments of counsel, the trial court granted the City's motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds. This appeal followed. Plaintiff raises two points on appeal for our review:

1. Did service of process on the city attorney constitute substantial compliance with the provisions of K.S.A. 60-304(d )?

2. Was service of process on the city attorney, even if not in substantial compliance with K.S.A. 60-304(d ), merely voidable and therefore sufficient to "commence" an action for purposes of K.S.A. 60-518?

We will discuss these issues in the order presented.

1. The petition in Dunn II was clearly filed outside the applicable two year statute of limitation period. That period expired on October 10, 1979, and the Dunn II petition was not filed until December 22, 1980. However, K.S.A. 60-518 provides:

"If any action be commenced within due time, and the plaintiff fail in such action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited for the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or, if the plaintiff die, and the cause of action survive, his or her representatives may commence a new action within six (6) months after such failure." Emphasis added.

Thus, if Dunn I was "commenced within due time," Dunn II would not be violative of the statute of limitations inasmuch as it would have been commenced within six months of the dismissal of Dunn I for lack of prosecution, a dismissal clearly "otherwise than upon the merits."

The "due time" for commencement of an action, referred to in K.S.A. 60-518, is governed by K.S.A. 60-203:

"A civil action is commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the court, provided service of process is obtained or the first publication is made for service by publication, within ninety (90) days after the petition is filed; otherwise the action is deemed commenced at the time of service of process or first publication. An entry of appearance shall have the same effect as service."

The petition in Dunn I was filed October 10, 1979, and service of process was had on the city attorney on a date which is undisclosed but which was clearly within ninety days of the filing of the petition. The question for review thus becomes: Was this service of process sufficient to "commence" the action?

The statutory method for service of process applicable to the case at issue is K.S.A. 60-304(d ), which provides in relevant part:

"Service shall be made as follows:

"(d ) Governmental bodies. ... (U)pon a city, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the petition to the clerk or the mayor ...."

As previously noted, service in Dunn I admittedly was not made upon the clerk or the mayor. Plaintiff nonetheless points to K.S.A. 60-204, which provides:

"The methods of serving process as set forth in article 3 of this chapter shall constitute sufficient service of process in all civil actions and special proceedings, but they shall be alternative to, and not in restriction of different methods specifically provided by law. In any method of serving process, substantial compliance therewith shall effect valid service of process if the court finds that, notwithstanding some irregularity or omission, the party served was made aware that an action or proceeding was pending in a specified court in which his or her person, status or property were subject to being affected."

Plaintiff argues that under the facts of Dunn I, service on the city attorney constituted "substantial compliance" with the method specified in K.S.A. 60-304(d ) and that, inasmuch as the City of Emporia was made aware the action was pending, the service should be held valid.

K.S.A. 60-204 was first discussed in Briscoe v. Getto, 204 Kan. 254, 462 P.2d 127 (1969). In Briscoe, an order of garnishment was directed to B. J. Kingdon as the individual employer of the judgment debtor. The order was served on Kingdon's secretary. No answer was filed and the judgment creditor sought judgment against Kingdon as a nonanswering garnishee. The trial court denied judgment on the grounds that the garnishment had not been properly served on Kingdon. The supreme court affirmed, holding:

"Service of process is the statutory method of obtaining jurisdiction over the person of a defendant and the method of service provided by statute must be substantially complied with. In Butler County Comm'rs v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 169 Kan. 225, 227, 217 P.2d 1070, we stated:

" 'In any action, it is essential that the trial court have jurisdiction not only over the subject matter thereof, but of the parties to the action. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be acquired only by issuance and service of process in the method prescribed by the statute or by voluntary appearance, and this statutory method is exclusive of any other method of service....'

"The appellants contend:

" 'It is obvious from the wording of the section (K.S.A. 60-204) that the legislature intended and has plainly stated that in any case where there is an irregularity, such as a service of process on an individual at his place of business by serving his secretary, the...

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17 cases
  • Kuhn v. Schmidt
    • United States
    • Kansas Court of Appeals
    • 30 Marzo 2012
    ...Kansas Supreme Court recognized the legislature enacted K.S.A. 60–203(b) to prevent that harsh result and pointed to Dunn v. City of Emporia, 7 Kan.App.2d 445, 643 P.2d 1137,rev. denied 231 Kan. 799 (1982), as an example of the sort of inequitable outcome to be avoided. Hughes, 240 Kan. at ......
  • Giles v. Adobe Royalty, Inc.
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    • 8 Junio 1984
    ..."[l]ack of valid service ... deprives the court of jurisdiction and the judgment may be attacked at any time." Dunn v. City of Emporia, 7 Kan.App.2d 445, 452, 643 P.2d 1137 (1982). Thus, if the notice was constitutionally defective in this case, the 1936 foreclosure proceedings are void as ......
  • Ford v. Willits
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    • 27 Septiembre 1984
    ...Futures, Ltd., 233 Kan. 324, 338, 662 P.2d 553 (1983) [lack of personal jurisdiction rendered judgment void]; Dunn v. City of Emporia, 7 Kan.App.2d 445, 643 P.2d 1137, rev. denied 231 Kan. 799 (1982) [improper service in an action against a city was void, not merely voidable]. In addition, ......
  • Hopkins v. State
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    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • 2 Julio 1985
    ...an amendment of a responsive pleading. K.S.A. 60-212(h). The issue of improper service upon a city was considered in Dunn v. City of Emporia, 7 Kan.App.2d 445, 643 P.2d 1137, rev. denied 231 Kan. 799 (1982). There, as here, service was made on the city attorney rather than the clerk or mayo......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Walking the Legal Tightrope: Serving Timely Process When Filing State Claims in Federal Court
    • United States
    • Kansas Bar Association KBA Bar Journal No. 73-9, September 2004
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    ...avoid the outcome in Bray v. Bayles, 618 P.2d 807 (Kan. 1980), Briscoe v. Getto, 462 P.2d 127 (Kan. 1969), and Dunn v. City of Emporia, 643 P.2d 1137 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982). Gard and Casad, 4 Kansas Law and Practice, Kansas C. of Civ. Proc. Ann. § 60-203, p. 13 (4th ed. 2003). The courts in t......

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